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iA BENEFIT-FOCUSED ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
HEALTH RIGHTS
ABSTRACT:
Socio-economic rights have the potential to contribute to the achievement of social
justice through insisting on the satisfaction of vital material needs.  However, their
effectiveness in this regard is compromised when they are incapable of tangibly
contributing to the satisfaction of the needs that they represent.  By including justiciable
socio-economic rights in the text of the 1996 South African Constitution, its drafters
indicated that South Africans are entitled to demand effective relief that amounts to
adequate reparation for the harm suffered through the non-satisfaction of their vital
material needs.  The legitimacy of the constitutional order partially depends on the
ability of socio-economic rights to live up to this promise.  This dissertation examines
the extent of this promise and the extent to which it is currently being fulfilled, in relation
to a discrete set of rights - those that operate together to achieve the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.  I argue that successful reliance on health-
related rights in litigation must, in appropriate circumstances, produce tangible benefits
for individual rights-bearers.  I explore the extent to which constitutional health rights
may realistically be expected to render tangible benefits, examine the degree to which
this potential of health rights is realised through current judicial approaches to their
vindication and suggest manners in which such approaches may be modified and/or
supplemented in order for tangible benefits to result more readily from successful
vindication of health rights.  In doing this, I attempt to show that a benefit-orientated
approach to the interpretation and enforcement of health rights is not only required, but
also facilitated by the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution.  Moreover, the Bill of
Rights enables South African courts to interpret and enforce health rights in
accordance with their benefit-rendering potential, without overextending judicial
capabilities or transgressing the institutional boundaries of the judicial function.  Courts
are accordingly implored to acknowledge and affirm the justiciable nature of health-
related rights and to adopt interpretative, evaluative and remedial practices that enable
their tangible vindication in appropriate circumstances.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AWARDING RIGHTS-STATUS TO SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CLAIMS
1
(a) Rights talk, needs talk and the challenge for socio-economic
rights
1
(b) The inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the
South African Constitution
6
(c) Enforcing justiciable socio-economic rights 9
1.2 PREMISES AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS DISSERTATION 11
CHAPTER 2: CONTENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW RIGHT TO HEALTH
2.1 INTRODUCTION: THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 22
2.2 CONTENT OF THE HEALTH RIGHTS PACKAGE 27
(a) Health-related freedoms 28
(b) Health-related entitlements 29
(c) Equality 34
2.3 OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 37
(a) The ‘tripartite typology of interdependent duties’ 39
(b) Minimum core obligations 41
2.4 SUMMARY: ENTITLEMENTS IMPLIED BY THE HEALTH RIGHTS PACKAGE 45
CHAPTER 3: HEALTH RIGHTS IN THE 1996 CONSTITUTION
3.1 BASIC FEATURES OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND A BENEFIT-FOCUSED
APPROACH TO HEALTH RIGHTS
48
3.2 THE HEALTH RIGHTS PACKAGE IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS 58
(a) Health-related freedoms 58
(b) Equality 61
(c) Health-related entitlements: Rights to determinants of health 65
iii
(d) Health-related entitlements: Rights to health care goods,
services and facilities
67
(i) The generic right of access to health care services 68
(ii) Priority-rights to specific health care services, goods and
facilities
79
3.4 SUMMARY: THE POTENTIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH RIGHTS
TO RENDER TANGIBLE BENEFITS
83
CHAPTER 4: HEALTH RIGHTS IN THE COURTS
4.1 GENERAL 86
4.2 SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE FROM A BENEFIT-
FOCUSED PERSPECTIVE
87
(a) Decisions concerning the right to have access to health care
services
89
(b) Decisions concerning the right to equality 110
(c) Decisions concerning the right not to be refused emergency
medical treatment
111
(d) Decisions concerning the right of children to basic health care
services
113
(e) Decisions concerning the right of detainees to adequate
medical treatment
116
(f) Evaluation 119
4.3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LIMITS OF SOUTH AFRICAN
HEALTH RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
121
(a) Institutional constraints 122
(b) Beyond institutional constraints 132
CHAPTER 5: ALTERNATIVES AND SUPPLEMENTS TO CURRENT
JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO HEALTH RIGHTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BEYOND GROOTBOOM REASONABLENESS 138
5.2 DIRECTLY REMEDYING INFRINGEMENTS OF HEALTH RIGHTS: TOWARDS
ENFORCEABLE ENTITLEMENTS
140
5.3 GIVING EFFECT TO HEALTH RIGHTS THROUGH DEVELOPING THE COMMON
LAW
150
iv
(a) The common law and s 12(2) 153
(b) The common law and s 27(1)(a) 155
(i) Access to care 155
(ii) Quality of care 159
(c) The common law and s 27(3) 163
(d) The common law and s 28(1)(c) 167
(i) Parental responsibility for child health 167
(ii) Parental co-operation in facilitating children’s access
to health care services
170
5.4 CONCLUSION: SUPPLEMENTING GROOTBOOM REASONABLENESS 174
CHAPTER 6: THE IMPACT OF HEALTH RIGHTS
6.1 THE SATISFACTION OF HEALTH-RELATED NEEDS AND THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY
175
6.2 THE ‘DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLE EFFECT’ OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH RIGHTS 177
6.3 CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH RIGHTS AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
RIGHT TO HEALTH: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THIS DISSERTATION
184
6.4 TOWARDS A BENEFIT-ORIENTED APPROACH TO HEALTH RIGHTS:
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
187
6.5 CONCLUSION 194
ANNEXURE A: TEXT OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATY PROVISIONS SURVEYED IN CHAPTER 2
197
BIBLIOGRAPHY 202
TABLE OF CASES 225
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF STATUTES 229
OTHER SOURCES 230
1On the use of liberal rights to frustrate social reform efforts, see Andre Du Toit
‘Understanding rights discourses and ideological conflicts in South Africa’ in Hugh Corder (ed)
Essays on Law and Social Practice in South Africa (1988) 237 at 252; 257; Morton J Horwitz
‘Rights’ (1988) 23 Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties LR 393 at 395; 398; 405-406; William H
Simon ‘Rights and redistribution in the welfare system’ (1986) 38 Stanford LR 1431 at 1432-
1435; Robin West ‘Rights, Capabilities and the Good Society’ (2001) 69 Fordham LR 1901 at
1904-1907; 1914-1915.
2See, for instance, the arguments of Frank I Michelman ‘The Supreme Court 1968 term:
Foreword: On protecting the poor through the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1969) 83 Harvard LR 7
at 7-8; 13-14; 33-39 in relation to the use of equal protection doctrine in poverty-alleviation cases
before the United States Supreme Court in the late 1960s.  Michelman argued that the success
of legal measures aimed at alleviating social hardship would depend on their ability to address
the actual, physical needs of the people that they aim to protect and advance.  He showed that
courts run the risk of rendering such needs extrinsic by demanding their incorporation in abstract
and relational legal standards.  Unless an approach was adopted that identified certain core
social needs and attempted directly to satisfy them, he warned, legal tools aimed at alleviating
social hardship would be only partially successful.  This argument is appropriated in the South
African context by Danie Brand ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights
jurisprudence, or “what are socio-economic rights for?”’ in Henk Botha et al (eds) Rights and
Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 at 35-37; Andre van der Walt ‘A South
African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social justice’ in Botha et al (ibid) 163 at 178;
182-183; 193; 196; 198-199.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AWARDING RIGHTS-STATUS TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CLAIMS
(a) Rights talk, needs talk and the challenge for socio-economic rights
The claim that human rights have the potential to alleviate socio-economic
hardship, and hence to bring about meaningful social change, has historically
been received with a measure of skepticism.  This is not only because liberal
rights have often been utilised to thwart state efforts at social redistribution1 but
also because of the tendencies of rights discourse towards abstraction and
proceduralisation, which often have the effect of removing the focus of rights-
based litigation from the concrete experiences of material deprivation at its
centre.2  For these reasons, among others, scholars affiliated to the Critical
Legal Studies movement in the mid 1980s suggested that focusing on needs
rather than rights would better serve the quest for social justice and would be
3See especially Mark Tushnet ‘An essay on rights’ (1984) 62 Texas LR 1363-1403.  See
also the summary of the CLS argument by Van der Walt op cit note 2 at 197.
4See especially Patricia J Williams ‘Alchemical notes: Reconstructing ideals from
deconstructed rights’ (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties LR 401 at 412-413.
5‘[A] claim which can neither be established as justified by some common decision
procedure nor is capable of being enforced or protected as such, does not qualify as a “right” in
any serious sense’. Du Toit op cit note 1 at 256.  See also Simon op cit note 1 at 1431.
6Bruce A Ackerman Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980) at 5 conceives of rights as
political tools with which to express justified and legitimate claims to social goods within societal
dialogues and power struggles.  In its Dworkinian formulation, rights are accordingly depicted
as ‘trumps’ over competing social claims.  Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) at
199.  See further Du Toit op cit note 1 at 251-255; Horwitz op cit note 1 at 395; Alicia Ely Yamin
‘Defining questions: Situating issues of power in the formulation of a right to health under
international law’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 398 at 402-403.
7Dworkin op cit note 6 at 200; 204; 269.  See also generally David Bilchitz ‘Towards a
reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic
rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 at 23; Etienne Mureinik ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries:
Economic rights in the Constitution’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 464 at 471-473.
8Mario Gomez ‘Social economic rights and human rights commissions’ (1995) 17 Human
Rights Quarterly 155 at 167; Sheetal B Shah ‘Illuminating the possible in the developing world:
Guaranteeing the human right to health in India’ (1999) 32 Vanderbilt J of Transnational Law 435
at 440-441; Van der Walt op cit note 2 at 197; Williams op cit note 4 at 411-412; 416; Yamin op
cit note 6 at 398; 401-403.
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more effective in securing discernible social benefits for poor and marginalised
sectors of society.3
But, in response, it has been shown that a mere articulation of need
would more often than not be powerless to satisfy such need, in the absence of
an effective political tool through which denial of need may be confronted.4
Since the objects of rights may (unlike the satisfaction of ‘mere’ needs) typically
be demanded through the legal process, rights discourse presents one of the
only viable political tools in this respect.5  Articulating claims to social goods as
rights clothes the interests that the claims represent in a measure of political
significance that is lacking in other interests which have not similarly been
elevated to the status of right.6  Rights entail enforceable obligations for those
against whom they are claimed and demand justification for their non-fulfilment.7
Rights-terminology is accordingly instrumental in reconceptualising needs as
entitlements rather than aspirations and in ensuring that the satisfaction of such
needs becomes a societal priority.8
In particular, socio-economic rights (which award entitlements to goods
and services that are essential for human survival and flourishing) appear
capable of effectively reconciling notions of right and need and accordingly of
9The notion of socio-economic rights was initially associated with socialist political
ideology.  Socio-economic rights are accordingly depicted by opponents of socialism as inimical
to the value of individual liberty and to respect for civil and political rights.  This opposition
resonates with contemporary depictions of socio-economic rights in neo-liberal discourse as
opposed to the structures of the free market, frustrative of economic growth and devaluing of
civil liberties.  For critical discussion of these arguments see, for example, Philip Alston
‘Economic and social rights in the international arena’ (1998) 1(2) ESR Review 2; AC Basson
‘Die ontwikkeling van ekonomiese regte’ (1994) 9 SA Public Law 94 at 97; 106-108; Matthew CR
Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on
its Development (1995) at 11; Asbjørn Eide ‘Freedom from want: Taking economic and social
rights seriously’ in Barend van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Lie (eds) Reflections on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: A Fiftieth Anniversary Anthology (1998) 121 at 126; Gomez op cit
note 8 at 161; Marius Pieterse ‘Beyond the welfare state: Globalization of neo-liberal culture and
the constitutional protection of social and economic rights in South Africa’ (2003) 14
Stellenbosch LR 3 at 5; 7; 12-13 and authorities cited there.
10Critically observed by Rolf Künnemann ‘A coherent approach to human rights’ (1995)
17 Human Rights Quarterly 323 at 333; Shah op cit note 8 at 445; Henry J Steiner & Philip
Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2000) at 237.
11These distinctions are set out and defended by, for instance, Marc Bossuyt
‘International human rights systems: Strengths and weaknesses’ in Kathleen E Mahoney & Paul
Mahoney Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century: A Global Challenge (1993) 47 at 52-55, who
concludes from them that it is artificial and counter-productive to view socio-economic
aspirations as rights.
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contributing to the achievement of an ultimately more just society, in which the
human dignity of all citizens is equally respected and affirmed.  However, the
very notion of socio-economic rights has through the years encountered much
ideological opposition9 and discursive devaluation.  In particular, socio-economic
rights have often been characterised by opponents of their enforcement as
moral aspirations rather than enforceable human rights10 - the latter term
typically being reserved for civil and political rights.  This has historically been
justified with reference to perceived differences between these two ‘categories’
of rights.  It has for instance been argued that civil and political rights are
ideologically neutral and conceptually certain, impose only duties of non-
interference on states and do not entail any significant state expenses, whereas
socio-economic rights embody vague, ideologically loaded and resource-
intensive claims that require positive state action for their fulfillment.11
These differences are, of course, for the most part fallacious.  It has
authoritatively been illustrated that both civil and political and socio-economic
rights engender a mixture of positive and negative state-obligations and involve
different degrees of policy-interference, budgetary priority-setting and cost-
12See Bertus De Villiers ‘Socio-economic rights in a new constitution: Critical evaluation
of the recommendations of the South African Law Commission’ (1992) TSAR 421at 425-426;
Pierre De Vos ‘The economic and social rights of children and South Africa’s transitional
Constitution’ (1995) 10 SA Public Law 233 at 236-244; Pierre De Vos ‘Pious wishes or directly
enforceable human rights?: Social and economic rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’
(1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 68-71; Asbjørn Eide ‘Economic, social and cultural rights as human
rights’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (1995) at
22-23; Maria Green ‘What we talk about when we talk about indicators: Current approaches to
human rights measurement’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 1062 at 1076; Nicholas Haysom
‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-economic rights’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 451 at
457-458; Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein The Cost of Rights (2000); Künnemann op cit note
10 at 333; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Social and economic rights: A critical challenge’ in Sandra
Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective (1995) 79 at 83-85;
Mureinik op cit note 7 at 465-468; Geraldine Van Bueren ‘Alleviating poverty through the
Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 52 at 61; GJH Van Hoof ‘The legal nature of economic,
social and cultural rights: A rebuttal of some traditional views’ in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds)
The Right to Food (1984) 97 at 103-105.
13See Haysom op cit note 12 at 452; Christof Heyns & Danie Brand ‘Introduction to
socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ (1998) 2 Law, Democracy &
Development 153 at 154; Mureinik op cit note 7 at 465; Craig Scott ‘The interdependence and
permeability of human rights norms: Towards a partial fusion of the international covenants on
human rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 789-790; 798-799.
14West op cit note 1 at 1902.  See also Michelman op cit note 2 at 13-15 and Sandra
Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR
1 at 2-3; 7.
15This principle and its foundations in the value of human dignity are affirmed by the
preambles of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which state that all
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implications.12  More fundamentally, the dichotomisation of the two ‘categories’
of rights ignores the reality that the theoretical ability to claim civil and political
rights offers little practical consolation to those who do not enjoy access to basic
social and economic amenities.13  It has convincingly been argued that a society
which values human dignity must not only respect the moral agency of its
citizens and safeguard such civil and political liberties as are necessary for their
individual and collective pursuit of ‘the good life’, but should also ‘ensure some
minimal level of well-being because such a threshold is necessary if citizens are
to live fully human lives and have the dignity to which their humanity entitles
them’.14
In international human rights law and scholarship, this notion has found
expression in the normative principle that all human rights (ie civil and political
rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights) are ‘interdependent and
indivisible’, in that they are incapable of being realised in isolation and that the
values associated with their protection are indistinct.15  Respect for and
human rights ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’ and that ‘the ideal of human
beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and
political rights’.
16Sandra Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights’ in Matthew Chaskalson et al (eds)
Constitutional Law of South Africa (RS5, 1999) ch 41 at 1.  See also generally Scott op cit note
13 as well as Sandra Liebenberg ‘Violations of socio-economic rights: The role of the South
African Human Rights Commission’ in Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann (eds) The Post
Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 405 at 410; Martin
Scheinin ‘Economic and social rights as legal rights’ in Eide et al op cit note 12, 41 at 44; Craig
Scott & Patrick Macklem ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social rights
in a new South African constitution’ (1992) 141 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1 at 86-87; Steiner &
Alston op cit note 10 at 247.
17Argued also by Mark Heywood ‘Debunking “Conglomo-talk”: A case study of the
amicus curiae as an instrument for advocacy, investigation and mobilisation’ (2001) 5 Law,
Democracy & Development 133 at 147; Liebenberg op cit note 14 at 18; Dikgang Moseneke ‘The
fourth Bram Fischer memorial lecture: Transformative adjudication’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 309 at
318.
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affirmation of inherent human dignity accordingly requires the actualisation of
civil and political rights as well as of socio-economic rights:
‘If human rights represent deeply held values about the nature of human
persons and their social interaction, the term “interdependence” attempts to
capture the idea that values seen as directly related to the full development of
personhood cannot be protected and nurtured in isolation.  [Interdependence]
reflects an appreciation of the intimate connections between the personal,
political and socio-economic dimensions of human dignity and well-being’.16
However, a mere rhetorical acknowledgment of the material dimensions of
human dignity and personhood is ultimately as inimical to the value of
interdependence as an exclusive focus on the enforcement of civil and political
rights.  In order to achieve the ideals associated with the value of
interdependence, it is necessary that socio-economic rights are capable of
realisation in practice as well as in theory.
Furthermore, if socio-economic rights are effectively to function as legal
tools through which denial of need may be confronted and remedied, their
appropriation in particular factual circumstances must connect concretely to the
needs and experiences of their subjects.17  The formulation of abstract legal
standards measuring compliance with socio-economic obligations and the
institutional settings within which these standards are conceived and
implemented is at most of indirect and secondary importance to the beneficiaries
of socio-economic rights, for whom the actual alleviation of their hardship carries
18Brand op cit note 2 at 35-36, drawing from Michelman op cit note 2.  See also Sandra
Liebenberg ‘The right to social assistance: The implications of Grootboom for policy reform in
South Africa’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 232 at 235.
19Sandra Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights:
An effective tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 159.  See
also Thomas J Bollyky ‘R if C > B + P: A paradigm for judicial remedies of socio-economic rights
violations’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 161 at 164; Dennis Davis ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa:
The record of the Constitutional Court after ten years’ (2004) 5(5) ESR Review 3 at 5;
Liebenberg op cit note 18 at 233; JC Mubangizi ‘Protection of human rights in South Africa:
Public awareness and perceptions’ (2004) 29(1) Journal for Juridical Science 62 at 80.
20Mark Heywood ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa:
Background, strategies and outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign case against the
Minister of Health’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 278 at 300; Liebenberg op cit note 19 at 176; Craig Scott
& Philip Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A comment on
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 at 254-255.  In
essence, this argument holds also for socio-economic rights litigation brought by NGOs and
other public interest litigators, who will more often than not be motivated by the desire to secure
tangible benefits for the groups of beneficiaries whose interests they represent.
21Liebenberg op cit note 19 at 160.
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priority.18  Legal tools which fail to acknowledge and reflect this priority will not
easily succeed in their aim to correct for the diminution of human dignity suffered
as a result of such hardship.
Moreover, socio-economic rights will be useful to rights-bearers only to
the extent that the rights have the potential to tangibly improve the physical
conditions of their lives - ‘[i]f ... socio-economic rights ... are to amount to more
than paper promises, they must serve as useful tools in enabling people to gain
access to the basic social services and resources needed to live a life consistent
with human dignity’.19  Accordingly, individuals may be expected to rely on socio-
economic rights and the legal process for the alleviation of their personal
hardship only if there is a distinct possibility that they will concretely benefit,
either directly or indirectly, from the exercise.20  If this is not the case, socio-
economic rights (and, by implication, rights-discourse as a whole) will have
failed in their purpose of effectively confronting the denial of need,21 and
additional or alternative political tools for this purpose will have to be sought.
(b) The inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the South African
Constitution
Much academic debate surrounded the political decision to include justiciable
22As Nicholas Haysom wrote at the time: ‘for a constitution to have a meaningful place
in the hearts and minds of the citizenry, it must address the pressing needs of ordinary people.
It cannot be seen to institutionalise and guarantee only political/civil rights and ignore the real
survival needs of the people - it must promise both bread and freedom.  If it does not do so, it
will find no lasting resonance amongst the true guardians of the constitution - which are not the
courts but the citizens’.  Haysom op cit note 12 at 454.  See also Mureinik op cit note 7 at 465;
Scott & Macklem op cit note 16 at 85.
23See DM Davis ‘The case against the inclusion of socio-economic demands in a Bill of
Rights except as directive principles’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 475 at 480-481; 484-485; Mureinik op cit
note 7 at 465; AJ Rycroft ‘The protection of socio-economic rights’ in Corder (ed) op cit note 1,
267 at 268.
24The directive principles option was strongly contended for, for these and other reasons,
by Davis op cit note 23.  See also Bertus De Villiers ‘Directive principles of state policy and
fundamental rights: The Indian experience’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 29 at 32-33; 39; Erika De Wet ‘The
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socio-economic rights in the text of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (‘the Constitution’).  One the one hand, it was readily
acknowledged that a new South African constitution had to embody an
unwavering commitment to the eradication of the inequalities occasioned by
apartheid and to the socio-economic upliftment of the greater majority of the
population.  The only way in which a constitutional text could meaningfully
reflect such a commitment, many felt, was for its Bill of Rights to include socio-
economic rights alongside civil liberties.22  But, others argued, to include socio-
economic rights in a Constitution would raise unrealistic expectations that these
rights could immediately be enforced.  Were such expectations to be shattered
(as, it was argued, was inevitable), the legitimacy of not only the socio-economic
rights in the Bill of Rights, but of the Bill of Rights as a whole and of the entire
constitutional enterprise of which it formed part, would be severely tarnished.23
One possible solution to the above problem, strongly mooted at the time,
was that the South African Constitution should only give limited recognition to
socio-economic rights, in the form of ‘directive principles of state policy’.  Such
principles require ongoing political commitment to social upliftment and inform
the content of legislative and policy initiatives, but do not grant any enforceable
entitlements to citizens.  Formulating socio-economic rights thus, it was
contended, would not only leave intact the legitimacy of the Bill of Rights, but
would also safeguard the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary, who would
otherwise face significant separation of powers and counter-majoritarian
tensions in having to decide on matters of socio-economic delivery.24
enforceability of socioeconomic directive principles / legislative commands, with special
reference to constitutional principle XI of the South African transitional Constitution’ (1995) 112
SALJ 462 at 464; 477; Ziyad Motala ‘Socioeconomic rights, federalism and the courts:
Comparative lessons for South Africa’ (1995) 112 SALJ 61 at 63; 66; 69; 72; 74; 87.
25Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para 77.
26Ibid para 78.  For comment on these dicta, see Iain Currie ‘Bill of rights jurisprudence’
(2000) Annual Survey of SA Law 24 at 51-52; Johan De Waal; Iain Currie & Gerhard Erasmus
The Bill of Rights Handbook (4th ed 2001) at 434; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note
16 at 5; Christa Van Wyk ‘The enforcement of the right of access to health care in the context
of HIV/AIDS and its impact on the separation of powers’ (2003) 66 THRHR 389 at 395.
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The Constitutional Assembly thought differently and included a significant
number of fully justiciable socio-economic rights in the draft text of the 1996
Constitution.  This inclusion was opposed during the hearings preceding the
certification of the text by the Constitutional Court.  It was argued that socio-
economic rights should not be justiciable because of the budgetary
consequences attached to their vindication, and because the notion of
justiciable socio-economic rights would involve the illegitimate judicial
encroachment on legislative and executive terrain.  The Constitutional Court
dismissed these objections, holding that ‘it cannot be said that by including
socio-economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon the Courts
so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it
results in a breach of the separation of powers’.25  The Court further pointed out
that civil and political rights often have similar budgetary consequences to socio-
economic rights, and concluded that ‘the fact that socio-economic rights will
almost inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar
to their justiciability.  At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be
negatively protected from improper invasion’.26
When the 1996 Constitution consequently came into operation in
February of 1997, its Bill of Rights included both civil and political and socio-
economic rights, without in principle differentiating between them on the basis
of justiciability.  The decision of the constitutional drafters to include justiciable
socio-economic rights in the Constitution, rather than non-justiciable directive
principles of state policy, is significant.  This is because rights, unlike directive
principles, entail more than abstract guidelines for judicial review - ‘[r]ights are
27West op cit note 1 at 1917.
28Dworkin op cit note 6 at 198-199; 269
29Davis op cit note 23 at 480; Rycroft op cit note 23 at 268.
30On the content of ‘ubi ius ibi remedium’, see Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952 (4)
SA 769 (A) at 780-781C; Administrator, Transvaal v Brydon 1993 (3) SA 1 (A) at 15G-16B;
Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ in Chaskalson et al op cit note 16, ch 9 at 1.  On the
maxim’s application in relation to socio-economic rights, see Rycroft op cit note 23 at 279; Van
der Walt op cit note 2 at 167.
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morally grounded imperatives, not a list of suggestions for good governance’.27
As Ronald Dworkin has shown in relation to civil and political rights, the granting
of a right implies a societal acceptance of the social costs that will have to be
incurred in order to enforce that right.28  The recognition of a right is accordingly
associated with a guarantee that it may be legally enforced.29
The clear legislative intent behind the entrenchment of justiciable socio-
economic rights in the Constitution therefore appears to be that citizens should
in appropriate circumstances be able to enforce these rights against the State,
or against others who threaten, disrupt or obstruct their exercise or enjoyment.
When considered in light of the common law maxim ‘ubi ius ibi remedium’
(according to which a remedy forms an inextricable part of a right to the extent
that a right would be rendered meaningless in the absence of an effective
remedy), the fact that citizens have been awarded socio-economic rights
indicates that they are entitled to effective remedies in cases where their rights
have unjustifiably been infringed.30  It also appears, both from the entrenchment
of justiciable socio-economic rights by the Constitutional Assembly and from the
Constitutional Court’s dismissal of objections to this entrenchment, that courts
are appropriate and competent fora in which to seek such relief.
(c) Enforcing justiciable socio-economic rights
The South African Constitutional Court’s approach to the enforcement of the
socio-economic rights contained in the Bill of Rights of the 1996 Constitution has
received a fair measure of praise for the manner in which it balances the need
for judicial vigilance implied by the constitutional presence of socio-economic
rights with the need for deference occasioned by its institutional role within a
31See, for instance, Cass R Sunstein ‘Social and economic rights? Lessons from South
Africa’ (2001) 11(4) Constitutional Forum 123; Frank I Michelman ‘The constitution, social rights,
and liberal political justification’ (2003) 1 International J of Constitutional Law 13.
32See chapter 4 below.
33The central proponent of this argument is David Bilchitz, who advocates instead for
the adoption of a minimum core approach to socio-economic rights adjudication, akin to that
followed in international law.  See for instance David Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights
teeth: The minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 119 SALJ 484; Bilchitz op cit note 7.
34See Brand op cit note 2; Liebenberg op cit note 19; Liebenberg op cit note 14.
35See Davis op cit note 19; Kameshni Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications
for the enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 255;
Theunis Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom - a reply to Cass R Sunstein’ (2002) 12(2)
Constitutional Forum 41 at 50-51; Mia Swart ‘Left out in the cold? Crafting constitutional
remedies for the poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 215.
36See Darrel Moellendorf ‘Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the future of
socio-economic rights claims’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 327; Liebenberg op cit note 18 at 255.
10
constitutional system that reflects the separation of powers.31  However, the
Court’s approach, which essentially amounts to a procedural inquiry into the
reasonableness of laws and policies aimed at the progressive realisation of
socio-economic rights,32 has also attracted significant criticism.
Certain scholars have expressed concern about the seemingly ad hoc,
abstract and context-dependent nature of the inquiry which, it has been argued,
fails to award meaningful content to socio-economic rights, to prioritise the
satisfaction of certain basic and urgent socio-economic needs over others and
to set consistent standards against which the adherence of government policies
to constitutional obligations may be measured.33  Other researchers have shown
that the Court’s approach is, due to its focus on procedural and technical issues
related to the content and implementation of socio-economic policy rather than
on the satisfaction of the survival interests of poor and vulnerable sectors of
society, at best of limited use to citizens in securing access to those goods and
services to which they are entitled by virtue of their inherent human dignity.34
Yet others have lamented the lack of remedial vigor displayed by the Court’s
socio-economic rights judgements, which appear to be shying away from
awarding mandatory, structural and tangible relief.35  Finally, concerns have
been expressed that the Court is failing to subject state assertions of resource
scarcity to sufficiently rigorous scrutiny.36
What most of these critiques have in common is a concern that the Court
seems to conceive of socio-economic rights not as separately enforceable rights
37See Bilchitz op cit note 7 at 22; Liebenberg op cit note 19 at 162.  Michelman op cit
note 31 at 17-18; 29; 32-34 regards the indirect, policy-directive effects of the Court’s approach
as its main advantage.
38See Iain Currie ‘Bill of Rights jurisprudence’ (2002) Annual Survey of SA Law 36 at 72.
See also chapter 4 note 51 and accompanying text.
39Davis op cit note 23 at 484-485.
11
to particular goods or services, but rather as a single, overarching guarantee
that socio-economic policies may be abstractly reviewed for their adherence to
certain principles of good governance.  Whereas many of the Court’s critics
concede that such a guarantee holds important benefits for the policy-driven
achievement of social justice in South Africa,37 the substantive ‘emptiness’ of the
Court’s predominantly procedural conception of socio-economic rights38 reminds
most of the warning by Dennis Davis in the pre-constitutional debates that
‘[t]o assert a right is to argue that another party has a duty to provide conditions
in terms of which that right can be fulfilled.  Once social and economic rights
are included in a bill of rights, the constitution trumpets to the society at large
that each is entitled to demand enforcement of such rights whether they be
rights to housing, to employment, to medical care or to nutrition.  To include
these rights as being of equivalent status to first-generation rights is to raise
expectations within a society that these rights can indeed be enjoyed by all.
For members of society to then find that all that is entailed thereby is a process
of negative constitutional review is to create a situation where expectations are
raised only to be dashed on the rock of a technical legal review. ... Certainly Mr
and Ms Citizen will demand more than review from a fully fledged right’.39
The text of the Constitution clearly awards justiciable rights to have access to
particular socio-economic amenities.  It accordingly indicates that it should be
possible to enforce these rights in a manner that entails the satisfaction of the
material needs that they represent.  To consistently interpret and ‘enforce’ these
rights in a manner that denies this possibility, diminishes the potential of rights
discourse to contribute meaningfully to the quest for social justice and threatens
also to diminish the legitimacy of the Bill of Rights in the eyes of the majority of
South Africans.
1.2 PREMISES AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS DISSERTATION
Departing from the premises, first, that the meaningful enforcement of socio-
economic rights is of integral importance in a society concerned with the
40By the notion of ‘tangible benefit’ I mean a perceptible outcome or necessary after
effect of litigation in which a health-related right was successfully vindicated, which firstly has
a discernible impact on the life of individual rights-bearers (in the sense that they gain something
which they did not have before the litigation, such as an item, access to a service, an
enforceable claim against a third party, an assurance that future needs will be met, or
compensation for losses suffered as a result of the non-satisfaction of past needs) and which
secondly contributes at least partially to the satisfaction of a particular health-related need or
compensates for the hardship resulting from its non-satisfaction.  A particular need is in turn
conceived of as being health-related where the satisfaction of the need is capable of leading to
an improvement in, or of preventing a deterioration in, individual health status.
41See Horwitz op cit note 1 at 399-400; Kevin P Quinn ‘Viewing health care as a
common good: Looking beyond political liberalism’ (2000) 73 Southern California LR 277 at 303-
304; Simon op cit note 1 at 1433; West op cit note 1 at 1912-1915 and also generally Peter
Gabel ‘The phenomenology of rights-consciousness and the pact of the withdrawn selves’ (1984)
62 Texas LR 1563-1599.
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affirmation and protection of human dignity; secondly, that enforcement of socio-
economic rights must respond concretely to the needs of their beneficiaries;
and, thirdly, that by virtue of their rights-status, socio-economic rights must be
capable of contributing perceptibly to the satisfaction of the needs they
represent, this dissertation conducts a benefit-focused analysis of health rights
enshrined in the 1996 Constitution.  I argue that successful reliance on health
rights in litigation must, in appropriate circumstances, produce tangible
benefits40 for individual rights-bearers.  This is possible, first, because the
relevant constitutional provisions are justiciable rights rather than directive
principles of state policy, which means that they are inherently capable of
resulting in direct and tangible relief and, secondly, because the Constitution
allows courts to give tangible effect to these rights without transgressing
institutional boundaries or departing radically from ‘traditional’ conceptions of the
judicial role.
Insofar as it argues for individual benefits, the dissertation is somewhat
controversial.  The Constitutional Court is on record as being opposed to an
interpretation of socio-economic rights that confers immediately enforceable,
individual socio-economic entitlements.  Indeed, rights discourse is often
criticised for its tendency to ‘atomise’ individuals and thereby to divorce rights-
claims from their social context, which is considered counterproductive in
bringing about large-scale social and economic reform.41  It is certainly
conceivable that vindicating individual socio-economic claims may upset
42On the need to find a balance between individual and collective aspects of socio-
economic rights claims in South Africa, see Bilchitz op cit note 7 at 22.
43See remarks of Scott & Alston op cit note 20 at 252-253.
44Liebenberg op cit note 14 at 12.  See also ibid at 22.
45Virginia Leary ‘Implications of a right to health’ in Mahoney & Mahoney (eds) op cit
note 11, 481 at 482.
46Ibid.
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carefully crafted programmes aimed at communal social upliftment.  It is
accordingly necessary when dealing with socio-economic rights to attempt to
balance communal and individual interests.42
But this should not mean that legitimate individual entitlements are always
sacrificed in favour of a vaguely-defined ‘common good’.43  Rights-based
terminology is used in relation to social goods precisely to counter the self-
defeatism of an ‘all-or-nothing’ communalist approach to social upliftment.  It
acknowledges that ‘we are diminished as a society to the extent that any of our
members are deprived of the opportunities to develop their basic capabilities to
function as individual and social beings’.44  A rights-based approach to health
‘sees the welfare of an individual as an object of morality and as a legitimate
purpose of a just society’45 and, unlike a utilitarian approach (seeking to confer
the greatest possible aggregate health-related benefit on society in general),
paternalistic approach (viewing the distribution of health-related benefits as
flowing from the benevolence of bureaucrats and health care professionals who
are deemed to have the best interests of society at heart) or market-based
approach (according to which health-related benefits are commodities capable
of alienation and purchase) undeniably involves the concept of individual
entitlement.46
This is not to say that individual entitlements must always trump
communal interests.  Nor am I contending that tangible benefits must necessarily
be conferred in every matter where a health-related right has apparently been
infringed.  There is certainly a significant range of circumstances in which an
infringement of a socio-economic right will either be justifiable or where it would
be inappropriate to award direct, tangible relief to individual litigants.  However,
there will also be circumstances in which awarding tangible relief for an
unjustifiable infringement for a socio-economic right is both appropriate and
47Rather than attempting to formulate a single theory for the application, interpretation
and limitation of health rights as a group, I contemplate alternative interpretative, evaluative and
remedial judicial strategies that could maximise the tangible benefits resulting from different
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possible.  In such circumstances, I believe that courts are constitutionally
obliged to give effect to the rights-based status of health-related claims and to
award such tangible relief as is appropriate in the circumstances.
Moreover, I believe that the structure and content of the Bill of Rights
requires of any court tasked with giving effect to a socio-economic right to start
from the double premise that the right is in principle enforceable and that the
applicant is in principle entitled to the tangible relief she seeks.  In
circumstances where the interests of justice or some other compelling interest
require that the extent of an applicant’s entitlement be limited, or where it would
for some institutional or other reason be inappropriate to award tangible relief,
the court is required to indicate whether, to what extent and for what reasons it
should depart from this premise.
I accordingly argue that the Constitutional Court is mistaken in its
opposition to an interpretation of socio-economic rights that confers immediately
enforceable entitlements upon claimants.  This opposition, I believe,
unnecessarily restricts the benefit-rendering potential of socio-economic rights.
While I concede that there are significant indirect benefits to be derived from the
Court’s current approach to socio-economic rights, I am of the view that such
benefits would also have resulted if socio-economic rights were constitutionally
included simply as directive principles of state policy.  Given that they have
instead been entrenched as justiciable rights, I contend that the benefits
resulting from the enforcement of socio-economic rights should, in appropriate
circumstances, also be direct and tangible.
The dissertation accordingly explores the extent to which constitutional
health rights may realistically be expected to render tangible benefits, examines
the degree to which the potential of health rights in this regard is realised
through current judicial approaches to their enforcement and suggests ways in
which such approaches may be modified and/or supplemented in order for
tangible benefits to result more readily from successful rights-vindication.47
health-related rights in different settings.  On the need for such a ‘multistranded’ or ‘pluriform’
theoretical approach to the interests implicated by socio-economic rights, see Van der Walt op
cit note 2 at 204-205.
48On the role of the SAHRC in this regard, see s 184 of the Constitution and also
Kenneth Creamer ‘Finance and the realisation of socio-economic rights: Analysing the Human
Rights Commission’s s 184(3) review of the financial authorities’ in Centre for Human Rights
Report on the Realisation of Socio-Economic Rights (2000) 13-28; Christof Heyns ‘Taking socio-
economic rights seriously: The “domestic reporting procedure” and the role of the South African
Human Rights Commission in terms of the new Constitution’ (1999) 32 De Jure 195-226;
Liebenberg (in Andrews & Ellmann) op cit note 16 at 405-443; Dwight G Newman ‘Institutional
monitoring of social and economic rights: A South African case study and a new research
agenda’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 189-216; Karrisha Pillay ‘An interpretation of “relevant organs of
state” in section 184(3) of the Constitution and their duty to provide information on socio-
economic rights to the South African Human Rights Commission’ (1998) 2 Law, Democracy &
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The focus of my research is predominantly on South African cases and
literature pertaining to the interpretation and enforcement of socio-economic
rights (and, particularly, of health-related rights) in the Constitution.  Given that
many of these rights have been modelled on provisions contained in
international law treaties, and in light of s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution’s
determination that international law must be considered when interpreting the
Bill of Rights, I also devote some attention to relevant treaty-provisions as well
as to local and foreign academic deliberations on their meaning and
implications.  Furthermore, although a comparative study of the protection of
health rights is not undertaken, I also rely occasionally on foreign
(predominantly Anglo-American) sources that illuminate concepts which I regard
as relevant to the protection and enforcement of health-related rights.
My focus is further limited to benefits resulting from asserting
constitutionally-based rights-claims within the judicial process.  This is not to
underplay the importance of rights awarded and enforcement mechanisms
created by legislation and/or executive policy, but I will refer to these only to the
extent that they supplement and/or illuminate the benefit-rendering potential of
relevant constitutional rights in the litigation setting.  Furthermore, at least one
other institution, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), is
constitutionally implicated in the actualisation of socio-economic rights.
Relevant SAHRC processes may therefore also produce tangible benefits for the
beneficiaries of socio-economic rights, but these are beyond the scope of the
dissertation.48
Development 179-196.
49I have discussed all of these obstacles in detail in Marius Pieterse ‘Coming to terms
with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 383-417.  See also the
various authorities cited there.  To the extent that these factors impact on South African courts’
ability to interpret and enforce health rights in a manner that produces tangible benefits for
beneficiaries, they will be considered in chapter 4 below.
50See for instance Gregg M Bloche ‘The invention of health law’ (2003) 91 California LR
249 at 270-271; Paul Gertler & Jacques Van der Gaag The Willingness to Pay for Medical Care:
Evidence from Two Developing Countries (1990) at 17; Mark A Hall & Gerard F Anderson
‘Health insurers’ assessment of medical necessity’ (1992) 140 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1637 at
1650; 1675; 1698-1700; David Mechanic ‘Professional judgment and the rationing of medical
care’ (1992) 140 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1713 at 1724-1725; 1727; John A Siliciano ‘Wealth,
equity, and the unitary medical malpractice standard’ (1991) 77 Virginia LR 439 at 480.
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It is necessary to acknowledge at the outset that the judicial process does
not always present an ideal institutional setting for the actualisation of benefits
implied by socio-economic rights.  Socio-economic rights matters often involve
choice-sensitive and polycentric issues and often have significant resource
implications.  They are accordingly often depicted as falling predominantly within
the realm of legislatures and policy-makers.  Real or perceived counter-
majoritarian and separation of powers-based concerns are therefore bound to
impact on the effectiveness of the enforcement of socio-economic rights through
the judicial process.  Difficulties experienced by courts in this regard will likely
further be compounded by the essentially formalist undertones of South African
legal culture, as well as by individual judges’ discomfort with using rights-based
terminology to vindicate social claims.49  Moreover, health rights matters are
likely to involve the technically specialist field of medicine, which is typically
perceived as being beyond judicial expertise and as accordingly requiring
respect for the decisions of health care professionals in a variety of contexts.50
However, whereas the problems of institutional legitimacy and
competence listed here must necessarily impact on the manner in which courts
give effect to health-related rights, I will argue that the obstacles posed by them
in this regard are not insurmountable, and that courts can give effect to health
rights in a manner that holds tangible benefits for their subjects without radically
departing from ‘traditional’ conceptions of their role or disrupting the functioning
of the modern-day democratic state.
When confronted with a claim that a health-related right has been
51Whereas this dissertation will not engage in a detailed study of the horizontal
application of health rights, many of its observations pertain equally to their invocation against
private entities.  In particular, I will argue that the benefit-rendering potential of health rights may
significantly be increased by allowing for their indirect horizontal application in certain
circumstances.
52In this sense, the benefit-focused approach adopted here is broader than the ‘remedy-
conscious’ approach argued for by Jonathan Klaaren ‘A remedial interpretation of the Treatment
Action Campaign decision’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 455-468.
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infringed by the State or a private entity,51 a court may be expected, first, to
ascertain the ambit and scope of the right in question, thereafter to evaluate the
challenged law or conduct in an attempt to establish whether the right has been
unjustifiably infringed in the circumstances, and, if that is found to have been the
case, to order that the infringement be remedied.  Whereas the question of
whether tangible benefits will result from an applicant’s victory in such a case
would appear most obviously to be contingent on the nature of the remedy
awarded, my focus extends beyond judicial remedial practices to contemplate
the interpretation of health-related rights as well as the evaluation of
respondents’ compliance with the obligations imposed by such rights.52  Indeed,
I will show that the manner in which courts carry out their interpretative and
evaluative functions constrains the exercise of their remedial function to the
extent that the failure of health-rights cases to produce tangible benefits is as
often ascribable to restrictive interpretative and evaluative practices, as to lack
of remedial vigour.
I devote a significant portion of the dissertation to clarifying the content
of the various health-related rights that form the object of my study.  By doing
this, I hope, in the first instance, to illustrate how a group of seemingly disparate
rights operate together to further a particular social goal (in this case, individual
and collective health-maximisation).  More importantly, I believe it to be
necessary to ground any critique of current adjudicative practices in relation to
socio-economic rights in a detailed and integrated understanding of the content
of the rights in question.  An unintended feature of the academic response to the
Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights judgments has been a
disproportionate focus on institutional and procedural aspects of the judicial
enforcement of socio-economic rights, rather than on their content and
53See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at
para 32; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at paras
37-38.
54See, for example, Audrey R Chapman ‘A “violations approach” for monitoring the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights
Quarterly 23 at 30; Matthew CR Craven ‘The domestic application of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1993) 40 Netherlands International LR 367 at 367-368;
Künnemann op cit note 10 at 337; Scheinin op cit note 16 at 42; 53; 62; Scott & Macklem op cit
note 16 at 72-73; Shah op cit note 8 at 445; Steiner & Alston op cit note 10 at 250; Van Hoof op
cit note 12 at 99.
55As Geoff Budlender has argued, there needs to be a shift in thinking in South African
socio-economic rights scholarship, away from institutional issues, in order to ‘find out how social
and economic rights can be used to benefit real people in South Africa’.  Geoff Budlender ‘Socio-
economic rights in South Africa: Facing the challenges of implementation’ (1999) 1(4) ESR
Review 15 at 15-16.  See also Van der Walt op cit note 2 at 166.
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implications, even as scholars lament the fact that the Court’s current approach
sidelines the content of the rights.  This is unfortunate, since the Court’s
reluctance to adopt a more robust approach to enforcing socio-economic rights
is at least in part ascribable to a perception among its members that socio-
economic rights suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity.53  Lest South African
socio-economic rights jurisprudence and scholarship be caught up in the
debilitating chicken-and-egg situation that has for years hindered the effective
enforcement of socio-economic rights in international and foreign law (where the
supposed lack of conceptual clarity of socio-economic rights has been used to
justify their limited enforcement, which conversely has hindered the incremental
fleshing out of their content through application in concrete cases54), we need
to focus anew on the content and practical implications of socio-economic rights
and of the obligations that they impose.55
My investigation into the benefit-related content and implications of rights
relevant to health-maximisation starts with their formulation in international law,
which not only functioned as the blueprint for corresponding rights in the South
African Constitution, but also remains the premier source of the content and
benefit-related implications of socio-economic rights.  Chapter 2 below surveys
the formulation of the so-called ‘right to health’ in international human rights
treaties, and shows that the right consists of an interrelated ‘package of rights’
that, exercised together, contribute to the highest attainable standard of human
health.  The constituent elements of this package includes both socio-economic
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and civil and political elements, illustrating that the enforcement of socio-
economic rights is closely connected to, dependent on and an essential
prerequisite for the effective protection of civil and political rights.  In an attempt
to derive a rounded understanding of the various benefits that may realistically
be expected to result from successful enforcement of health-related rights, the
chapter also considers prominent academic and institutional elaborations on the
content of the rights consisting this ‘package’ as well as of the obligations that
they impose.
Chapter 3 then moves the focus of the study to the South African
constitutional setting.  It commences by illustrating that the Bill of Rights in the
1996 Constitution, in addition to containing justiciable socio-economic rights
alongside civil and political rights, enables a benefit-centered approach to
health-related rights through awarding courts sufficient interpretative leeway and
remedial flexibility to balance the interests served by the rights with the public
interest.  It is therefore possible, in appropriate circumstances,  to enforce
health-related rights in a manner that renders tangible benefits.  I subsequently
show that all constituent elements of the right to health in international law find
adequate protection in the South African Bill of Rights. I identify constitutional
provisions that correspond to the various constituent elements of the right to
health and indicate the extent of their potential to render tangible benefits to a
range of persons in a variety of circumstances.  In doing so, I propose
interpretations of the relevant constitutional provisions that I believe best reflects
their purpose and best enables them to adequately respond to the needs they
represent, while at the same time remaining true to their textual formulation.
In chapter 4, I evaluate the approach of South African courts to certain of
the health-related rights in the 1996 Constitution.  Through integrating the
various critiques of South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, I show
that, while current judicial approaches are capable of resulting in a measure of
tangible benefits for rights-bearers, they often unduly limit the potential of
constitutional health rights in this regard.  Shortcomings in current judicial
practices are identified and possible institutional and other reasons for these are
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considered.  In the main, I argue that the Constitutional Court’s denial that socio-
economic rights embody enforceable individual claims, as well as its alternative
focus on the reasonableness of socio-economic policies, has served to strip
these rights of discernible content and has removed the focus of the Court’s
inquiry from the needs that the rights aim to satisfy.  However, there remain
indications in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, supported by a
number of High Court judgments, that certain interests served by health-related
rights may yet be tangibly vindicated as South African socio-economic rights
jurisprudence develops.  I also show that, contrary to the assertions of the
Constitutional Court and its defenders, the overly restrictive elements of its
current approach to health-related rights are not necessitated by the institutional
constraints typically associated with the judicial vindication of socio-economic
rights.
Building on the conclusions reached in chapter 4, chapter 5 illustrates
that there exist viable alternative and supplementary judicial approaches to the
enforcement of health-related rights, which would be more conducive to tangible
benefits than the Constitutional Court’s current approach.  Adopting such
approaches would neither preclude courts from conducting a ‘reasonableness
analysis’ in appropriate circumstances, nor require of them to depart drastically
from the manner in which they typically conduct themselves in socio-economic
rights matters.  The chapter argues, first, for the identification and enforcement
of core-like interests underlying rights to health and, secondly, for the increased
indirect application of health rights to a variety of public and private disputes,
through the development of the common law in accordance with the spirit,
purport and objects of the Constitution.
Finally, chapter 6 situates the enforcement of constitutional health rights
within  the overarching social and economic transformation ‘project’ envisaged
by the preamble of the 1996 Constitution.  I argue that, by virtue of their
justiciability, health rights have the potential to contribute to this transformation
project not only through their ‘directive principle effect’, but also through
enabling vulnerable sectors of South African society to demand the tangible
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satisfaction of their health-related needs.  Summarising and integrating the
findings of the dissertation, the chapter points out that this potential remains
largely unrealised.  I argue that courts should acknowledge and affirm the rights-
based nature of health rights by adopting interpretative, evaluative and remedial
practices that enable the vindication of the claims they represent in appropriate
circumstances.  I also indicate areas in which further research is required in
order to overcome theoretical lacunae which continue to inhibit the potential of
health rights to render tangible benefits through the judicial process.
Overall, I aim to illustrate that there are circumstances in which it is not
only permissible, but both possible and appropriate to enforce health-related
rights (and, by implication, all socio-economic rights) in a manner that confers
tangible benefits on their beneficiaries.  It is hoped that this dissertation will
provide increased clarity on the content and implications of health-related rights
and on the manner in which they interact, and also that the benefit-focused
perspective adopted here will shed new light on their remedial potential and will
suggest useful approaches to their enforcement.
1René Descartes famously claimed that health-preservation is ‘chief of all goods’ and
should be pursued at all cost.  R Descartes Discourse on Method (trans A Wollaston, 1960) at
85, as quoted and discussed by Michael Walzer ‘Welfare, membership and need’ in Michael J
Sandel (ed) Liberalism and its Critics (1984) 200 at 200-201.  Walzer himself argues that pursuit
of health belongs to ‘a separate sphere of justice’ and that community efforts and goods aimed
at health preservation should be equally distributed.  Ibid at 213-217.  Whereas these
observations do not necessarily hold true for all health-related needs and the goods and services
with which they may be satisfied (as convincingly shown by Ronald Dworkin ‘Justice in the
distribution of health care’ (1993) 38 McGill LJ 883 at 885-888), they appear to indicate
significant consensus on the notion that human health is a highly valued social good and that
its preservation relates intricately to respect for individual and communal dignity.  See also
Kevin P Quinn ‘Viewing health care as a common good: Looking beyond political liberalism’
(2000) 73 Southern California LR 277 at 286; 289; 325; 357.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
RIGHT TO HEALTH
2.1 INTRODUCTION: THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the protection of and interaction
between various health-related rights in international and regional human rights
law.  Through this overview, I hope to identify the various health-related
interests that must be affirmed and protected in order for a rights-based
approach to health-maximisation to be effective.  I would also like to draw
attention to the existence of a detailed elaboration of the content of health-
related rights, the obligations they impose and the benefits they imply on the
international law level, which I believe to be instructive for domestic courts
tasked with awarding meaningful content to corresponding provisions in the
South African Constitution.
It is universally accepted that the pursuit of physical and mental health is
a legitimate individual and societal goal1 and that human dignity is compromised
when members of society are denied the means with which to participate in this
pursuit.  As Michael Walzer has remarked in relation to health care:
‘Were medical care a luxury, these discrepancies [in access thereto] would not
matter much; but as soon as medical care becomes a socially recognized need,
and as soon as the community invests in its provision, they matter a great deal.
For then deprivation is a double loss - to one’s health and to one’s social
2Walzer op cit note 1 at 214-215.
3See remarks of Alicia Ely Yamin ‘Defining questions: Situating issues of power in the
formulation of a right to health under international law’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 398
at 407-408.  The goal of health-maximisation is also largely incapable of self-fulfillment.
Population health necessarily depends, at least in part, on sustained, state-driven, community-
wide efforts, which explains why the safeguarding and protection of public health is a central
goal of all modern states.  See Rene Bowser & Lawrence O Gostin ‘Managed care and the
health of a nation’ (1999) 72 Southern Californian LR 1209 at 1210-1211; Knut Erik Tranoy ‘Vital
needs, human rights, health care law’ (1996) 15 Medicine & Law 183 at 186.
4Apart from the latter, these are usually referred to as ‘determinants of health’, which are
typically sub-classified into biological, behavioural (ie lifestyle related), structural (ie health-
system-related), socio-economic, socio-cultural and (physical, biological, social and economic)
environmental determinants of health.  See for instance Carol Barker The Health Care Policy
Process (1996) at 108-116; Sundrasagaran Nadasen Public Health Law in South Africa: An
Introduction (2000) at 3-8.
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standing.  Doctors and hospitals have become such massively important
features of contemporary life that to be cut off from the help they provide is not
only dangerous but also degrading’.2
It would thus appear that the intrinsic importance of human health and its close
connection to the value of human dignity justifies adopting a rights-based
approach in relation to claims for equal participation in the quest for health-
maximisation, as well as claims to such social goods and services that may
assist in this quest.
Of course, the main problem with adopting a rights-based approach
towards health-maximisation is that a state of ‘perfect’ (or ‘sufficient’, or ‘good’,
or ‘acceptable’) human health, in addition to defying exact and universal
definition, is incapable of complete and lasting achievement.3  The success of
exercising a right to health-maximisation will accordingly always only be partial.
It will also vary from individual to individual and will depend on the particular
circumstances in which the right is asserted.  Individual health status is impacted
by a complex interaction of several variable factors, such as genetics, the
operation of social power structures, individual lifestyle and behaviour, the
physical environment, age, gender, the state of science and technology, the
state of the health system and, beyond all of these, coincidence.4  Exercising a
right (or rights) to health-maximisation will impact at most partially on certain of
these determinants and may have no influence whatsoever on others.
To the extent that health status is impacted by socio-economic
5On the ‘matrix of vulnerability’ occasioned by the intersection of vulnerabilities
associated with determinants such as gender, race, age and social status, and its impact on and
interaction with individual and communal health status, see, for example, Cathi Albertyn ‘Using
rights and the law to reduce women’s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy &
Development 179 at 179-184; Barker op cit note 4 at 104; 112-113; Lynn P Freedman
‘Reflections on emerging frameworks of health and human rights’ in Jonathan M Mann et al (eds)
Health and Human Rights: A Reader (1999) 227-252; Linda J Jones The Social Context of
Health and Health Work (1994) at 24; 27; 230; 251-253; 306; 313-316; Barbara Klugman
‘Mainstreaming gender equality in health policy’ (1999) Agenda Monologue 48-70; L Walker &
L Gilbert ‘HIV/AIDS: South African women at risk’ (2002) 1 African J of AIDS Research 75 at 75;
77; Susan L Waysdorf ‘Fighting for their lives: Women, poverty, and the historical role of United
States law in shaping access to women’s health care’ (1995-96) 84 Kentucky LJ 745; Lisa K
Whittle & Marcia C Inhorn ‘Rethinking difference: A feminist reframing of gender/race/class for
the improvement of women’s health research’ (2001) 31 International J of Health Services 147-
165; Yamin op cit note 3 at 409-411; 415.
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vulnerability and the operation of social power structures,5 the success or
otherwise of exercising right(s) to health-maximisation is further contingent on
the dismantling of such structures in the quest for substantive equality and on
the simultaneous satisfaction of other, equally compelling, socio-economic
needs.  Accordingly, the ability to exercise right(s) to health may be but one of
several capacities required for the effective maximisation of individual and
collective health.
A wide array of ‘goods’, which differ significantly in nature, contribute in
different ways to the various needs associated with health-maximisation and
may all be required in order for an individual to enjoy the maximum attainable
level of health.  It would be virtually impossible to formulate a single, specific
right that simultaneously and practicably caters for all of these needs.  Rather,
achievement of the ‘right to health’ (as the conglomeration of these needs is
often referred to) requires the exercise of a variety of complementing rights to
the various social goods that contribute to the highest attainable standard of
health.
One of the earliest conceptualisations of a ‘right to health’ in international
law is found in the 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO),
the preamble of which proclaims that ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition’.  The
preamble further defines ‘health’ as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and
6See Audrey R Chapman ‘Core obligations related to the right to health and their
relevance for South Africa’ in Danie Brand & Sage Russell (eds) Exploring the Core Content of
Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (2002) 35 at 39-40;
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘The right to health in international law: Its implications for the
obligations of state and non-state actors in ensuring access to essential medicine’ (2003) 19
SAJHR 541 at 545; Jones op cit note 5 at 6; Virginia Leary ‘Implications of a right to health’ in
Kathleen E Mahoney & Paul Mahoney Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century: A Global
Challenge (1993) 481 at 481; 484; Charles Ngwena ‘Access to antiretroviral therapy to prevent
mother-to-child transmission of HIV as a socio-economic right: An application of section 27 of
the Constitution’ (2003) 18 SA Public Law 83 at 97; Brigit Toebes ‘Towards an improved
understanding of the international human right to health’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 661
at 662.
7See Chirwa op cit note 6 at 545; Aart Hendriks & Brigit Toebes ‘Towards a universal
definition of the right to health?’ (1998) 17 Medicine & Law 319 at 321; Paul Hunt Reclaiming
Social Rights: International and Comparative Perspectives (1996) 108; Toebes op cit note 6 at
663.
8UNCESCR General Comment 14 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of
Health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2000)
at paras 1; 3-4; 7-9.  See also Hendriks & Toebes op cit note 7 at 325; Ngwena op cit note 6 at
97; Brigit Toebes The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law (1999) at 19;
Geraldine Van Bueren ‘Health’ in MH Cheadle et al (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The
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social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity’.  This
definition has been criticised for its essentially idealist and unworkable nature,
given that a ‘state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ is
unattainable by most persons and that its achievement would certainly seem
beyond the reach of law.6  However, given that it is not a human right to this
state of well-being that is proclaimed, but rather one to the ‘highest attainable’
degree of such a state, the WHO definition of health, as well as its concomitant
understanding of a right to health, may be regarded as sufficiently flexible to
incorporate diverse health-related concerns.  This said, the relative vagueness
of the standard clearly calls for further clarification.7
In its General Comment on the content of the right to health as enshrined
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(UNCESCR) emphasised that the phrase ‘right to health’ should not be read as
implying a right to be healthy, since health status is influenced by various
personal and environmental factors.  Rather, it determined that the right may
best be understood as encompassing a package of interrelated and mutually
supporting rights, that operate jointly to enable the achievement of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health.8
Bill of Rights (2002) 491 at 494.
9See for instance the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1987/17/Annex (1987) (‘Limburg Principles’); the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) reprinted in (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 691-
704 (‘Maastricht Guidelines’) as well as the various General Comments by the UNCESCR.
10Provisions surveyed, in addition to art 12 of the ICESCR, are: Article 12 of the
Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); art 5(e)(iv)
of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); art 24 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); arts 11 and 13(1) of the European Social
Charter (ESC); art 11 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (‘American
Declaration’); art 10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘San Salvador Protocol’), art 16 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘African Charter’) and art 14 of the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC).  All provisions surveyed are quoted in full in
Annexure A to this dissertation.
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Section 2.2 below aims to tease out the constituent elements of this
package through a cursory survey of the formulation of the right to health and
related entitlements in leading international and regional human rights
instruments.  My predominant focus is on the formulation of the right in article
12 of the ICESCR, since that is the most authoritative international treaty on
socio-economic rights and since its provisions have been the subject of several
high-profile and authoritative institutional attempts at norm-clarification.9  In
particular, I rely heavily on UNCESCR’s elaboration of the content of the
ICESCR’s formulation of the right to health, in its 14th General Comment.  In
addition, I will engage with the formulations of the right to health and related
aspects in several other prominent UN treaties as well as in the prime regional
human rights instruments.10  These all bind different states in different ways and
are all enforced differently, but these technical and procedural aspects of
international health rights protection and enforcement do not concern me here.
My intention is merely to identify certain common elements evident from these
formulations, in order to arrive at a fairly tangible ‘package of rights’ that may be
said to constitute, or at least to contribute to, achievement of the right to health.
Furthermore, an important feature of international human rights law is the
demarcation of state responsibility under relevant treaties and the concomitant
development of workable and realistic standards according to which state
compliance with rights may be ascertained, monitored and ensured.  While I do
not intend to elaborate on the procedural aspects of these obligations or their
11Of course, the international human rights framework does not currently provide for the
direct enforcement of socio-economic rights by individuals against states.  Instead, compliance
with relevant treaty-obligations is typically monitored through complex reporting mechanisms.
The various weaknesses of these, as well as the prominent institutional attempts to overcome
them (and hence to make the rights more effectively enforceable at international level) do not
concern me here.  For my purposes, it is sufficient to note the extent to which these instruments
regard the relevant obligations as binding on states.
12UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 9.  See also para 8.
13Ibid at paras 18-19.
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various associated compliance-measuring standards, it is necessary for a proper
understanding of the content of the ‘health rights package’ to contemplate also
some of the institutional elaborations on the content of obligations flowing from
health rights.  These are relevant especially insofar as they shed light on the
extent to which the entitlements implied by the health rights package may
realistically be enforced against states at any given time.11  Section 2.3 below
briefly examines the terms of article 2.1 of the ICESCR (which determines in
essence that states must take appropriate steps to facilitate progressively the
full realisation of socio-economic rights within the maximum of their available
resources), as well as two of the theoretical approaches aimed at clarifying
various aspects of this generic obligation, namely the ‘tripartite typology of
interdependent duties’ and the ‘minimum core obligation’ approach, both of
which are of particular relevance to the content of the right to health.
2.2 CONTENT OF THE HEALTH RIGHTS PACKAGE
Acknowledging the multi-dimensional nature of health as a social good,
UNCESCR understands the right to health as encompassing both health-related
freedoms and health-related entitlements that afford citizens ‘the enjoyment of
a variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the
realization of the highest attainable standard of health’.12  It further affirms that,
like most other human rights, the right to health is underscored by a guarantee
of equality and non-discrimination which, substantively conceived, also requires
a policy commitment to prioritising the health rights of socially and economically
vulnerable sectors of society.13  It is accordingly clear that the pursuit of the
14Dieter Giesen ‘A right to health care? A comparative perspective’ (1994) 4(2) Health
Matrix 277 at 280.
15Yamin op cit note 3 at 415.
16UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 8.
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highest attainable standard of health requires the concurrent exercise of civil
liberties and social rights.  The right to health, thus conceived, affirms and
embodies the principle that human rights are interdependent and indivisible.
UNCESCR’s typology of the constituent elements of the right to health presents
a useful starting point for an investigation into the content of the right.  Following
this typology, this section now elaborates on the content of each of the central
components of the ‘right to health’.
(a) Health-related freedoms
Just as ‘individuals require a minimum level of health and physical well-being in
order to develop autonomously their life-styles and to fulfill their goals in
accordance with their value-commitments’,14 individuals must possess sufficient
autonomy to pursue optimal health through exercising informed choices relating
to their lifestyle and their exposure to the risk of disease, to seek medical
attention in the event of sickness and to participate meaningfully in medical and
other decisions that concern their health and well-being.  Therefore, ‘a right to
health must refer to a right to gain control over one’s sense of physical and
psychological well-being’.15
The package of rights constituting the right to health accordingly includes
a number of autonomy-related rights.  In General Comment 14, UNCESCR lists
the following freedoms as forming part of the right to health:  ‘The right to control
one’s health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right
to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-
consensual medical treatment and experimentation’.16  These liberty-interests
broadly correspond to those protected by rights to security of the person and to
freedom from degrading treatment (including freedom from medical
experimentation without consent) under the International Covenant on Civil and
17See arts 7 and 9 of the ICCPR.  On the freedom to control health and body, see Maria
Green ‘What we talk about when we talk about indicators: Current approaches to human rights
measurement’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 1062 at 1074.  On the overlap between
protection of the right to health and protection of physical integrity in international law, see
Toebes op cit note 8 at 264-269.
18See art 16(1)(e) of CEDAW.
19On the importance of such information for the autonomous pursuit of good health, see
Barker op cit note 4 at 112-113.
20See Albertyn op cit note 5 at 187; Barker op cit note 4 at 113; Aart C Hendriks
‘Patients’ rights and access to health care’ (2001) 20 Medicine & Law 371 at 375; Jones op cit
note 5 at 27; Sheetal B Shah ‘Illuminating the possible in the developing world: Guaranteeing
the human right to health in India’ (1999) 32 Vanderbilt J of Transnational Law 435 at 461;
Walker & Gilbert op cit note 5 at 76; Yamin op cit note 3 at 407; 411; 417.
21UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 8.
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Political Rights (ICCPR).17  Given its importance for the pursuit of substantive
gender equality, reproductive freedom further finds explicit protection under the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW).18
However, meaningful exercise of these liberties not only requires that
people have access to sufficient health-related information,19 but also depends
almost entirely on their material ability to exercise the choices to which their
autonomy entitles them.  If people lack access to goods and services that
facilitate the exercise of autonomous, health-conducive choices, the choices are
for all practical purposes beyond their reach.20  Accordingly, the exercise of
health-related freedoms is closely related to the objects of health-related
entitlements, to which I now turn.
(b) Health-related entitlements
Since the societal goal of health-maximisation is best achieved through
structured, community-wide efforts, General Comment 14 regards the existence
of a national system of health protection, within which the achievement of
various constituent elements of the right to health may be facilitated, as the
primary entitlement to flow from the right.21  Accordingly, the right to health may
be understood as mandating at least the existence of a health system, an
overarching legislative and policy framework facilitating health protection and
22General Comment 14 (ibid) at paras 53-56 acknowledges that it is not feasible to
dictate the contents of such systems, legislation, policy, frameworks and plans, since these must
respond to the specific health needs of every population and will necessarily depend on the
economic, structural and social realities of each society.  Broad policy guidelines, including
principles of non-discrimination, community participation in health policy formulation,
transparency and accountability, are however listed.
23See art 12(1) of the ICESCR; art 24(1) of the CRC; art 10(1) of the San Salvador
Protocol; art 16(1) of the African Charter.
24UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at paras 7; 13.
25Ibid para 14.  Similarly, art 12(2) of the CEDAW requires ‘appropriate services in
connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period’, whereas art 24(2)(a) of the
CRC mandates measures aimed at diminishing infant and child mortality and at ensuring that
mothers receive appropriate pre- and post-natal care.  See also art 24(2)(d) of the CRC.
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promotion, as well as a national health strategy and plan of action.22
More tangible individual entitlements to health-conducive social amenities
(which may be viewed as legitimate claims against particular health systems and
their functionaries) may be derived from further engagement with the formulation
of the right to health in international and regional human rights instruments.
Most of these proclaim the right in broad terms similar to that of the WHO
definition,23 but then proceed to award more tangible content to the right by
listing a variety of sub-rights or sub-obligations that are understood to flow from
it.  For instance, whereas article 12(1) of the ICESCR emulates the WHO’s
idealistic formulation of the right, article 12(2) prescribes an open-ended list of
steps to be taken in pursuit of the ‘highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health’.  These are:
‘(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality
and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational
and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and
medical attention in the event of sickness’.
General Comment 14 emphasises that this list is not exhaustive, and may be
viewed as representing a list of separate, subservient ‘rights’ to particular
aspects of health, which form part of the overarching right to health.24
The first of these is a right to adequate maternal, child and reproductive
health services and information derived from article 12(2)(a).25  This may be
understood as an elaboration on a more general right to health care services (to
26UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 15.
27Ibid paras 4; 11.  See also Chapman op cit note 6 at 36; Chirwa op cit note 6 at 547;
Green op cit note 17 at 1074; Hunt op cit note 7 at 111; Toebes op cit note 6 at 676.  These are
discussed in more detail in Toebes op cit note 8 at 254-259.
28On occupational health, see art 3 of the ESC; art 7(e) of the San Salvador Protocol,
as well as the myriad of standards contained in the conventions of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) (see for example ILO Convention 155 on Occupational Safety and Health
and the Working Environment (1983); ILO Convention 161 on Occupational Health Services
(1988).  For an overview of relevant ILO treaties, see Nadasen op cit note 4 at 107-110).
Environmental health and social goods that impact on health status are viewed as flowing from
the ‘right to health’ by for instance art 24 of the CRC (adequate nutrition; clean drinking water;
healthy environment), art 12 of the American Declaration (food, clothing, housing), arts 11 and
12(1) of the San Salvador Protocol (healthy environment; adequate nutrition); art 14 of the
ACRWC (adequate nutrition; safe drinking water) and art 11(1) of the ESC.  While not directly
included in art 16 of the African Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
has held that failure to provide ‘basic services’ (such as safe drinking water) and shortage of
medicine amounts to a violation of art 16 (see Union Inter-africaines des Droits de ‘l’Homme v
Zaire Communication No. 100/93; discussed by Vincent O Orlu Nmehielle The African Human
Rights System: Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions (2001) at 127) and that the deliberate
pollution of water, soil and air violates art 16, which was found to bar governments from
deliberately engaging in health-harming activities (see Social and Economic Rights Action
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be discussed below), that entitles pregnant women and new-born children to the
context-specific care necessitated by their peculiar health-related vulnerabilities.
A right to have access to adequate reproductive health care services may further
be justified by virtue of the fact that such access is essential for the effective
exercise of reproductive freedom and for the achievement of substantive gender
equality.
According to General Comment 14, article 12(2)(b) may be understood
as implying two broad entitlements - firstly, a right to occupational health, safety
and hygiene, and secondly a right to environmental determinants of health
including a healthy physical environment, safe drinking water and adequate
sanitation services.26  This resonates with General Comment 14's assertion that
the phrase ‘state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’
encompasses ‘a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions
whereby people can lead a healthy life’, which also implies protection of
underlying determinants of health such as adequate nutrition, access to safe
drinking water, adequate housing conditions as well as health-conducive
working and environmental conditions.27  Such entitlements are also recognised,
with greater or lesser specificity, in most of the other human rights documents
surveyed here.28  Viewed together, these seem to represent essential
Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria Communication No. 55 of 1996,
discussed by Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘A fresh commitment to implementing economic, social
and cultural rights in Africa’ (2002) 3(2) ESR Review 19-21).
29See arts 55(b) and 62(1) of the UN Charter; art 25 of the Universal Declaration.
30UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 16.
31See for instance WHO Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (1986).  The provisions
of the Ottawa Charter and the WHO’s approach to health promotion are discussed by Nadasen
op cit note 4 at 8-9.  Health promotion and health protection initiatives measures are similarly
viewed as mandated by the right to health by arts 24(2)(c) and (e)-(f) of the CRC, arts 10(2)(c)-
(e) of the San Salvador Protocol and art 16 of the African Charter.
32See also art 24(1) of the CRC; art 2(1)(c) of CERD and art 12 of the American
Declaration.
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components of the right to a standard of living conducive to health and well-
being enshrined in the 1945 UN Charter and in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.29  For my purposes, they may be grouped together as elements
of an overarching right to determinants of health, which may be understood as
consisting of rights to occupational health, environmental health and to have
access to non-medicinal, health-enhancing social goods.
Article 12(2)(c) of the ICESCR, according to General Comment 14,
implies a right to disease prevention, treatment and control and requires the
establishment and maintainance of disease-prevention and health-education
programmes, as well as of a responsive public health system that effectively
combats the spread of infectious epidemic and endemic diseases.30  As such,
it corresponds to the right of health promotion and protection in article 11 of the
ESC and seems to reflect the WHO’s understanding of ‘health promotion’ as a
broad policy objective encompassing the conception and implementation of
health-enhancing public policy measures, as well as the encouragement and
empowerment of individuals and communities to lead healthy lives.31  From a
benefit-focused perspective, the only tangible entitlements that may conceivably
flow from a right to health promotion and protection would seem to be to those
goods, facilities or services (such as immunisation services, quarantine facilities
or medicines specifically required to combat particular epidemics) that form part
of a responsive public health system.
Finally, a right to have access to health care facilities, goods and services
is implied by article 12(2)(d) of the ICESCR.32  This right may be viewed as an
elaboration on the more vague entitlement to medical attention in the event of
33See arts 55(b) and 62(1) of the UN Charter; art 25 of the Universal Declaration; art
24(2)(b) of the CRC; art 13(1) of the ESC; art 16 of the African Charter.
34See art 24(2)(b) of the CRC, art 10(2)(a) of the San Salvador Protocol and arts 14(2)(b)
and (d) of the ACRWC.  Primary health care aims to satisfy basic health needs through
prevention and treatment services for commonly encountered medical conditions.  Secondary
health care involves prevention and treatment of less common conditions that require more
specialised treatment, whereas tertiary health care refers to highly specialised medical
interventions requiring advanced facilities, drugs and knowledge.  See WHO Glossary of Terms
(1984) paras 2-30, as well as discussions of the typology by Gina Bekker ‘Introduction to the
rights concerning health care in the South African Constitution’ in Gina Bekker (ed) A
Compilation of Essential Documents on the Rights to Health Care (2000) 1 at 9; Nadasen op cit
note 4 at 13; Karrisha Pillay ‘Tracking South Africa’s progress on health care rights: Are we any
closer to achieving the goal?’ (2003) 7 Law, Democracy & Development 55 at 61; Toebes op cit
note 8 at 247; HJ Van Rensburg ‘Primary health care in disadvantaged communities in South
Africa’ (1994) 13 Medicine & Law 133 at 134.  The importance of the provision of primary health
care services is further discussed under 2.3(b) below.
35UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 17.  The reference to ‘essential
drugs’ is best understood as referring to the WHO’s list of ‘essential drugs’, a term which it has
through time defined as medicines ‘of utmost importance, basic, indispensable and necessary
for the health needs of the population’ that ‘should be available within the functioning health
systems at all times in adequate amounts, in appropriate dosage forms, with assured quality and
at a price that individuals and the community can afford’, and which have been selected ‘with
due regard to disease prevalence, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-
effectiveness’.  This is a conglomeration of various definitions of the term to be found in WHO
Technical Reports through the years, set out by Chirwa op cit note 6 at 554-555.
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illness guaranteed by several other human rights instruments.33  The treaty
provisions surveyed here typically do not themselves define what is meant by
‘health care goods and services’, save for indicating that these relate both to
physical and mental health.  Several of the provisions however emphasise the
provision of primary health care services, goods and facilities, in line with the
WHO’s distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary health care.34  The
extent of the article 12(2)(d) entitlement has been clarified by General Comment
14, which understands it to require ‘the provision of equal and timely access to
basic preventative, curative, rehabilitative health services and health education;
regular screening programmes; appropriate treatment of prevalent diseases,
illnesses, injuries and disabilities, preferably at community level; the provision
of essential drugs; and appropriate mental health treatment and care’.35
General Comment 14 further determines that compliance with the right to
have access to health care facilities, goods and services should be assessed
with reference to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of the
facilities, goods, and services.  Each of these determinants seemingly
represents an essential element of the right to have access to health care
36UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 12.  See further Chapman op
cit note 6 at 45; Green op cit note 17 at 1073; Toebes op cit note 8 at 287-288.  Similarly, the
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers has indicated that ESC art 11 implies an obligation
to ensure that health care services are ‘financially accessible’.  Council of Europe,
Recommendation R (86)5 of the Committee of Ministers (1986), quoted and discussed by
Katarina Tomasevski ‘Health rights’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: A Textbook (1995) 125 at 133.
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services and it therefore makes sense to view them as separately enforceable
entitlements.  An entitlement to the availability of services, goods and facilities
would accordingly require that particular treatment options as well as the
personnel, facilities and medicines required to effect these are physically
available, in sufficient quantities, in the health sector concerned.  The standard
of accessibility in turn demands that health care facilities, goods and services
are physically and geographically accessible to all citizens and are within the
financial means of all (implying an additional standard of affordability), whereas
the standard of acceptability requires that health care facilities, goods and
services are culturally appropriate and adhere to relevant medical ethics and
standards.  Finally, an entitlement to care of adequate quality requires that
health services, goods and facilities are ‘scientifically and medically appropriate’,
and implies further entitlements to access to trained medical professionals,
scientifically approved and safe medication and medical equipment, as well as
of safe drinking water and adequate sanitation at health care facilities.36
To summarise, the entitlements implied by the right to health may be
subdivided into two categories.  The first is a right to determinants of health,
which implies entitlements to occupational health, environmental health and to
various non-medicinal, health-enhancing social goods.  The second is a right to
available, accessible, and acceptable health care goods, services and facilities
of sufficient quality.  The latter right pertains to a large range of health care
services, facilities and products, but specifically includes at least primary health
care services, maternal and reproductive health care services and health
protection services.
(c) Equality
37WHO Equity in Health and Health Care (1996) 1, quoted from Bekker op cit note 34
at 10.
38Clair Apodaca ‘Measuring women’s economic and social rights achievement’ (1998)
20 Human Rights Quarterly 139 at 144; Alicia Ely Yamin & Deborah P Maine ‘Maternal mortality
as a human rights issue: Measuring compliance with international treaty obligations’ (1999) 21
Human Rights Quarterly 563 at 601.
39UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 18, which lists the following
grounds upon which such discrimination is prohibited: ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental disability,
health status (including HIV/AIDS), sexual orientation and civil, political, social or other status’.
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The egalitarian undertones of the right to health are evident firstly from its
phrasing in the preamble of the WHO Constitution (which explicitly determines
that its enjoyment may not be impeded by discrimination) and secondly from the
WHO’s policy of equity in health care provision (which is aimed at reducing
‘avoidable gaps in health status and health services between groups with
different levels of social privilege’).37  The implementation of all rights in the
ICESCR is similarly underscored by a guarantee of equality.  Article 2(2) of the
ICESCR determines that ‘the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status’.  A further emphasis on gender equality is to be found in article 3,
which requires states to ‘ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights...’.  Measures taken in
pursuit of the right to health may therefore not be discriminatory and should
emphasise the need to target gender-discrepancies in the enjoyment of the
right.38
The equality component of the right to health may accordingly be said to
entail an uncompromising guarantee against unfair discrimination from public or
private sources, in the provision of health-related goods and services, where
such discrimination ‘has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal
enjoyment or exercise of the right to health’.39  In slightly broader terms, the core
entitlement conferred by the equality-component of the right to health is one
against arbitrary or discriminatory exclusion from the ambit of laws, policies or
programmes which confer health-related benefits.  Successfully enforcing this
right would thus entitle the beneficiary to share equally in the benefits conferred
40Ibid paras 18-19.  A right of substantive equality of access is also evident from art
2(1)(c) of CERD; art 12 of CEDAW; art 2 of the CRC; art 13(2) of the ESC and art 3 read with
arts 10(2)(b) and (f) of the San Salvador Protocol.  See also UNCESCR General Comment 3
The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, para. 1 of the Covenant) (1990) at para 1;
Limburg Principles 14; 37-39; Matthew CR Craven The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (1995) at 117; Brigitte I Hamm ‘A
human rights approach to development’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 1005 at 1024; Hunt
op cit note 7 at 119; Leary op cit note 6 at 489; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its implications for South Africa’ (1995) 11 SAJHR
359 at 364.
41UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at paras 20-21 (mandating special
attention for the specific health needs of women); 22 (requiring special measures aimed at
addressing children’s health needs as represented by art 24 of the CRC); 25 (special measures
aimed at satisfying health needs of older persons); 26 (need for measures aimed at eradicating
de facto discrimination against persons with disabilities); 27 (need for appropriate measures
responding to specific health needs of indigenous peoples).  Article 5(e)(iv) of CERD
emphasises the need for substantive racial equality in relation to enjoyment of the right to health,
whereas women’s health needs are emphasised by arts 12 and 14(2)(b) of CEDAW (the latter
of which requires specific attention for the health needs of rural women).
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by the law, programme or policy.
On a somewhat more abstract level, General Comment 14 further
determines that the ICESCR’s anti-discrimination provisions must be understood
as endeavouring to ensure substantively equal access to health care services,
goods and facilities.  Beyond an obligation immediately to abolish all instances
of de jure discrimination in health care policy and/or practices and to refrain from
such discrimination, this also requires a commitment on the part of states to
eradicate de facto discrimination, occasioned by unequal enjoyment of health
rights.  States must therefore endeavour to bring about the substantively equal
enjoyment of relevant goods and services.40  This necessitates the active
targeting and dismantling of those social structures and associated
vulnerabilities that impact perniciously on the health status of particular groups
in society.  One way of achieving this is through the adoption of special
measures that aim to address the specific health needs of socially vulnerable
and/or marginalised groups, such as women (especially rural women), children
(especially girl children), members of minority or historically oppressed racial
groups, the elderly, the disabled and indigenous communities.41  Beyond sharing
in the benefits implied by health-related laws, policies and programmes aimed
at the general population, the equality-component of the right to health thus
entitles members of such vulnerable groups to special consideration for their
42‘Related interdependence’ involves viewing rights as ‘mutually reinforcing or mutually
dependant, but distinct’.  Craig Scott ‘The interdependence and permeability of human rights
norms: Towards a partial fusion of the international covenants on human rights’ (1989) 27
Osgoode Hall LJ 769 at 782-783.  The UN Human Rights Committee has, in considering
individual complaints under the ICCPR, showed a willingness to apply the ICCPR’s equal
protection clause also to legislation awarding benefits associated with ICESCR rights.  See Scott
(ibid) at 851-859 and the authorities cited there; also Scott Leckie ‘Another step towards
indivisibility: Identifying the key features of violations of economic, social and cultural rights’
(1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 81 at 104-105; Henry J Steiner & Philip Alston International
Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2000) at 247.
43As shown by Frank I Michelman ‘The Supreme Court 1968 term: Foreword: On
protecting the poor through the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1969) 83 Harvard LR 7-59.  For
example, the right to equality is of little assistance in circumstances where all groups in society
are equally deprived of access to health-related goods or services, or where benefits are equally
conferred by relevant laws, policies or programmes but are inadequate to satisfy urgent health-
related needs.
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particular health-related needs and vulnerabilities.
Non-compliance with both the formal and more substantive obligations
implied by the equality component of the right to health may be depicted not only
as a violation of the right to health but also as an infringement of the right to
equality.  As such, the interaction between articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR
and the right to equality in article 26 of the ICCPR is one of the most typically
cited examples of the ‘related interdependence’ of civil and political and socio-
economic rights.42  Although the right to equality would often be incapable of
directly remedying hardship occasioned by substantial deprivation of health-
related needs, due to the relational nature of an inquiry into compliance with the
right,43 it could usefully be appropriated in circumstances where a ‘typical’
infringement thereof coincides with non-compliance with the right to health.  This
is so especially since the right to equality typically enjoys stronger and more
immediate protection in most societies than do more direct rights to health-
related goods, services or facilities.
2.3 OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
The international community has recognised the unfortunate reality that, due
firstly to the extent of socio-economic need and secondly to the significant
resource implications of satisfying such need, expecting of states immediately
to comply with all the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights would simply
44See Pierre De Vos ‘Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights?: Social and
economic rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 96; Johan De Waal;
Iain Currie & Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (4th ed 2001) at 441; Andrea Gabriel
‘Socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights: Comparative lessons from India’ (1997) 1(6) Human
Rights and Constitutional LJ of Southern Africa 8 at 10; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic
rights’ in Matthew Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (RS5, 1999) ch 41
at 39-40.
45See also for instance art 4 of the CRC and art 1 of the San Salvador Protocol.  The
terms of art 2.1 of the ICESCR are discussed in detail by Craven op cit note 40 at 114-116; 125-
144.  Chapter 3 below will further engage with the meaning of the progressive realisation
standard and the resource limitation, as they are phrased in the South African Constitution.
46See for instance the critical discussions of the art 2.1 standards by Audrey R Chapman
‘A “violations approach” for monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23 at 31; 36-39; Audrey R Chapman
‘Monitoring socio-economic rights: A “violations approach”’ (1998) 1(3) ESR Review 2-4; Craven
op cit note 40 at 130-131; Robert E Robertson ‘Measuring state compliance with the obligation
to devote the “maximum available resources” to realizing economic, social and cultural rights’
(1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 693 at 694; Geraldine van Bueren ‘Alleviating poverty
through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 52 at 60; Geraldine van Bueren ‘Combating
child poverty - human rights approaches’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 680 at 690-691.
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be unrealistic.44  Accordingly, like several other international and regional human
rights instruments, article 2.1 of the ICESCR affirms that there are limits on the
extent to which socio-economic rights may be enforced at any given time.  It
determines that states must take deliberate steps, through all appropriate
measures and to the maximum of their available resources, in order to achieve
progressively the full enjoyment of all socio-economic rights.45
Despite purporting to capture the urgency with which states must pursue
the socio-economic upliftment of their populations, article 2.1 (and particularly
the progressive realisation standard and resource-limitation it contains) has
been criticised for failing to articulate sufficiently concrete standards against
which state compliance with the obligations imposed by socio-economic rights
may be measured.46  Accordingly, its terms have often been appropriated to fuel
perceptions that socio-economic rights amount to perpetually unachievable
ideals, rather than to enforceable rights.
Much institutional and academic energy has been spent on countering
such perceptions.  As UNCESCR stated in its third General Comment:
‘the fact that realisation over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen
under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of
all meaningful content.  It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device,
reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any
country in ensuring full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.  On
47UNCESCR General Comment 3 op cit note 40 at para 9.
48See Limburg Principle 35; Maastricht Guideline 11; UNCESCR General Comment 14
op cit note 8 at para 30.
49Shue first developed the typology in Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S
Foreign Policy (1980).  I rely here on his subsequent elaboration on the typology in Henry Shue
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the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective,
indeed the raison d’etre, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations
for State parties in respect of the full realisation of the rights in question’.47
There have been several attempts to clarify the obligations imposed by socio-
economic rights and to show that certain of their elements are capable of
immediate enforcement, notwithstanding the limits imposed by the progressive
realisation standard and the resource limitation.
It has for instance been shown that the equality-guarantee underlying
protection of rights such as the right to health is immediately enforceable and
accordingly operates unaffected by resource-availability or progressive
realisation.48  Due to their resonance with autonomy rights protected under the
ICCPR (which does not contain a clause equivalent to article 2.1 of the
ICESCR), the same may be said for the health-related freedoms discussed
above.  As to health-related entitlements, this section of the chapter briefly
considers two theoretical approaches to rights in the ICESCR which distinguish
between different categories of obligations flowing from socio-economic rights.
I attempt here to indicate the extent to which these obligations (and their
correlative entitlements) are capable of immediate enforcement and thereby to
illuminate and further clarify the content of several of the entitlements forming
part of the health rights package.
(a) The ‘tripartite typology of interdependent duties’
The ‘tripartite typology of interdependent duties’ was first conceived of by Henry
Shue, who argued that all rights impose obligations on states, first, to avoid
depriving citizens of existing enjoyment of rights, secondly, to protect them from
violations of their rights by third parties and, thirdly, to aid the deprived.  These
have since been recast as duties to respect, protect and fulfill all human rights.49
‘The interdependence of duties’ in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds) The Right to Food (1984) at
83-95.  The typology indicates unequivocally that socio-economic rights are capable of imposing
concrete standards against which compliance may be measured.  Hunt op cit note 7 at 133;
Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social
rights in a new South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1 at 73.  Whereas
a degree of vagueness still hampers effective monitoring of the obligation to fulfill socio-
economic rights, the typology indicates a tangible theoretical basis for enforcing the obligations
to respect and protect them.  Second, the typology counteracts the distinction between socio-
economic and civil and political rights by showing that both entail ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ state
obligations.  Craven op cit note 40 at 110; Hunt op cit note 7 at 133; Toebes op cit note 6 at 677;
GJH Van Hoof ‘The legal nature of economic, social and cultural rights: A rebuttal of some
traditional views’ in Alston & Tomasevski (this note) 97 at 107.
50Maastricht Guideline 6.  See further Craven op cit note 40 at 109-114; Victor Dankwa,
Cees Flinterman & Scott Leckie ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 705 at 713-715;
Hendriks & Toebes op cit note 7 at 330; Rolf Künnemann ‘A coherent approach to human rights’
(1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323 at 327-328; Scott & Macklem op cit note 49 at 73-77;
Van Hoof op cit note 49 at 106.
51UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 33.
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In relation to socio-economic rights, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights describe the ‘duty to respect’ as entailing
an immediately enforceable obligation on states to refrain from interfering with
existing enjoyment of socio-economic rights, the ‘duty to protect’ as requiring
states to act immediately in order to prevent third parties from infringing socio-
economic rights and the duty to fulfill as requiring the adoption of ‘appropriate
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the
full realization of [socio-economic] rights’.50
In General Comment 14, UNCESCR adopted the tripartite typology in
relation to the obligations imposed by article 12 of the ICESCR, and has
elaborated on the ‘right to health’-specific content of each of the obligations.
The obligation to respect the right, according to UNCESCR, ‘requires States to
refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to
health’.51  This means that citizens are awarded immediately enforceable
entitlements to non-disruption of existing access to health-related goods,
services and facilities and to the removal of arbitrary barriers to access.  In
addition, UNCESCR’s understanding of the obligation to respect the right to
health affirms the right to autonomy in health-related decisionmaking (by
forbidding coercive treatment and the withholding of vital health information), as
well as rights to equality of access and not to be discriminated against in health
52Ibid paras 34; 50.  See also Limburg Principle 72; Maastricht Guidelines 14(a); 15(g).
For further deliberation on the obligation to respect implied by the right to health, see Toebes
op cit note 8 at 312-313; 316-326.
53UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 33.
54Ibid paras 35; 51.  See also Maastricht Guideline 15(d).  The obligation to protect the
right to health is further contemplated by Toebes op cit note 8 at 326-332.
55See Bekker op cit note 34 at 14; Craven op cit note 40 at 113-114; Christof Heyns &
Danie Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ (1998) 2
Law, Democracy & Development 153 at 158; Karrisha Pillay ‘South Africa’s commitment to
health rights in the spotlight: Do we meet the international standard?’ in Brand & Russell op cit
note 6, 61 at 64; Sage Russell ‘Minimum state obligations: International dimensions’ in Brand
& Russell (ibid) 11 at 19.
41
care provision (by requiring of states to abstain from various discriminatory
practices and from impeding equal access to care).  It also illuminates rights to
quality of care (by mandating that states refrain from marketing unsafe drugs),
to reproductive health care services (by mandating that states refrain from
limiting access to contraceptives and other reproductive health services) and to
environmental health (by forbidding willful pollution).52
The obligation to protect the right to health is understood by UNCESCR
as requiring the adoption of measures that prevent third parties from infringing
upon article 12.53  This immediately entitles citizens to demand the availability
of effective remedies that protect them against private violations of their health-
related rights.  UNCESCR’s understanding of the ‘obligation to protect’ also
further clarifies the quality-dimension of the right to access health care, by
requiring measures that ensure the acceptability and quality of privately
available health care products and services, as well as measures ensuring that
health care professionals act ethically and that their conduct meets appropriate
standards of competence and skill.54
Apart from affirming the rights to health protection and equal access to
determinants of health, few directly enforceable entitlements may be derived
from General Comment 14's elaboration on the obligation to fulfill the right to
health.  This is in line with predominant academic opinion that the obligation to
fulfill represents mainly those aspects of the right that are to be realised
progressively.55  Accordingly, General Comment 14 elaborates on the
progressive elements of rights to determinants of health (by mandating
measures that ensure increased population access to non-medicinal, health-
56UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at paras 33; 36-37; 52.  See also
Toebes op cit note 8 at 332-336.
57These aspects of minimum core are explained by David Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable
approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights
jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 at 11-18; Thomas J Bollyky ‘R if C > B + P: A paradigm for
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conducive social amenities), the availability and quality of health services (by
requiring ongoing efforts to increase the number of health care facilities,
especially in rural areas, as well as ongoing training of medical professionals)
and affordable care (by requiring the provision of a public or private health
insurance system).  UNCESCR’s understanding of the ‘obligation to fulfill’ also
includes a programmatic (ie not directly benefit-related) element in that it obliges
states to attempt the realisation of the right to health through adopting measures
aimed at health care provision and health promotion.  It also requires states to
adopt benchmarks and timeframes with which to measure progress towards full
realisation of the right to health.56
(b) Minimum core obligations
The development of a ‘minimum core approach’ to the substantive rights
enshrined in the ICESCR has served both to clarify the content of these rights
and to expound the standard of progressive realisation, through prioritising
certain basic needs over others (thereby indicating both a logical starting point
and a temporal framework for progressive realisation).  In line with the premise
that human dignity is denied those who are forced to subsist without access to
even the most basic of socio-economic amenities, the concept of ‘minimum core
obligation’ entails that there are minimum levels of socio-economic subsistence
below which no-one should be allowed to exist, regardless of state-resource
constraints.  Aimed at protecting the most vulnerable members of society, the
minimum core approach involves identifying such subsistence levels in respect
of each socio-economic right and insisting that the provision of ‘minimum core’
goods and services enjoys immediate priority.  The minimum core of a right thus
represents a ‘floor’ of immediately enforceable entitlements from which
progressive realisation should proceed.57
judicial remedies of socio-economic rights violations’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 161 at 184; Chapman
op cit note 6 at 37; Iain Currie ‘Bill of Rights jurisprudence’ (2000) Annual Survey of SA Law 24
at 57; Dankwa; Flinterman & Leckie op cit note 50 at 717-718; Pierre De Vos ‘The economic and
social rights of children and South Africa’s transitional Constitution’ (1995) 10 SA Public Law 233
at 251; Leckie op cit note 42 at 101-102; Liebenberg op cit note 44 at 43; Caroline MA Nicholson
‘The right to health care, the best interests of the child and AIDS in South Africa and Malawi’
(2002) 35 CILSA 351 at 360; Russell op cit note 55 at 15; Craig Scott & Philip Alston
‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A comment on Soobramoney’s
legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 at 250; Scott & Macklem op cit note 49
at 77; Toebes op cit note 6 at 676-677; Geraldine van Bueren ‘On floors and ceilings: Minimum
core obligations and children’ in Brand & Russel op cit note 6, 183 at 185.
58Bilchitz op cit note 57 at 11-12; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in
interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 1 at 18; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The
interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Stuart Woolman (ed) Constitutional Law of South
Africa (2ed; 2003) ch 33 at 28-29.
59See Dworkin op cit note 1 at 886; 888-894, who argues for a Rawlsian exercise of
public deliberation through which society determines which health-related needs are most vital
and accordingly prioritises their satisfaction over other, less vital, health-related needs.
60UNCESCR General Comment 3 op cit note 40 at para 10.  See also Limburg Principle
72; Maastricht Guideline 15(i).
61That states must emphasise the provision of primary health care is also echoed by art
24 of the CRC and art 10(2)(b) of the San Salvador Protocol.
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The moral and practical importance of a minimum core approach to the
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights lies in its acknowledgement that
certain socio-economic needs are of extreme vitalness and urgency, and that
their satisfaction should accordingly be prioritised over the satisfaction of other,
less urgent and vital, needs.58  This distinction is especially useful in relation to
the right to health, due to the substantial variations in urgency and vitalness of
health-related needs and in the cost and effectiveness with which such needs
may be satisfied.59
UNCESCR embraced the minimum core concept in its third general
comment, where it stated that
‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least,
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State
party.  Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care,
of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima
facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant’.60
Of course, this affirmation of the existence and implications of minimum core
obligations sheds little light on their content in relation to specific rights.  For
instance, all that is said about the right to health is that deprivation of ‘essential
primary health care’ would amount to non-compliance therewith.61
62WHO Declaration of Alma-Ata (1978) para VI.  Primary health care forms the crux of
the WHO’s ‘Health for All’ strategy, and its importance is also emphasised by arts 24(2)(b)-(c)
of the CRC and art 10(2)(a) of the San Salvador Protocol.  On the usefulness of the ‘primary
health care’ concept in fleshing out the mimimum core content of the right to health, see
Hendriks & Toebes op cit note 7 at 326; Nicholson op cit note 57 at 360-361; Toebes op cit note
6 at 676; Toebes op cit note 8 at 283-284.  On viewing provision of essential medicines as part
of the minimum core of the right to health, see Chirwa op cit note 6 at 542; 549; 565.
63Bekker op cit note 34 at 9.  See also Nadasen op cit note 4 at 12-14; Nicholson op cit
note 57 at 360-361.
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Accordingly, greater clarity on the core content of the right to health may
be gained by engaging with the WHO’s understanding of the concept of primary
health care, defined in its Declaration of Alma-Ata as ‘essential health care
based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and
technology made universally available to individuals and families in the
community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and
country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit
of self-reliance and self-determination’.62  Essential elements of primary health
care identified at Alma-Ata include ‘promotion of food supply and proper
nutrition; basic sanitation and safe water; provision of essential drugs and
maternal and child care, including family planning; education regarding
prevailing health problems; prevention and control of locally endemic diseases;
appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and immunization
against major infectious diseases’.63
Much-needed further clarity on the minimum core content of the right to
health has been provided by UNCESCR, which in General Comment 14
provided a list of obligations comprising the core content of article 12 of the
ICESCR.  These are:
‘(1) to ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and services on a
non-discriminatory basis especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups;
(2) to ensure access to the minimum essential food which is sufficient,
nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger to everyone;
(3) to ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate
supply of safe and potable water;
(4) to provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined by the WHO’s Action
Programme on Essential Drugs; 
(5) to ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services;
(6) to adopt and implement a national public health strategy and plan of action,
on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the health concerns of the
64UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 8 at para 43, which also contains a list
of minimum characteristics to which public health strategies should adhere.
65Ibid para 44. These lists of core and comparable obligations are discussed in more
detail by Bekker op cit note 34 at 15-16; Chapman op cit note 6 at 49-50; 54; Karrisha Pillay
‘South Africa’s commitment to health rights in the spotlight’ (2000) 2(3) ESR Review 1 at 2-3;
Pillay op cit note 55 at 65-66.
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whole population...’.64
An additional list of obligations, considered by UNCESCR as being ‘of
comparable priority’ to minimum core obligations, is also furnished, namely:
‘(1) to ensure reproductive, maternal (pre-natal as well as post-natal) and child
health care;
(2) to provide immunization against the community’s major infectious diseases;
(3) to take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic
diseases;
(4) to provide education and access to information concerning the main health
problems in the community, including methods of preventing and controlling
them;
(5) to provide appropriate training for health personnel, including education on
health and human rights’.65
It would thus seem that the minimum core of the right to health, rather than
adding entitlements and/or obligations to those already identified above, affirms
the importance of certain of those entitlements (such as that to equality and non-
discrimination and the adoption of a public health strategy) while indicating
essential elements of others.  In particular, the core of the right to health care
services, goods and facilities encompasses the provision of essential drugs,
reproductive health care services, child health care and immunisation against
infectious diseases, whereas core aspects of non-medicinal determinants of
health (illuminated elsewhere in relation to specific rights to housing, food, etc)
should similarly be prioritised.
In principle, a minimum core approach to the obligations imposed by
socio-economic rights entails that citizens should generally be able to demand
to be provided with the goods, facilities and services that comprise the minimum
core of a right such as the right to health.  This is the case notwithstanding the
dictates of progressive realisation and despite the resource implications of
providing minimum core goods and services, although states may nevertheless
justify non-provision of core goods and services by showing that complying with
66According to Maastricht Guideline 9, minimum core obligations generally apply
‘irrespective of the availability of resources ... or any other factors and difficulties’. UNCESCR
nevertheless indicated that non-fulfillment of core obligations could be justified by resource
scarcity, but only where states can demonstrate that ‘every effort has been made’ to use all
available resources in order to satisfy the core obligations ‘as a matter of priority’.  UNCESCR
General Comment 3 op cit note 40 at para 10.  It further emphasised that, even in times of
economic crisis, states must do all in their power to ensure that rights are afforded the ‘widest
possible enjoyment ... under the circumstances’ and should prioritise meeting the needs of the
most vulnerable sectors of society.  Ibid at paras 11-12.  See also Limburg Principles 25-28; 72
as well as discussions on limitation of core interests in international law by Chapman op cit note
6 at 37; Craven op cit note 40 at 143; Liebenberg op cit note 40 at 366-367; Robertson op cit
note 46 at 701-702.
67Philip W Bates ‘Health law, ethics and policy: Challenges and new avenues for the 21st
century and new millennium’ (1999) 18 Medicine & Law 13 at 21.
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their core obligations is objectively impossible, or demonstrably outside of their
resource capacity.66
2.4 SUMMARY: ENTITLEMENTS IMPLIED BY THE HEALTH RIGHTS PACKAGE
It is clear that the right to health, in addition to representing ‘an aspirational
ethical ideal for the international community, which is intrinsically valuable’,67
also encompasses tangible human rights standards and imposes a network of
enforceable obligations on states.  These derive from an interrelated package
of rights that together ensure maximum possible enjoyment of the right to health.
This chapter has identified the contributing elements to this package from
authoritative formulations of health-related rights in several international human
rights instruments.  Understandings of health rights emerging from this survey
were integrated with institutional and academic elaborations on their content as
well as on the content of the obligations they generate.
Three strands of rights emerged from the survey.  The right to health, it
may be said, consists first of a group of freedom rights (such as freedom from
coercive treatment, the right to bodily integrity, the right to reproductive freedom
and the right not to be treated without consent), which may immediately be
enforced in the same way as other civil liberties.  Second, there is an
immediately enforceable entitlement to equal enjoyment of the right to health.
This in turn implies an entitlement not to be arbitrarily or unfairly excluded from
health-related services and/or benefits.  Citizens should thus be able to demand
68For a discussion of some of these, see Fons Coomans ‘Reviewing implementation of
social and economic rights: An assessment of the “reasonableness” test as developed by the
South African Constitutional Court’ (2005) 65 Heidelberg J of International Law 167 at 185.
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that their health-related liberties are respected in a variety of settings, to be
included in the ambit of laws, policies and programmes that confer health-
related benefits and to receive such benefits where these are being withheld
arbitrarily or due to unfair discrimination.
Third, the right to health awards a number of entitlements to health-
conducive social goods and services.  These may be subdivided into two
groups: On the one hand, the right to health encompasses rights to determinants
of health (in turn consisting of rights to occupational health, to environmental
health and to non-medicinal, health-conducive social goods such as housing,
food, water and sanitation that are typically the subjects of separate socio-
economic rights).  These all consist of immediately enforceable core elements
(which may be derived from literature relating specifically to the separate rights
they represent) and of non-core elements which are to be realised progressively.
On the other hand, the right to health implies a right to available, accessible and
acceptable health care services, products and facilities of adequate quality.  The
immediately enforceable core of this right consists of the provision of essential
medicines, primary health care, reproductive health care and services necessary
for health protection (such as immunisation services).  In relation to other (non-
core) services, products and facilities, citizens at least possess enforceable
entitlements to non-disruption of existing access and to have arbitrary barriers
in the way of access removed.
There are of course important institutional differences between the
international human rights framework upon which the survey conducted in this
chapter has been based and the domestic legal setting.68  In particular, the
possibility of individuals actually enforcing their rights against their state, and
therefore of deriving tangible benefit from the exercise of their rights, is real on
the domestic level.  The focus of the remainder of this dissertation is therefore
on the extent to which the elements of the health rights package identified in this
chapter find recognition and protection in the South African Constitution and on
48
the extent to which the benefits that they imply have in fact accrued from their
invocation in South African constitutional litigation.
1Thomas J Bollyky ‘R if C > B + P: A paradigm for judicial remedies of socio-economic
rights violations’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 161 at 180-181; Pierre De Vos ‘Pious wishes or directly
enforceable human rights?: Social and economic rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’
(1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 70; Christof Heyns & Danie Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights
in the South African Constitution’ (1998) 2 Law, Democracy & Development 153 at 157; Marius
Olivier ‘Constitutional perspectives on the enforcement of socio-economic rights: Recent South
African experiences’ (2002) 33 Victoria Univ of Wellington LR 117 at 135; Craig Scott & Philip
Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A comment on
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 at 214.
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CHAPTER 3
HEALTH RIGHTS IN THE 1996 CONSTITUTION
3.1 BASIC FEATURES OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND A BENEFIT-FOCUSED
APPROACH TO HEALTH RIGHTS
By including justiciable socio-economic rights alongside civil and political rights,
the Bill of Rights in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution affirms the principle of
interdependence and indivisibility of human rights.1  The apparent equal
justiciability of socio-economic rights and civil and political rights means that,
unlike constitutional systems where socio-economic rights are not included in
a bill of rights or are included as non-enforceable directive principles of state
policy, there is no textual impediment in the South African Bill of Rights to
tangible benefits being claimed in, and resulting from, litigation involving socio-
economic rights.  This chapter first discusses basic features of the Bill of Rights
that facilitate and impact on a benefit-centered approach to health rights.
Thereafter, I engage with the formulation of substantive health rights in the Bill
of Rights and illustrate that the benefits implied by the health rights package in
international law are also capable of resulting from South African Bill of Rights
litigation.
According to s 39(1) of the Constitution, courts must promote the
underlying values of an open and democratic society, must take international
law into account and may also have regard to foreign law when interpreting
rights in the Bill of Rights.  This provision appears to mandate consideration of
interpretations of the right to health in international law when interpreting rights
2See Audrey R Chapman ‘Core obligations related to the right to health and their
relevance for South Africa’ in Danie Brand & Sage Russell (eds) Exploring the Core Content of
Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (2002) 35 at 50-51;
Chrystal Chetty ‘The right to health care services: Interpreting section 27 of the Constitution’
(2002) 17 SA Public Law 453 at 454; Olivier op cit note 1 at 123-124; Karrisha Pillay ‘South
Africa’s commitment to health rights in the spotlight: Do we meet the international standard?’ in
Brand & Russell (this note) 61 at 62-63; Sage Russell ‘Minimum state obligations: International
dimensions’ in Brand & Russell (this note) 11 at 14; Scott & Alston op cit note 1 at 222.
Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR, its provisions and the
various deliberations on the meaning thereof remain important in terms of s 39(1), especially
since many socio-economic rights in the 1996 Constitution were clearly modeled on provisions
of the ICESCR.  See Sandra Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Stuart
Woolman (ed) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2ed; 2003) ch 33 at 11.  In any event, while
not incurring any obligations in terms of the ICESCR, South Africa indicated its agreement with
the substantive terms thereof by signing the treaty, and has ratified several of the treaties that
recognise the right to health in terms not dissimilar to that of art 12 of the ICESCR, such as the
CEDAW, the CERD, the CRC, the African Charter and the ACRWC.
3With the exception that s 7(2) adds a separate obligation to promote rights, which in
international law is viewed as part of the obligation to fulfill.  See UNCESCR General Comment
14 The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (article 12 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2000) at paras 33; 37.
4See Gina Bekker ‘Introduction to the rights concerning health care in the South African
Constitution’ in Gina Bekker (ed) A Compilation of Essential Documents on the Rights to Health
Care (2000) 1 at 14; Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘The right to health in international law: Its
implications for the obligations of state and non-state actors in ensuring access to essential
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in the Bill of Rights that correspond to elements of the health rights package.
While not requiring that such interpretations be followed regardless of
differences between the domestic and international formulation of rights or in the
institutional setting within which these are translated into reality, s 39(1) allows
courts to rely on an extensive body of theory which considers the content and
implications of relevant rights and standards in detail.2
For example, s 7(2) of the Constitution determines that ‘[t]he state must
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’.  Clearly a
domestic recasting of the ‘tripartite typology of interdependent duties’,3 this
subsection opens the door for UNCESCR’s deliberation of the obligations
derived from the right to health to enter South African courts’ interpretations of
constitutional health rights.  For example, South African courts may recognise
that the obligation to respect health rights implies entitlements to the
continuation and non-disruption of their existing enjoyment, whereas the
obligation to protect health rights requires that individuals have access to
effective remedies that prevent or compensate for private infringements of their
rights.4
medicine’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 541 at 559-560; De Vos op cit note 1 at 79-80; 83; Pierre De Vos
‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as contextual fairness’
(2001) 17 SAJHR 258 at 273; Stephen Ellmann ‘A constitutional confluence: American “State-
action” law and the application of South Africa’s socio-economic rights guarantees to private
actors’ in Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid Constitutions:
Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 444 at 448; Heyns & Brand op cit note 1 at 158;
Sandra Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights’ in Matthew Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law
of South Africa (RS5, 1999) ch 41 at 27-28; 31-32; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Violations of socio-
economic rights: The role of the South African Human Rights Commission’ in Andrews &
Ellmann (this note) 405 at 411; 414-415; Olivier op cit note 1 at 137-138; Kate O’Regan
‘Introducing socio-economic rights’ (1999) 1(4) ESR Review 2; Pillay op cit note 2 at 64; 67;
Karrisha Pillay ‘Rights concerning health’ in Centre for Human Rights Report on the Realisation
of Socio-economic Rights (2000) 51 at 54; Russell op cit note 2 at 18-19; Craig Scott & Patrick
Macklem ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social rights in a new South
African constitution’ (1992) 141 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1 at 74.
5See UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 3 at paras 35; 42.
6See for instance Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) BCLR 187 (T) at 196I-197D re s 28(1)(b) of
the Constitution; Modderklip Boerdery v Modder East Squatters 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) at 394G-
395(B) and Theewaterskloof Holdings v Jacobs 2002 (3) SA 401 (LCC) at para 18 re s 26(1) of
the Constitution; also Halton Cheadle & Dennis Davis ‘The application of the 1996 Constitution
in the private sphere’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 44 at 59-60; Alfred Cockrell ‘Private Law and the Bill of
Rights: A threshold issue of “horizontality”’ in Butterworths Bill of Rights Compendium (RS13
October 2003) ch 3A at 13; Rolf Künnemann ‘A coherent approach to human rights’ (1995) 17
Human Rights Quarterly 323 at 339-340.
7On the capacity of private entities to infringe socio-economic rights and the need to hold
them responsible for such infringements, see Maastricht Guideline 18; Danwood Mzikenge
Chirwa ‘Non-state actors’ responsibility for socio-economic rights: The nature of their obligations
under the South African Constitution’ (2002) 3(3) ESR Review 2 at 4; Chirwa op cit note 4 at
561-562; KD Ewing ‘Social rights and constitutional law’ (1999) Public Law 104 at 119; Mark
Heywood ‘Debunking “Conglomo-talk”: A case study of the amicus curiae as an instrument for
advocacy, investigation and mobilisation’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy & Development 133 at 134-
135; Scott Leckie ‘Another step towards indivisibility: Identifying the key features of violations
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The duty to protect socio-economic rights further clearly requires the
recognition, regulation and enforcement of private socio-economic obligations.5
This appears to imply at least a measure of horizontal application of socio-
economic rights, the possibility of which is often denied or overlooked by courts
and academic commentators alike.6  Whereas the constitutional text seems to
indicate that only the State bears the duty to progressively realise socio-
economic rights, this need not mean that it is the only actor implicated in socio-
economic rights matters, nor that socio-economic rights are inherently incapable
of horizontal application.  Certainly, private entities appear as capable of
harming the enjoyment of socio-economic rights as the State.  Given that the
satisfaction of many health-related needs is often frustrated through the conduct
of private entities, health rights will frequently be meaningless to their
beneficiaries unless they are capable of invocation also against such entities.7
of economic, social and cultural rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 81 at 108; 111;
Liebenberg (in Andrews & Ellmann) op cit note 4 at 414; Jordan J Paust ‘Human rights
responsibilities of private corporations’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt J of Transnational Law 801 at 802;
Marius Pieterse ‘Beyond the welfare state: Globalization of neo-liberal culture and the
constitutional protection of social and economic rights in South Africa’ (2003) 14 Stellenbosch
LR 3 at 25-26; Steven R Ratner ‘Corporations and human rights: A theory of legal responsibility’
(2001) 111 Yale LJ 443 at 462; Johan van der Walt ‘Progressive indirect horizontal application
of the Bill of Rights: Towards a co-operative relation between common-law and constitutional
jurisprudence’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 341 at 353.
8Johan De Waal; Iain Currie & Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (4th ed
2001) at 55; Ellmann op cit note 4 at 451-452; 461; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note
4 at 45.
9Cockrell op cit note 6 at 13.  In determining the extent to which a private entity should
be bound by a particular socio-economic obligation, it is useful to consider the nature and extent
of the power exercised by the entity, the degree to which it emulates state power and the manner
in which exercising the power impacts on the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.  Examples
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Application of the Bill of Rights is regulated by s 8 of the Constitution,
which determines in relevant part:
‘(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive,
the judiciary and all organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if, and to the
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the
nature of any duty imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person
in terms of subsection (2), a court - 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give
effect to that right; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that
the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1)’.
Socio-economic rights are nowhere excluded from horizontal application.  What
is acknowledged by s 8, however, is that application of a right to a private
dispute will depend on the nature of the right and on the nature of the duties it
imposes - indicating that not every right, and not all duties imposed by a
particular right, will find horizontal application.8  In addition, it may be argued
that a third factor, namely the nature or identity of the actor against whom/which
the right is applied, is significant, since not all actors have equal capacity to
comply with the various obligations imposed by a socio-economic right.  It may
accordingly be argued that s 8(2) ‘proceeds on the assumption that
constitutional rights might be agent-relative and context-sensitive, inasmuch as
their direct application against private agencies will depend on the
circumstances of the case and the characteristics of the particular person’.9
of private entities that may be considered bound by health rights because of the nature and
impact of the power they wield include private hospitals, pharmaceutical companies and private
health care practitioners.  Otherwise, it may be argued that private entities should be regarded
as socio-economic duty-bearers in contexts where a ‘special relationship’ may be said to exist
between them and the relevant rights-bearers.  Examples include the doctor-patient relationship,
the employer-employee relationship, the parent-child relationship, spousal relationships and a
variety of contractual relationships such as that between individuals and their medical aid
schemes.  See Ellmann op cit note 4 at 444; 446; 462-467; also Chirwa op cit note 7 at 4; 6;
James W Nickel ‘How human rights generate duties to protect and provide’ (1993) 15 Human
Rights Quarterly 76 at 78; 81-82; Ratner op cit note 7 at 497-511; 524-525; Henry Shue ‘The
interdependence of duties’ in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds) The Right to Food (1984) 83 at 90.
10See De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 37 and also the separate concurring
remarks of Sachs J in Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at para 187.
11Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 46.  On possibilities in this regard, see
generally Pieter Carstens & Anton Kok ‘An assessment of the use of disclaimers by South
African hospitals in view of constitutional demands, foreign law and medico-legal considerations’
(2003) 18 SA Public Law 430 at 441; De Vos op cit note 1 at 100-101; Pieterse op cit note 7 at
26.
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Section 8(3) proceeds to indicate that rights would seldom directly apply
to a private dispute.  The preferred manner to vindicate them in the private
sphere would be by way of legislative enactment or through developing the
common law, which would generate more effective remedies for private rights-
infringements.10  Given the plethora of relevant legislative provisions regulating
social service delivery and the vast body of common law that may be developed
to give effect to socio-economic rights, direct reliance on socio-economic rights
in a private dispute will likely be a rare occurrence.  Fears of overzealous private
application are further allayed by the determination that rules of common law
may be developed to limit the private application of a right.11
Notwithstanding the manner in which the Bill of Rights is applied to a
particular dispute, all rights can be limited by the State in accordance with the
general limitations provision contained in s 36 of the Constitution, which reads:
‘(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors, including - 
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights’.
12For a more detailed exposition of the ‘two-stage’ approach, see De Waal; Currie &
Erasmus op cit note 8 at 145-147.
13See Liebenberg op cit note 2 at 55 and authorities there cited.
14Accordingly, the Constitutional Court has on several occasions indicated that it would
adopt a generous and purposive approach to interpretation of rights in the Bill of Rights.  A
generous approach to Bill of Rights interpretation involves preferring as wide and inclusive an
interpretation of a right as is possible within the parameters of the constitutional text.  De Waal;
Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 132-133.  Purposive interpretation ‘aims to tease out the core
values underpinning listed fundamental rights in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom and then to prefer the interpretation of a provision that best
supports and protects those values’.  Ibid at 130-131.
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Given that s 36 affords the State an opportunity to show that there are valid
reasons why a limitation on the enforcement of a particular right should be
upheld in particular circumstances, courts have adopted a so-called ‘two stage’
approach to Bill of Rights adjudication.  This involves broadly that a court, first,
determines whether an infringement of a right has occurred by defining the ambit
and scope of that right and, thereafter, if an infringement is indeed found, that
the respondent is called upon to justify such infringement in terms of s 36.12  In
addition to promoting accountability by insisting that the State publicly define
and justify the extent to which it seeks to limit rights,13 the two-stage approach
affords courts the luxury of being able to generously and permissively award
content to a particular right through the process of interpretation without being
hindered by the fact that there must inevitably be limits to the extent of its
enforcement, since these may properly be deliberated in the limitation-stage of
proceedings.14
Section 36 is of significance to a benefit-centered approach to health
rights not only because it facilitates the unfettered development of their content
in this manner but specifically because, through essentially mandating that a
proportionality analysis be conducted in deciding whether or not to allow a
particular limitation, it allows courts to perform the inevitable balancing act of
weighing individual interests in obtaining tangible benefit from a particular
health-related right against competing individual or societal interests.  Through
its consistent invocation on a case-by-case basis, s 36 can therefore assist in
the development of a coherent theory on the circumstances in which health
rights may legitimately render the benefits that they promise.
15See John C Mubangizi ‘Public health, the South Arican Bill of Rights and the socio-
economic polemic’ (2002) TSAR 343 at 349 and in general Tembeka Ngcukaitobi ‘The evolution
of standing rules in South Africa and their significance in promoting social justice’ (2002) 18
SAJHR 590-613.
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Finally, s 38 of the Constitution, which is simultaneously the Bill of Rights’
standing provision and its primary remedial clause, is of particular importance
for a benefit-focused analysis of health rights.  It determines:
‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court,
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and
the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.  The
persons who may approach a court are- 
a) anyone acting in their own interest;
b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their
own name;
c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class
of persons;
d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
e) an association acting in the interest of its members’.
Section 38 drastically relaxed standing rules in South Africa, where previously
litigants had to prove that they had a personal interest in a matter before they
could bring it before a court.  Its scope furthers the cause of social justice by
enabling socio-economic rights-based litigation on behalf of poor and otherwise
marginalised persons who would ordinarily not be in a position to assert their
rights themselves.15  Even more significant for a benefit-focused approach is that
s 38 clearly allows individuals to approach a court for individual relief where their
socio-economic rights have been infringed or threatened.  Arguments that socio-
economic rights should only function as group rights and should generally not
result in the granting of individual relief due to their polycentric nature are thus
without constitutional foundation.
As to its remedial aspect, s 38's affirmation that courts may grant
‘appropriate relief’ in the event of an infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights
is augmented by s 172(1) of the Constitution's determination that courts ‘(a)
must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and (b) may make any order that is just
and equitable...’.  Appropriateness, justness and equity are thus the only
constitutionally derived limits on the remedial power of the judiciary in Bill of
16See Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) at paras 18-19;
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC)
at para 165; Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 42; Jonathan Klaaren
‘Structures of government in the 1996 Constitution: Putting democracy back into human rights’
(1997) 13 SAJHR 3 at 11; Jonathan Klaaren ‘Judicial Remedies’ in Chaskalson et al op cit note
4, ch 9 at 2-4; 29; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 10; 52; Olivier op cit note 1
at 132; 146-147; Kameshni Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the
enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 255 at 257-
258; Scott & Alston op cit note 1 at 224; Wim Trengove ‘Judicial remedies for violations of socio-
economic rights’ (1999) 1(4) ESR Review 8.
17These are considered for instance in Fose op cit note 16 at paras 19; 96; Hoffmann op
cit note 16 at para 45 and by Howard Varney ‘Forging new tools: A note on Fose v Minister of
Safety and Security CCT 14/96' (1998) 14 SAJHR 336 at 340-343.
18See for instance S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at para 32; Mistry v Interim
Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at para 35; National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality op cit note 16 at paras 82; 94 as well as discussion of these
principles by De Waal, Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 174; 183.
19See chapter 1 note 30 and accompanying text.
20UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 3 at para 59.
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Rights cases.16
An inquiry into the justness and appropriateness of a particular remedy
in the circumstances of a particular case is necessarily a context-specific one
and is impacted by various practical, legal, institutional and moral
considerations.  These pertinently include that relief must sufficiently address
the wrong caused by the constitutional infringement and must be effective, fair,
flexible and capable of being enforced.17  Courts should further take account of
the principles that successful litigants must generally obtain the relief that they
seek and that relief should generally not be confined only to such litigants, but
should extend also to all others who are similarly situated, unless this would be
inappropriate or unjust.18
I have argued in chapter 1 that the justiciable nature of socio-economic
rights, read with the common law maxim of ‘ubi ius ibi remedium’, entitles
citizens to effective relief for infringements of their socio-economic rights.19
Similarly, UNCESCR has stated that ‘[a]ny person or group who is a victim of a
violation of the right to health should have access to effective judicial or other
appropriate remedies ... [and] should be entitled to adequate reparation, which
may take the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of
non-repetition’.20  In order for an applicant in a health rights matter to derive
tangible benefit from the successful invocation of her right, it is necessary that
21The appropriateness of various of these remedies for violations of socio-economic
rights and in other related contexts is considered for instance by David Bilchitz ‘Towards a
reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic
rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 at 18; 25-26; Bollyky op cit note 1 at 177; 184-186; De
Waal, Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 175-190; 451-452; Klaaren (1999) op cit note 16 at 7-
8A; 11-16; 22; 28; Jonathan Klaaren ‘A remedial interpretation of the Treatment Action
Campaign decision’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 455 at 461; 465; Leckie op cit note 7 at 120; Liebenberg
(in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 52-54; Liebenberg op cit note 2 at 62-63; Sandra
Liebenberg ‘Basic rights claims: How responsive is reasonableness review?’ (2004) 5(5) ESR
Review 7 at 11; Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender ‘Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction:
When is it appropriate, just and equitable?’ (2005) 122 SALJ 325; Theunis Roux ‘Understanding
Grootboom - A Response to Cass R Sunstein’ (2002) 12(2) Constitutional Forum 41, 51; Scott
& Alston op cit note 1 at 224-25; Mia Swart ‘Left out in the cold? Crafting constitutional remedies
for the poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 215 at 225-228; Trengove op cit note 16 at 8-11;
Varney op cit note 17 at 337-338; 344-345.  See also Fose op cit note 16 paras 19-20; 58-61;
67; 72; 99; 104.
22Bollyky op cit note 1 at 163-164.
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relief awarded to prevent or compensate for the unjustifiable infringement of her
right is both effective and amounts to ‘adequate reparation’.
A wide range of remedies may constitute appropriate, just, equitable and
effective relief for unjustifiable infringements of health-related rights, depending
on the nature of the right, the nature of the infringement and the unique
circumstances of each case.  These include, for instance, an order declaring
that a challenged law, policy or conduct is invalid, an order suspending a
declaration of invalidity of legislation or policy and allowing the legislature or
executive to correct the defect, an order that words be read into legislation or
policy, a declaration of rights, a prohibitive interdict, a mandamus, a structural
interdict, an order of specific performance or reparations in kind, the
development of the substantive or remedial provisions of the common law, an
award of damages or compensation as well as various forms of interim relief.21
Of course, tangible benefits will result more readily from some of these
remedies than from others.  So for instance will purely declaratory relief, while
it may indirectly benefit individual rights-bearers, often be of little use to them -
‘[t]he benefits of moral condemnation ... seem rather abstract for those whose
rights have been violated, such as the thousands of South Africans living with
HIV/AIDS and dying without access to effective treatment. ... Effective relief for
these individuals must be more than declaratory, it must be mandatory in form
and structural in purpose, addressing the underlying conditions that threaten
constitutional values as well as the private and public acts that create and
perpetuate those conditions’.22
23See De Waal, Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 194.
24Remarked in a more general sense by De Waal, Currie & Erasmus (ibid) at 169.
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Nevertheless, circumstances may well arise in which the interests of justice and
equity dictate that a declaratory order is the only appropriate one.23  What is
required in every case is for courts to weigh the applicant’s interest in an
effective remedy that amounts to adequate reparation for the harm threatened
or suffered against competing individual or societal interests and to award a
tangible remedy unless doing so would be unjust, inequitable or inappropriate.
The extent of courts’ remedial flexibility enables them to strike an
appropriate balance between individual and communal interests in socio-
economic rights cases and further to delineate the circumstances in which the
interests of justice permit tangible benefits to result from a finding that a socio-
economic right has unjustifiably been infringed.  Accordingly, it facilitates a more
explicitly benefit-focused approach to the interpretation and limitation of health
rights, by allowing courts to avoid potentially unjust consequences of a
permissive and benefit-focused interpretation of health rights or a finding that a
(permissively interpreted) health right has unjustifiably been infringed, through
tailoring a remedy that is appropriate in light of the specific circumstances of
every case.24
Overall, the provisions governing the structure of Bill of Rights litigation
appear to encourage a benefit-focused approach to socio-economic rights.  Not
only are socio-economic rights fully justiciable and enforceable by a wide range
of individuals and groups against the State or certain private entities, but their
enforcement may also, in appropriate circumstances, result in the granting of
tangible and effective relief which amounts to adequate reparation for their
infringement.  Courts are empowered firstly to ascertain the extent of the
benefits implied by various socio-economic rights through a generous and
purposive approach to their interpretation, secondly to ascertain whether law or
conduct has infringed a particular right by balancing the interests served by any
limitation on its ambit against the applicant’s interests in obtaining relief that
satisfies the needs it represents, and thirdly to delineate the circumstances in
25Bekker op cit note 4 at 1-2; Chapman op cit note 2 at 35-36; 51.
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which the benefits implied by a right should result by deliberating the
appropriateness of a range of orders through which to remedy the infringement.
It is thus possible for the socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights, including the
various health-related rights to be discussed in the following section, to directly
and tangibly compensate for the denial of the needs they represent, and hence
to contribute to the affirmation and protection of the inherent dignity of their
subjects.
3.2 THE HEALTH RIGHTS PACKAGE IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS
There is no single provision in the Constitution that simultaneously protects all
aspects of the right to ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health’.  Rather, chapter 2 of the Constitution contains
several scattered provisions aimed at promoting the realisation of the right to
health, which ought to be read together when ascertaining the extent of health-
related protection awarded by the Bill of Rights.25  This section identifies the
rights in the Bill of Rights that guarantee interests similar to those that enjoy
protection as part of the health rights package in international law, and
illustrates that the benefits implied by these constitutional provisions are virtually
identical to those conferred by the right to health.  I accordingly propose an
interpretation of these rights that corresponds to the interpretation of the
relevant constituent elements of the health rights package advanced in chapter
2, and consider the extent to which these rights are capable of rendering the
benefits they promise (and, accordingly, of satisfying the needs they affirm)
within the structural framework of South African Bill of Rights litigation.
(a) Health-related freedoms
Control over physical and mental health status may be seen as an integral
aspect of human autonomy, and the pursuit of health through the exercise of
26RS Downie; Carol Tannahill & Andrew Tannahill Health Promotion: Models and Values
(1996) at 176; Dieter Giesen ‘A right to health care? A comparative perspective’ (1994) 4(2)
Health Matrix 277 at 280; Sheetal B Shah ‘Illuminating the possible in the developing world:
Guaranteeing the human right to health in India’ (1999) 32 Vanderbilt J of Transnational Law 435
at 457; 460-461; Alicia Ely Yamin ‘Defining questions: Situating issues of power in the
formulation of a right to health under international law’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 398
at 404; 422.
27In the context of abortion, the exercise of this right is facilitated by s 5 of the Choice
on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, which determines that no consent other than that
of a pregnant woman is required for the termination of a pregnancy.  The reverberance of this
provision with s 12(2)(a) of the Constitution influenced a finding that the limits occasioned by it
on the rights of parents to consent to medical treatment received by their daughters were not
unjustifiable in Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T).
See 1092H-1095J.
28Joanna Birenbaum ‘Contextualising choice: Abortion, equality and the right to make
decisions concerning reproduction’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 485 at 485-486; 489-490; 502; Charles
Ngwena ‘Access to health care as a fundamental right: The scope and limits of section 27 of the
Constitution’ (2000) 25(1) Journal for Juridical Science 1 at 9.  See also Christian Lawyers
Association of SA v Minister of Health 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T) at 1123E-G.
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personal choices as an expression of that autonomy.26  As shown in 2.2(a)
above, the health rights package accordingly includes a number of autonomy-
based freedoms.  In South Africa, these are located in s 12(2) of the
Constitution, which determines:
‘Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the
right -
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their
informed consent.’
Regarded also as an important instrument for the achievement of
substantive gender equality, s 12(2)(a) enshrines the control of women over
their reproductive capacity.  As such, it is most often equated to choices to use
contraception or to terminate a pregnancy, and requires firstly that legal and
other obstacles to exercising such choices be removed and secondly that
women are not to be refused access to reproductive health care facilities, goods
and services when they request it.27
Given that the availability and accessibility of such facilities, goods and
services are logical and essential prerequisites for the meaningful exercise of
this right,28 s 12(2)(a) should further be interpreted as affording additional weight
to any claims to such access that women have in terms of other constitutional
provisions.  For example, Jonathan Berger argues that lack of access to
29Jonathan M Berger ‘Taking responsibilities seriously: The role of the state in preventing
transmission of HIV from mother to child’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy & Development 163 at 166-
168.
30See Dieter Giesen ‘Health care as a right: Some practical implications’ (1994) 13
Medicine & Law 285 at 292-293; Aart C Hendriks ‘Patients’ rights and access to health care’
(2001) 20 Medicine & Law 371 at 373-374; Ngwena op cit note 28 at 15; SA Strauss
‘Geneesheer, pasient en die reg: ‘n Delikate driehoek’ (1987) TSAR 1 at 3.
31De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 262-264.
32The extent to which the ss 12(2)(b) and (c) rights are protected by the current state of
common law is discussed under 5.3(a) below.  Patients’ right not to be treated without their
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treatment preventing the transmission of the HIV virus from mother to child could
effectively negate reproductive freedom through indirectly coercing poor, HIV-
positive, pregnant women to opt for termination of pregnancy.  Berger
accordingly views s 12(2)(a) as obliging the State to ensure that women have
access to such health care services as would enable them freely to exercise
their choice whether or not to continue with a pregnancy.29
Other than in relation to reproductive autonomy, the context in which
health-related freedoms are most at issue is that of the doctor-patient
relationship.  The inherent imbalances in medical knowledge between patients
and health care professionals, combined with the remnants of a culture of
medical paternalism within the medical profession, complicates the ability to
exercise informed choices in relation to medical treatment options.  It is
therefore necessary that patients are afforded rights to have full facts regarding
their own medical status, diagnosis, prognosis and treatment options disclosed
to them by health care practitioners and that they are not subjected to medical
interventions without their informed consent.30
Section 12(2)(c) of the Constitution entrenches a right not to be treated
without consent, albeit in the context of medical or scientific experimentation.
In addition, the phrase ‘security in and control over [the] body’ in s 12(2)(b) is
arguably aimed at protecting individual interests in ‘bodily autonomy and self-
determination’ from undue interference.31  If interpreted in accordance with the
South African common law understanding of physical integrity, this phrase would
encompass protection of individual control over physical and mental health
status, as well as protection of independent and informed decision-making in
pursuit of health.32  To administer medical treatment without a patient’s consent
informed consent also finds expression in ss 7-9 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, which
require that a patient’s informed consent be obtained before the administering of any medical
treatment and which provide for patients’ participation in all decisions affecting their health.
33For instance, s 7 of the National Health Act determines that treatment without the
consent of a patient may proceed where the patient is unable to consent and consent is instead
obtained from another person who has been authorised by the patient to consent to treatment
on her behalf or, in appropriate circumstances, from a spouse, parent or close family member
of the patient; where failure to treat the patient would pose serious risks for the public health or,
in circumstances where the patient has not expressly refused consent, where failure to treat
would pose serious risk to the life or health of the patient; provided that in all of these instances
a health care provider has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the patient’s consent.
34See De Vos op cit note 4 at 265; Pierre De Vos ‘Substantive Equality after Grootboom:
The emergence of social and economic context as a guiding value in equality jurisprudence’
(2001) Acta Juridica 52 at 53; Caroline MA Nicholson ‘The right to health care, the best interests
of the child and AIDS in South Africa and Malawi’ (2002) 35 CILSA 351 at 359.
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would therefore likely amount to a breach of ss 12(2)(b) and/or (c).
As s 12(2) does not contain an internal limitation, non-compliance with
the obligations it imposes would be capable of justification only under
circumstances allowed for by laws which satisfy the criteria laid down by s 36 of
the Constitution.33 Where an unjustifiable infringement of a s 12(2) right is
occasioned by the terms of some law or policy, such law or policy would be
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with s 12(2).  Furthermore, it is
conceivable that rights-bearers may attempt to prevent infringement of their s
12(2) rights by applying for interdicts or similar orders against health care
professionals or others who threaten to interfere with their exercise of the s
12(2) rights, or that they may seek compensation in circumstances where they
suffered damages due to an infringement of their health-related autonomy rights.
(b) Equality
The eradication of socio-economic inequalities is a primary aim of South Africa’s
constitutional order.  The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights
is particularly indicative of this aim.  As such, the socio-economic rights in the
Constitution may be said to be egalitarian in orientation while the aims of the
right to equality include addressing the inequalities resulting from decades of
social deprivation.34  Section 9 of the Constitution determines:
‘(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law.
35See Eric Buch ‘Discrimination in the area of health and health care’ in Christof Heyns
et al (eds) Discrimination and the Law in South Africa Volume 1 (1994) 152; Barbara Klugman
‘Mainstreaming gender equality in health policy’ (1999) Agenda Monologue 48 at 50-51; Charles
Ngwena ‘Accessing abortion services under the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act:
Realising substantive equality’ (2000) 25 Journal for Juridical Science 19 at 35; Ngwena op cit
note 28 at 6; Edgar Pieterse & Mirjam van Donk ‘Incomplete ruptures: The political economy of
realising socio-economic rights in South Africa’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 193
at 203; Jeremy Sarkin ‘Health’ (1997/8) SA Human Rights Yearbook 97 at 131; HCJ van
Rensburg et al Health Care in South Africa: Structure and Dynamics (1992) at 30-31.
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(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status,
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on
one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair’.
The guarantee of ‘equal protection and benefit of the law’ in s 9(1), as well as
s 9(2)’s determination that the right to equality encompasses the ‘full and equal
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’, indicates that equal access and enjoyment
of socio-economic amenities is envisaged.  The State is accordingly tasked with
the programmatic eradication of lingering inequalities in such access and
enjoyment.
Many of these inequalities are occasioned by the operation of patriarchal
social power-structures and their interaction with the remnants of the structural
racial oppression of apartheid, which continue to lend definite racial and gender
dimensions to discrepancies in access to health-conducive social amenities and
to health care facilities, goods and services.  For instance, the lack of availability
and comparatively poorer quality of health care services in rural areas coincides
with the fact that rural areas are predominantly populated by black people and
women.35  Another example is the virtual exclusion of poor South Africans (the
overwhelming majority of whom are black and female) from the high quality care
that is available at considerable expense in the private health care sector, and
their concomitant relegation to the over-burdened and under-resourced public
36Only approximately 18% of South Africans (most of whom have medical insurance and
belong to the White and Indian population groups) are treated in the private health care sector.
However, approximately 80% of health care expenditure takes place in the private sector, which
also employs by far the greatest number of health care professionals.  For these figures and for
discussion of problems relating to quality discrepancies between private and public sector health
care in South Africa see Buch op cit note 35 at 156; Chapman op cit note 2 at 52; MA
Christianson ‘Health care’ in EML Strydom (ed) Social Security Law (2001) 122 at 138; Herma
Forgey et al South Africa Survey 2000/01 (2001) at 229; 237-239; Heywood op cit note 7 at 136-
138; Heinz Klug ‘Five years on: How relevant is the Constitution to the new South Africa?’ (2002)
26 Vermont LR 803 at 806; Bruce E Leech ‘The right of the HIV-positive patient to medical care:
An analysis of the costs of providing medical treatment’ (1993) 9 SAJHR 39 at 43; Ngwena op
cit note 28 at 7; Sarkin op cit note 35 at 97; Jeremy Sarkin ‘A review of health and human rights
after five years of democracy in South Africa’ (2000) 19 Medicine & Law 287 at 288; Van
Rensburg et al op cit note 35 at 28.
37Laid down in Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at paras 42-54.
38Ibid para 54(b)(i).  One non-listed ground upon which discrimination in health service
provision is especially rife is that of health status (see for example Mahendra Chetty ‘Human
rights, access to health care and AIDS’ (1993) 9 SAJHR 71-76; Mary A Crossley ‘Of diagnoses
and discrimination: Discriminatory nontreatment of infants with HIV infection’ (1993) 93 Columbia
LR 1581-1667; David Orentlicher ‘Destructuring disability: Rationing of health care and unfair
discrimination against the sick’ (1996) 31 Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties LR 49 at 50-51; 61;
Marelise Richter ‘Aiding intolerance and fear: The nature and extent of AIDS discrimination in
South Africa’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy & Development 195 at 205-208).  In Hoffmann op cit
note 16, the Constitutional Court determined that unfair discrimination in employment practices,
on the ground of HIV status, infringes s 9.  It would seem both logical and necessary to extend
protection in this regard also to the provision of health-related benefits.  Other non-listed grounds
which could conceivably come into play in this context include citizenship, geographical location,
and socio-economic status.
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health sector.36  The right to equality demands that the amelioration of these
discrepancies in enjoyment of health-related rights receives urgent attention in
a variety of policy-formulation and -implementation processes.
But the right to equality also holds more immediately enforceable benefits
for its subjects.  Read with the Constitutional Court’s test for establishing
violations of the right,37 it would seem that s 9(1) may be used to attain the
benefit of inclusion in programs conferring health-related benefits from which an
applicant has arbitrarily and/or irrationally been excluded, or to attain access to
health care services where such access is arbitrarily or irrationally being denied,
unless the exclusion or refusal can be justified under s 36.  Similarly, where
denial, exclusion or inequitable provision of health-related benefits results from
unfair discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in s 9(3) or on another
ground where discrimination on that ground ‘is based on attributes and
characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity
of persons or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner’,38 such
39See De Vos op cit note 34 at 64-65; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at
30; Liebenberg (in Andrews & Ellmann) op cit note 4 at 412-414; Mubangizi op cit note 15 at
346.
40On the ambit, scope and impact of s 6 see Charles Ngwena ‘HIV in the workplace:
Protecting rights to equality and privacy’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 513 at 532; Charles Ngwena
‘HIV/AIDS and equal opportunities in the workplace: The implications of the Employment Equity
Act’ (2000) 33 CILSA 96 at 102-106.
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denial, exclusion or inequitable provision will be unconstitutional unless it is
found to be justifiable under s 36.39
A wide array of potential remedies, ranging from orders that policy or laws
be modified to comply with the dictates of the right to equality to declaratory
orders that particular applicants are entitled to receive certain benefits, may
compensate for unjustifiable infringements of s 9.  These may be considered
effective from a benefit-focused perspective where they result in the inclusion
of the applicant in the ambit of the health-related policy or program from which
she was previously excluded, or in the conferring of the health-related benefit
which she was previously denied.
According to s 9(4), the right to equality may also be asserted
horizontally.  The subsection further indicates the need for legislation in order
to provide effective remedies for unfair discrimination in the private sector.  In
relation to health, three legislative enactments augment s 9(4).  First, s 6 of the
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 prohibits unfair discrimination in the
workplace on grounds similar to those in s 9(3), but significantly including also
HIV status.  The prohibition explicitly extends to the provision of employment
benefits, which would include health-related benefits such as contributions to
medical aid schemes, sick leave etc.40
Second, s 24(2)(e) the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 prohibits
registration of a medical scheme which discriminates on a list of grounds similar
to those in s 9 of the Constitution but prominently including ‘state of health’.
This provision is augmented by s 29(1)(n) of the Act’s determination that terms
and conditions applicable to a person’s admission to a medical scheme may not
relate in any manner to similar grounds.  Together, these provisions constitute
a prohibition on the exclusion of membership from a medical scheme based on
41For a discussion of the impact of these provisions, see Ngwena (2000) (ibid) at 106-
107. 
42Relevant provisions of the Act are discussed by Cathi Albertyn, Beth Goldblatt & Chris
Roederer (eds) Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act (2001) 84-86; 112-114; Sandra Liebenberg & Michelle O’Sullivan ‘South Africa’s new
equality legislation: A tool for advancing women’s socio-economic equality?’ (2001) Acta Juridica
70 at 92-96.
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health status or any ground listed in the Constitution.41
Third, several health-related provisions are contained in the Promotion
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.  Augmenting
s 6's general prohibition on unfair discrimination, are determinations outlawing
the provision of inferior services to any racial group (s 7(d)) and the limiting of
women’s access to health benefits (s 8 (g)).  Section 34 urges that inclusion of
HIV status as an explicitly enumerated prohibited ground of discrimination
should be considered, whereas item 3 of the Schedule to the Act contains an
illustrative list of unfair practices in the health sector, which include the unfair
denial or refusal of access to health care facilities and the discriminatory refusal
to provide emergency medical treatment to particular people or groups of
people.  A wide array of remedies for victims of unfair discrimination is allowed
for by s 21 of the Act.  These include declaratory orders, orders for payment of
damages, prohibitive interdicts, orders for the implementation of special
measures that aim to address unfair discrimination, orders requiring an
unconditional apology and the suspension or revocation of a health care
practitioner’s licence.42
Overall, it would seem that the immediate protection afforded by s 9 of the
Constitution and its detailed elaboration in a variety of legislative provisions
serve adequately to vindicate the equality-element of the right to health.
Combining challenges based on more ‘conventional’ health rights with a
challenge based on the right to equality in circumstances where a deprivation
of health-related benefits also falls foul of the latter right, would give practical
effect to the principle that rights are interdependent and indivisible.  Indeed,
where a challenge to the non-provision of or denial of access to a social good
or service may be brought under the ambit of s 9, adequate reparation for such
43De Vos op cit note 4 at 270-271; 273-274; De Vos op cit note 34 at 65-66; 68.  Note,
however, the drawbacks of using the right to equality to ameliorate social hardship discussed in
chapter 2 note 43 and accompanying text.
44Erika De Wet The Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights: The
Meaning of the German Constitutional Model for South Africa (1996) at 119; Jan Glazewski
Environmental Law in South Africa (2000) at 85; Mubangizi op cit note 15 at 345.
45UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 3 at para 43 views the adoption of a
public and environmental health strategy as part of the minimum core of the right to health.  See
also Brigit Toebes ‘Towards an improved understanding of the international human right to
health’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 661 at 668; Yamin op cit note 26 at 410-411.
46See Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb 1996 (3) SA 155 (N); Jan Glazewski
‘Environment’ in MH Cheadle et al (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights
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non-provision or non-access may result more readily from basing a
constitutional challenge on s 9 than from relying on another right which
guarantees provision of the good or service more generally.43
(c) Health-related entitlements:  Rights to determinants of health
Section 2.2(b) above has shown that rights to a variety of determinants of health,
including rights to environmental and occupational health as well as to several
non-medicinal, health-conducive social goods, form part of the health rights
package in international law.  Rights to the majority of these amenities are also
contained in the 1996 Constitution.
Section 24(a) of the Constitution determines that ‘[e]veryone has the right
... to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being’.  This open-
ended right obviously guarantees environmental health and is phrased broadly
enough to serve as a constitutional basis for a right to occupational health
(working environment not harmful to health or well-being) and for rights to a
variety of other non-medicinal, health-conducive social goods.44  In addition to
requiring that the State adopt measures aimed at ensuring that environmental
conditions do not harm citizens’ health (from which tangible health-related
benefits will flow indirectly),45 infringements of s 24(a) may also be directly
remedied through, for instance, an interdict prohibiting health-damaging actions
by public or private entities (such as dumping toxic waste in a residential area)
or an award of compensation where such actions have adversely affected
health.46
(2002) 409 at 422; Cheryl Loots ‘The impact of the Constitution on environmental law’ (1997)
1 SAJELP 57 at 58-59.  Environmental law has, through standards such as the ‘polluter pays
principle’, long acknowledged that not only states are responsible for environmental
preservation.  See Paust op cit note 7 at 818; Ratner op cit note 7 at 479-481.  Indeed, a
multitude of statutory standards of environmental and occupational health have through the
years been enforced against public and private entities.  See for instance the Atmospheric
Pollution Act 45 of 1965; the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 and ss 83 and 89
of the National Health Act 61 of 2003.
47On the impact of these amenities on individual health status, see UNCESCR General
Comment 14 op cit note 3 at para 44; David Abbott ‘AIDS and the homeless’ (1994) 144 New
LJ 1726-1727; Cathi Albertyn ‘Using rights and the law to reduce women’s vulnerability to
HIV/AIDS’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy & Development 179 at 185; Sundrasagaran Nadasen Public
Health Law in South Africa: An Introduction (2000) at 8-12; David R Phillips Health and Health
Care in the Third World (1990) 13-16; Toebes op cit note 45 at 668.
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With the exception of a right to sanitation (which I would argue
nevertheless finds residual protection under s 24(a)), rights to most non-
medicinal, health-conducive social goods are also enshrined separately by the
Bill of Rights.  A right to have access to adequate housing is guaranteed by s
26, whereas ss 27(1)(b) and (c) award rights to have access to sufficient food
and water and to social security respectively.47  Children’s rights to shelter and
basic social services find further protection under s 28(1)(c), whereas s 29(1)(a)
confers a right to basic education.  With the exception of the latter two, these
rights are all guaranteed subject to the proviso that the State must take
reasonable measures to achieve their progressive realisation within its available
resources.  As reflected in the constitutional text, these social goods are all
subjects of rights-based protection regardless of their impact on individual or
communal health status.  Indeed, reported South African court decisions in
which these constitutional provisions have come into play typically do not
involve the right to health.
While such court decisions remain relevant to an analysis of the potential
of health rights to render tangible benefits (due to the textual similarities
between these rights and the various rights to health care services, goods and
facilities discussed below), I will not conduct a separate benefit-focused analysis
of these rights.  However, the majority of observations pertaining to health-care
related entitlements discussed below pertain equally to entitlements flowing from
rights to non-medicinal, health-conducive social amenities.
48On the categorisation of socio-economic rights in the 1996 Constitution as generic
‘access’ rights on the one hand and fully enforceable, priority rights on the other, see De Vos op
cit note 1 at 87-91.
49See De Vos op cit note 4 at 265-266; Liebenberg op cit note 4 at 26-27; Ngwena op
cit note 28 at 3; 7-9; 27; Charles Ngwena ‘Aids in Africa: Access to health care as a human right’
(2000) 15 SA Public Law 1 at 13; Marius Pieterse ‘Foreigners and socio-economic rights: Legal
entitlements or wishful thinking?’ (2000) 63 THRHR 51 at 54; 56; SAHRC Third Economic and
Social Rights Report (1999) at 189.
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(d) Health-related entitlements: Rights to health care goods, services and
facilities
To complete the health rights package, the 1996 Constitution appears broadly
to recognise two distinct categories of rights to health care services, goods and
facilities.  First, a generic right to have access to such amenities, which is limited
in the extent to which it may be enforced at any given time, is guaranteed by s
27(1)(a) read with s 27(2) of the Constitution.  Apart from this generic provision,
more direct and seemingly unlimited priority entitlements to certain specific
forms of health care are found elsewhere in the Constitution.48  This section
discusses the ambit, scope and enforceability of the entitlements implied by
these respective categories of rights.
(i) The generic right of access to health care services
Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution determines:
‘Everyone has the right to have access to ... health care services, including
reproductive health care’.
By determining that ‘everyone’ is entitled to have access to health care services,
s 27(1)(a) clearly has an equality-threshold that forbids any group-based
distinctions in the provision of health care services.  This aspect of s 27(1)(a)
supplements the right to equality by embodying an entitlement not to be
arbitrarily or unfairly excluded from the ambit of policies, laws and programmes
which confer health care-related benefits and by forbidding the inequitable
provision of health care services.49  The equality-component of s 27(1)(a) is
50See Chirwa op cit note 7 at 4; Chirwa op cit note 4 at 559; 564-565.
51The inclusion of reproductive health care services aligns s 27(1)(a) with South Africa’s
obligations to ensure ‘appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the
post-natal period’ under art 12 of CEDAW.  See Berger op cit note 29 at 167-168; Ngwena op
cit note 28 at 8; Ngwena op cit note 35 at 32.
52These issues are identified by Karrisha Pillay ‘Tracking South Africa’s progress on
health care rights: Are we any closer to achieving the goal?’ (2003) 7 Law, Democracy &
Development 55 at 60.  Unfortunately, the National Health Act does not provide any clarity on
these issues.  Instead, its definition of ‘health care services’ merely refers back to s 27(1)(a) and
related provisions whereas other concepts such as ‘essential health services’ and ‘primary health
services’ are left to be defined by the Minister.
53Including all such services within the ambit of s 27(1)(a) accords with UNCESCR
General Comment 14 op cit note 3 at para 17 and is reflected also by s 1 of the Medical
Schemes Act 131 of 1998. See further Christianson op cit note 36 at 123-126; 132; De Waal,
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further considered to be horizontally enforceable in conjunction with s 9(4).50
This means that it can be used by citizens to demand medical treatment from
public or private sources where such treatment is being withheld arbitrarily or
unfairly.
Beyond this threshold, s 27(1)(a) is unclear as to the kinds of ‘health care
services’ it envisages, save for indicating explicitly that such services include
reproductive health care.51  Specific definitional issues to consider include which
health needs are addressed by s 27(1)(a), what kinds of services the subsection
envisages and on which levels such services need to be rendered.52
It may be argued that, in line with a generous approach to constitutional
interpretation and in order to resonate with international law standards, s
27(1)(a) should be interpreted as encompassing entitlements to all services,
goods and facilities aimed at securing the greatest attainable standard of
physical and mental well-being.  Section 27(1)(a) should thus be read as
addressing more than the need for physical medical treatment to encompass
also services aimed at satisfying mental health needs, and as extending beyond
medical treatment to include services aimed at health protection and promotion,
as well as the prevention and diagnosis of illness.  The concept of ‘medical
treatment’ should in turn be understood as implying all services aimed at
alleviating, curing or rehabilitating the causes or symptoms of disease and as
including entitlements to access ambulance and hospital services, access to
care by general and specialist medical practitioners and access to beneficial
pharmaceutical products.53  A similar broad reading of ‘reproductive health care’
Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 448; Nicholson op cit note 34 at 359; Pillay op cit note 4 at 52-
53; Pillay op cit note 52 at 60-62; Karrisha Pillay ‘Testing for HIV/AIDS: The constitutional
standard’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy & Development 213 at 214; SAHRC op cit note 49 at 185;
Geraldine Van Bueren ‘Health’ in Cheadle et al op cit note 46, 491 at 495.
54This understanding is reflected by the preamble to the Choice on Termination of
Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.  See also Ngwena op cit note 28 at 8; Ngwena op cit note 35 at 21;
32; Van Bueren op cit note 53 at 497-498; Ferdinand Van Oosten ‘The Choice on Termination
of Pregnancy Act: Some comments’ (1999) 116 SALJ 60 at 61-62.
55See P Carstens et al ‘Health care’ in MP Olivier et al (eds) Social Security Law:
General Principles (1999) 213 at 216; De Vos op cit note 1 at 87; Andrea Gabriel ‘Socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights: Comparative lessons from India’ (1997) 1(6) Human Rights
and Constitutional LJ of SA 8 at 9; Heyns & Brand op cit note 1 at 159; Liebenberg op cit note
4 at 26; Pillay op cit note 4 at 53; Pillay op cit note 53 at 214.
56See M Geldenhuys ‘The rights to health care and housing: Some aspects of
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may be advanced to include access to reproductive education and counselling
services, contraceptive services and products, termination of pregnancy
services as well as pre- and post-natal care.54  A generous and purposive
interpretation of the phrase ‘health care services’ in s 27(1)(a) would further
imply that access to the services outlined here should in principle be guaranteed
at primary, secondary as well as tertiary levels of care.
Much is often made of the fact that it is not a right to health care services
that is guaranteed, but merely a right to have access to such services.  This is
said to mean that s 27(1)(a) does not enable anyone directly to demand
particular health care services, but rather envisages that people should be
capable of securing such services for themselves.  On such a reading of s
27(1)(a), the State is depicted as being responsible only for providing an
‘enabling environment’ within which citizens may realise the right for themselves,
by providing conditions necessary to make health care services accessible to
all.55
From a benefit-focused perspective, however, this argument holds only
for those who are already in the material position to access health care services
for themselves.  Beyond such people, the right of access to health care services
must imply more than simply an equal ability to seek care.  A theoretical ability
to access care is of no significance if such access does not translate into
actually obtaining the relevant health care service or product, or physical access
to the relevant health care facility.  Indeed, in order to be meaningful, a right of
access to care must imply the ability to obtain, rather than to seek, treatment.56
constitutional interpretation’ (2005) 17 SA Mercantile LJ 182 at 193; Giesen op cit note 30 at
290; Hendriks op cit note 30 at 374; Knut Erik Tranoy ‘Vital needs, human rights, health care law’
(1996) 15 Medicine & Law 183 at 186-188.  Such an understanding of access is reflected by the
SA Department of Health’s recent Draft Charter of the Private and Public Health Sectors of the
Republic of South Africa (2005) at 6, which defines ‘access’ to mean ‘having the capacity and
means to obtain and use an affordable package of health care services in South Africa in a
manner that is equitable’ (my emphasis).
57See Bekker op cit note 4 at 15; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 28-30.
58See Department of Health Draft Charter op cit note 56 at 13; Chapman op cit note 2
at 52; De Vos op cit note 1 at 87; Gabriel op cit note 55 at 9; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al)
op cit note 4 at 26; Olivier op cit note 1 at 144-145.
59The ‘meaningful access’ standard was first developed in relation to the capping of
medical aid benefits in Alexander v Choate 469 US 287 (1985) at 301 and followed in a line of
subsequent similar cases.  For discussion, see Alexander Abbe ‘“Meaningful access” to health
care and the remedies available to Medicaid managed care recipients under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act’ (1999) 147 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1161-1203; Orentlicher op cit note 38 at
79-82.
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I would argue that the only limiting function fulfilled by the access
standard in s 27(1)(a) is to indicate that health care services need not be made
available free of charge to everyone.  Where people do have the means and
capacity to access health care services themselves, their s 27(1)(a) right is
satisfied and capable of infringement only where such access is subsequently
deprived, denied, obstructed or otherwise interfered with.57  The State, however,
incurs significantly more responsibility towards those groups or individuals who,
through social or financial vulnerability, geographical isolation, the
consequences of unfair discrimination or some other reason, lack the means or
capacities to access health care services themselves.58  In relation to such
individuals, it may be argued that access to health care services has to be
meaningful or adequate in order to comply with s 27(1)(a).
In a different context, American courts have held that access to health
care services cannot be said to have been meaningful where vulnerable groups
are excluded from such access, where limits on eligibility for treatment are
based on criteria that vulnerable groups are objectively incapable of meeting
and where recipients of treatment are unable to benefit meaningfully from it.59
An even more useful assessment of meaningful access is provided in relation
to the international law right to health by UNCESCR, which determined in
General Comment 14 that health care services, goods and facilities must be
accessible, available, affordable, culturally acceptable as well as ‘medically
60See UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 3 at para 12; also chapter 2 note 36
and accompanying text.
61See further Chapman op cit note 2 at 45; Pillay op cit note 52 at 64; Pillay op cit note
2 at 63-64; Toebes op cit note 45 at 666-667; 669; Van Rensburg et al op cit note 35 at 30-32.
62See Carstens & Kok op cit note 11 at 442 (‘professional health care services ...
provided in a non-negligent manner’); Christianson op cit note 36 at 133 (‘basic minimum
standards’ of care); De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 448 (‘proper’ care); Ngwena op
cit note 49 at 5-6 (‘adequate’ care).
63On these and other variables complicating the development of a unitary standard of
‘adequacy’ in the American context, see generally Einer Elhauge ‘Allocating health care morally’
(1994) 82 California LR 1451 at 1455; 1466-1472; Paul E Kalb ‘Defining an adequate package
of health care benefits’ (1992) 140 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1987-1998; John A Siliciano ‘Wealth,
equity and the unitary medical malpractice standard’ (1991) 77 Virginia LR 439-487.  On
resource discrepancies and quality of care in the context of s 27, see Neil Van Dokkum ‘The
evolution of medical malpractice law in South Africa’ (1997) 41 J of African Law 175 at 189.
64See Department of Health Draft Charter op cit note 56 at 19 (‘access to health services
of unacceptable quality is not access’); Carstens & Kok op cit note 11 at 442; Hendriks op cit
note 30 at 377.
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appropriate and of good quality’ for the meaningful enjoyment of the right to
health.60
Access to health care services should therefore not be regarded as
meaningful where such services are geographically or physically inaccessible,
unavailable or unattainable within a reasonable time after the need for them
arises.  Similarly, a person should be regarded as having been precluded from
exercising his right to meaningfully access health care services where care is
unaffordable or not rendered by adequately skilled medical professionals.61  As
to quality, most commentators agree that s 27(1)(a) implies some kind of
‘appropriateness’, ‘adequacy’ or ‘reasonableness’ standard against which the
quality of health care services may be measured.62  Access to care is
accordingly considered to be inhibited where services rendered are of an inferior
quality.  Defining what level of services would qualify as ‘adequate’, ‘reasonable’
or ‘appropriate’ may be difficult, not least because quality of treatment is
necessarily influenced by the financial resources of both the patient and the
health care facility, the nature of the medical condition, medical-technological
progress, and the circumstances in which care is rendered.63  However, it must
at least be acknowledged that access to health care services is impaired where
substandard or negligent care is rendered, and that the duty to protect health
rights implies the creation and/or sustenance of remedies for damage suffered
as a result of substandard or negligent care.64
65See De Waal, Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 133-135.
66Since s 27(2) is identical to s 26(2), which delineates the right to have access to
adequate housing, I rely also on literature pertaining to s 26(2).
67Article 2.1 requires states parties to take steps to the maximum of their available
resources whereas s 27(2) requires measures to be taken within the state’s available resources.
Whereas s 27(2) requires measures to be aimed at achieving the ‘progressive realisation’ of s
27(1)(a), art 2.1 employs the phrase ‘with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation’
of relevant rights.
73
Section 27(1)(a) may thus be understood as conferring an entitlement to
the availability, accessibility, and acceptability of preventative, diagnostic and
curative health care services of adequate quality on primary, secondary and
tertiary levels.  Such a permissive interpretation of the right accords with the
premise that a generous and purposive approach to constitutional interpretation
requires that the initial interpretation of the ambit and scope of a right should be
as wide as is textually and contextually permissible.  Only after the ambit of the
right has been identified in this manner, should an inquiry into potential
justifications for restrictions or limitations on the right be launched.65  Given that
there are great variations in the cost and effectiveness of various forms of
medical treatment, and also that there are many competing health-related needs
in society (not all of which are equally urgent and vital), it comes as no surprise
that the Bill of Rights envisages the limitation of s 27(1)(a) both through an
internal textual limitation on the extent to which it may be enforced and in
accordance with s 36.
The internal limitation on s 27(1)(a)’s ambit and scope is contained in s
27(2), which determines:
‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights [guaranteed in s 27(1)]’.66
While clearly modeled on article 2.1 of the ICESCR, s 27(2) differs in certain
respects from its international law counterpart.  First, there are semantic
differences in the framing of the provisions’ respective resource-specifications
and standards of progressive realisation.67  Second, s 27(2) imports a standard
of reasonableness that is absent from article 2.1, which instead prescribes a
standard of appropriateness.  These differences notwithstanding, the terms
68The ‘dual’ nature of s 27(2) is acknowledged by Sandra Liebenberg ‘The right to social
assistance: The implications of Grootboom for policy reform in South Africa’ (2001) 17 SAJHR
232 at 238; Frank Michelman ‘The Constitution, social rights and reason: A tribute to Etienne
Mureinik’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 499 at 503.  Its ‘amplifying’ nature is emphasised by Carstens et al
op cit note 55 at 217; De Vos op cit note 4 at 262; Gabriel op cit note 55 at 9-10; Sandra
Liebenberg ‘Health’ in Dennis Davis et al (eds) Fundamental Rights in the Constitution:
Commentary and Cases (1997) 354 at 358; Ngwena op cit note 28 at 23-24, whereas its ‘limiting’
character is highlighted by De Vos op cit note 1 at 93; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit
note 4 at 48; Darrel Moellendorf ‘Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the future of
socio-economic rights claims’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 at 330; Mubangizi op cit note 15 at 345.
69See, in relation to art 2.1 of the ICESCR, Limburg Principle 16; Matthew CR Craven
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its
Development (1995) at 114-116; Ngwena op cit note 28 at 22.
70David Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its
importance’ (2002) 119 SALJ 484 at 495; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 38.
71UNCESCR General Comment 3 The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, para.
1 of the Covenant) (1990) at paras 11-12.  See also Craven op cit note 69 at 132-133; De Vos
op cit note 1 at 98; De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 443; Pillay op cit note 53 at 215.
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employed by s 27(2) cannot be understood entirely in isolation from the meaning
of corresponding international law provisions, especially given the dictates of s
39(1) of the Constitution.
It appears that s 27(2) fulfills two distinct functions.  First, it amplifies the
rights guaranteed in s 27(1) through indicating the extent of the positive duties
they impose on the State.  Second, it limits s 27(1) by indicating that not all
benefits implied by it may immediately be claimed.68  As to its amplifying
function, the various terms employed in s 27(2) may all be interpreted as
indicating specific obligations on the State.  First, the duty to take legislative or
other appropriate measures constitutes an immediate obligation of conduct,
notwithstanding the margin of discretion awarded in relation to the form and
content of measures.69  This margin of discretion is simultaneously preserved
and qualified by s 27(2)’s determination that measures adopted must be
reasonable.70  Second, if the resource-specification in s 27(2) is understood as
implying similar obligations to those in article 2.1 of the ICESCR, it would
indicate that the State infringes s 27(2) where it fails to fulfill an aspect of s 27(1)
despite resources for the purpose indeed being available.  It also requires that
the State prioritise expenditure aimed at satisfying the needs of the most
vulnerable sectors of society.71  Third, the standard of progressive realisation
requires that the State incrementally make relevant socio-economic amenities
72UNCESCR General Comment 3 op cit note 71 at paras 2; 9; Limburg Principles 16;
21; Maastricht Guideline 14(e)-(f).  See also Audrey R Chapman ‘A “violations approach” for
monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18
Human Rights Quarterly 23 at 42-43; Chapman op cit note 2 at 37; Craven op cit note 69 at 131-
132; Pierre De Vos ‘So much to do, so little done: The right of access to anti-retroviral drugs
post-Grootboom’ (2003) 7 Law, Democracy & Development 83 at 90-91; Gabriel op cit note 55
at 10; Maria Green ‘What we talk about when we talk about indicators: Current approaches to
human rights measurement’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 1062 at 1070-1071; Heyns &
Brand op cit note 1 at 160; Leckie op cit note 7 at 93; 98-100; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its implications for South
Africa’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 359 at 365; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 39-41;
Liebenberg (in Andrews & Ellmann) op cit note 4 at 421-422; Ngwena op cit note 28 at 223;
Olivier op cit note 1 at 149; Pillay op cit note 53 at 214; Pillay op cit note 2 at 64; Toebes op cit
note 45 at 677.
73Iain Currie ‘Bill of rights jurisprudence’ (2000) Annual Survey of SA Law 24 at 56;
Liebenberg op cit note 4 at 41; Olivier op cit note 1 at 142.
74Demand for health services typically exceeds the availability of resources, since
technological progress has led to an increasing number of serious ailments becoming treatable
(often at high expense) and since even routine health care services are ordinarily often
expensive, especially at secondary and tertiary levels.  See Elhauge op cit note 63 at 1459;
Richard D Lamm ‘Rationing health care: Inevitable and desirable’ (1992) 140 Univ Pennsylvania
LR 1511 at 1512; Moellendorf op cit note 68 at 332; Ngwena op cit note 28 at 19.
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available both to a larger number and a wider range of people, and must show
that it is moving ‘effectively and expeditiously’, through concrete and deliberate
steps, towards full realisation of the right.  Deliberately retrogressive measures
(resulting in lesser enjoyment of the right) are regarded as infringing the right
unless they are necessitated by extreme resource scarcity or are in the interest
of the progressive realisation of the totality of socio-economic rights.  The same
would apply where the State does not take any measures aimed at progressive
realisation, halts progressive realisation or delays the adoption of appropriate
measures unreasonably.72
Section 27(2)’s limiting function is far more significant from a benefit-
focused perspective, since it directly impacts on the extent to which tangible
individual benefits may be claimed under s 27(1)(a).  In particular, the resource
specification in s 27(2) indicates that the State will not fall foul of s 27(1)(a)
where it does not have the resources to give effect to all of the entitlements
implied by the provision.73  Particularly in the health care sector, the reality is
that not all medically beneficial treatment is affordable and that, while resource
scarcity persists, certain treatment will be unavailable to those who cannot
finance it for themselves.74  It is, however, important to view resource scarcity
75See Bilchitz op cit note 21 at 18; 21; Fons Coomans ‘Reviewing implementation of
social and economic rights: An assessment of the reasonableness test as developed by the
South African Constitutional Court’ (2005) 65 Heidelberg J of International Law 167 at 191-192;
Currie op cit note 73 at 56; Scott & Alston op cit note 1 at 255.
76De Vos op cit note 1 at 96; De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 441; Gabriel
op cit note 55 at 10; Liebenberg op cit note 4 at 39.
77Liebenberg op cit note 2 at 25.  See also Bilchitz op cit note 21 at 21; Gabriel op cit
note 55 at 11; Nicholas Haysom ‘Giving effect to socio-economic rights: The role of the judiciary’
(1999) 1(4) ESR Review 11 at 12; Michelman op cit note 68 at 504-505; Scott & Alston op cit
note 1 at 239; 249.
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not as qualifying the ambit of s 27(1)(a) but rather as limiting the extent to which
its implied benefits may be demanded at a given time.75  In this sense, the
resource specification links to the concept of progressive realisation which, by
conceding that certain aspects of socio-economic rights are only capable of
realisation over time, limits the extent to which they are immediately
enforceable.76
The progressive realisation standard and the resource limitation in s
27(2) accordingly allow courts to approach the task of ascertaining the State’s
compliance with the obligations imposed by s 27(1)(a) realistically and within the
context of every specific matter.  However, there remains a real risk, as in
international law, that the terms of s 27(2) can be used to deflate the content of
s 27(1)(a) to such an extent that they strip the right of most of its remedial
capacity.  This would defeat the intention of the drafters of the Constitution and
would diminish the right’s impact on the lives of those it was designed to protect:
‘[n]o provision should be interpreted in a way that makes its enforcement
practically impossible.  If section 27(2) is interpreted to be exhaustive of the
State’s positive duties, individual right holders have no direct right to claim
anything specific from the state’.77
It is accordingly necessary to acknowledge that not all obligations engendered
by s 27(1)(a) are rendered unenforceable by the limiting effect of s 27(2).
As in international law, greater clarity on the extent to which obligations
engendered by the right of access to health care services survive the limiting
effect of the progressive realisation standard and the resource limitation may be
gained through considering the extent to which the ‘tripartite typology of
interdependent duties’ finds application in relation to s 27(1)(a) of the
Constitution.  In line with the Constitutional Court’s acknowledgment in its First
78Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at para 78.
79See Chirwa op cit note 7 at 5-6; Chirwa op cit note 4 at 559; 564; De Vos op cit note
1 at 92-94; 100; Ellmann op cit note 4 at 460-461; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note
4 at 46-48; Sandra Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights:
An effective tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 159 at 178;
Liebenberg op cit note 2 at 19; 58; Michelman op cit note 68 at 504; Pieterse op cit note 7 at 26.
80See UNCESCR General Comment 14 op cit note 3 at paras 34; 50; Chapman op cit
note 2 at 46; Chetty op cit note 2 at 453; De Vos op cit note 1 at 81; De Vos op cit note 72 at 88-
89; De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 435; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note
4 at 28-30; Liebenberg (in Andrews & Ellmann) op cit note 4 at 411-414; 421; Liebenberg op cit
note 79 at 163; Pillay op cit note 4 at 54; Pillay op cit note 2 at 67; Richter op cit note 38 at 202;
Toebes op cit note 45 at 677.
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Certification judgment that socio-economic rights may at least negatively be
protected against improper invasion,78 it may be argued that entitlements implied
by the obligation to respect s 27(1)(a) should be immediately enforceable
against public and private entities notwithstanding resource availability or the
limits inherent to progressive realisation.79  Infringements of the obligation to
respect s 27(1)(a) would typically occur where law or conduct intentionally
deprives existing access to or enjoyment of health rights (by, for example,
closing existing health care facilities or discontinuing the provision of particular
services in State hospitals) or has the effect of denying or obstructing existing
access or enjoyment.  The obligation could further be infringed by health-
harming conduct (such as pollution or the marketing of unsafe pharmaceuticals),
by the adoption of deliberately retrogressive measures or by non-compliance
with the guarantee of equal access to health care services.80
It may further be argued that the obligation to protect s 27(1)(a) requires
that some of the standards inherent in the concept of ‘meaningful access’ to
health care services should be capable of enforcement against third parties
without reference to s 27(2).  For instance, claimants should generally be able
to avail themselves of remedies where health care services to which they have
had access were not acceptable or of a reasonable quality.
The elements of s s 27(1)(a) identified here as being capable of
immediate enforcement when read with the domestic recasting of the ‘tripartite
typology of interdependent duties’ in s 7(2) of the 1996 Constitution, correspond
with certain of the obligations identified by UNCESCR as constituting the
81See Maastricht Guideline 8; David Bilchitz ‘Placing basic needs at the centre of socio-
economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 4(1) ESR Review 2 at 3; Chapman op cit note 2 at 37; 54;
Craven op cit note 69 at 132-133; Currie op cit note 73 at 56; Pierre De Vos ‘The economic and
social rights of children and South Africa’s transitional Constitution’ (1995) 10 SA Public Law 233
at 251; De Vos op cit note 1 at 97; Gabriel op cit note 55 at 10; Heyns & Brand op cit note 1 at
160; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 43; Liebenberg op cit note 2 at 41; Russell
op cit note 2 at 15; Scott & Alston op cit note 1 at 80-81.
82See Bilchitz op cit note 81 at 3; Bilchitz op cit note 21 at 11; 13.
83Scott & Alston op cit note 1 at 227.
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minimum core of the right to health or as being of similar priority.  UNCESCR’s
list of core and comparable obligations flowing from the right to health also
extends beyond these obligations, to include obligations to provide primary
health care services, essential reproductive health care services, essential
medicines and immunisation against major infectious diseases.  In international
law, access to these core amenities is viewed as the immediately enforceable
baseline of protection awarded by the right to health, from which the State must
progressively facilitate increased enjoyment of non-core amenities, with the goal
of ultimately ensuring full enjoyment thereof.  It would be useful to adopt a
similar minimum core approach in relation to s 27(1)(a), which would mean that
rights to access such core services, together with other, non-core services to
which universal access has already been established through progressive
realisation, are viewed as immediately enforceable, notwithstanding the dictates
of s 27(2).81
A minimum core approach to the interpretation of s 27(1)(a) would be
useful firstly because it would determine a concrete starting point for the process
of progressive realisation.82  Acknowledging that s 27(1)(a) entails a core of
claimable entitlements would further enable the right to make a concrete
difference to the lives of its beneficiaries and would counter perceptions of
socio-economic rights as ‘never being capable of being violated, as constantly
receding into the future’.83  Moreover, a minimum core approach would affirm the
reality that certain socio-economic needs are more vital and urgent than others,
and that the immediate satisfaction of the most urgent and vital of these needs
is essential in a society that values and protects human dignity.  As David
Bilchitz argues:
84Bilchitz op cit note 21 at 11-12.  See also Liebenberg op cit note 2 at 28-29; Sandra
Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR
1 at 15; 18; 22.
85De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 451.  See also Christianson op cit note 36
at 131.
79
‘There are two important interests that ss 26 and 27 of the Constitution protect.
The first is at a minimum the very basic interest people have in survival and the
socio-economic goods required to survive.  The second is the interest people
have in being provided with the conditions that enable them to pursue their own
projects and to live a good life by their own lights.  The notion of progressive
realisation links these two interests: it recognises that what the government is
required to do is to provide core services to everyone without delay that meet
their survival needs and then qualitatively to increase these services so as
ultimately meet the maximal interests that the state is required to protect.
Without protecting people’s survival interests, all other interests and rights that
they may have - whether civil, political, social or economic - become
meaningless.  The recognition of a minimum core of social and economic rights
that must be realised without delay attempts to take account of the fact that
certain interests are of greater relative importance and require a higher degree
of protection than other interests’.84
Through acknowledging and giving effect to the relative urgency of basic health-
related needs by awarding direct claims to their satisfaction, a minimum core
approach to s 27(1)(a) would enable the right to connect concretely to the needs
and experiences of its subjects by allowing them to demand the immediate
satisfaction of the most urgent of the needs it represents.
To hold that certain entitlements implied by s 27(1)(a) are capable of
being claimed from the State notwithstanding the terms of s 27(2) is not to say
that the State would always be forced to deliver relevant goods and services to
all without consideration of the circumstances of delivery, even where delivery
would entail severe resource implications for the State, would derail the totality
of its social reform efforts or would similarly threaten the interests of justice.  It
should be remembered that any infringement of s 27(1)(a) may nevertheless be
justified as amounting to a reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right in
terms of s 36 of the Constitution.  Unless a finding that s 27(1)(a) has been
infringed is based on a finding that measures adopted towards its progressive
realisation were unreasonable (in which case it may be self-defeating to argue
that an unreasonable measure in terms of s 27(2) is nevertheless reasonable in
terms of s 3685), the possibility therefore remains that the State can offer a
86See Bilchitz op cit note 21 at 17-18; 23; Liebenberg op cit note 2 at 29-31.  Insisting
on justification for non-compliance with minimum core obligations in accordance with s 36 seems
to accord with the international law standards in relation to non-satisfaction of core interests.
See chapter 2 note 66 and accompanying text.
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satisfactory explanation for non-compliance with a particular obligation.86
Furthermore, in the event that such explanation is not forthcoming, an order that
the good or service in question be provided to the claimant is but one of the
myriad ways in which a court can choose to remedy the infringement.  A finding
that a right to receive a minimum core entitlement had been breached would
accordingly still result in tangible benefit for the beneficiary only in
circumstances where non-provision of the benefit cannot objectively be justified
by the State and where it is appropriate in the circumstances to order that the
claimant be provided with the benefit.
(ii) Priority-rights to specific health care services, goods and facilities
Apart from the generic right of access to health care services, three further
constitutional provisions award distinct entitlements to particular health care
services, goods or facilities.  Significantly, not one of these contains an internal
modifier subjecting its enforcement to resource availability or progressive
realisation.  Given this, and in light of the fact that the benefits implied by these
provisions relate either to extremely urgent health-related needs or to the health-
related needs of particularly vulnerable sectors of society, it appears reasonable
to conclude that these benefits are more readily claimable than those awarded
by s 27(1)(a).
The first of these provisions, s 27(3), determines that ‘[n]o-one may be
refused emergency medical treatment’.  By virtue of its textual separation from
s 27(1)(a) and the strong negative language it employs, it may be argued that
s 27(3) operates free from the constraints posed by s 27(2).  Its unequivocal
language and the fact that it identifies no specific duty-bearer further seems to
indicate that it will operate horizontally, at least against those entities that are
able and qualified to render emergency care (such as paramedics, emergency
87On these aspects of s 27(3), see Carstens et al op cit note 55 at 217; Chirwa op cit
note 7 at 5; Coomans op cit note 75 at 170; De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 55; 449-
450; De Wet op cit note 44 at 117; Ellmann op cit note 4 at 460; Heyns & Brand op cit note 1 at
158; Liebenberg op cit note 68 at 357-358; Liebenberg (in Andrews & Ellmann) op cit note 4 at
415; Liebenberg op cit note 79 at 163; DJ McQuoid-Mason & SA Strauss ‘Medicine, dentistry,
pharmacy and other health professions’ in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa
Volume 17 (1st Reissue, 1999) 129 at 193-194; SAHRC op cit note 49 at 186; Scott & Alston op
cit note 1 at 247-248; 251; SA Strauss ‘Twee mediese regsvrae: Die aanspreeklikheid van
private hospitale met ongevalle-afdelings en die aanspreeklikheid van sportpromotors en
skeidsregters teenoor beseerde spelers’ (2000) TSAR 205 at 208-209; Van Bueren op cit note
53 at 505.  See further 5.3(c) below.
88On the difficulties of defining a medical emergency, see Anna-Katarina S Christakis
‘Emergency room gatekeeping: A new twist on patient dumping’ (1997) Wisconsin LR 295 at
312-315; Erik J Olson ‘No room at the inn: A snapshot of an American emergency room’ (1994)
46 Stanford LR 449 at 455.
89See Carstens et al op cit note 55 at 217; Liebenberg op cit note 68 at 358; SAHRC op
cit note 49 at 186; Van Bueren op cit note 53 at 504.
90That non-compliance with s 27(3) requires immediate remedial action unless it can be
justified in terms of s 36, is argued by Carstens et al op cit note 55 at 217; Liebenberg (in
Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at 37; 42fn1; Liebenberg op cit note 68 at 358; Liebenberg op cit
note 79 at 163; Ferdinand Van Oosten ‘Financial resources and the patient’s right to health care:
Myth and reality’ (1999) 32 De Jure 1 at 13.
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services, private hospitals and health care practitioners).87
The scope of the entitlements conferred by s 27(3) primarily depends on
the meaning of ‘emergency medical treatment’.  While clearly not applicable to
routine preventative, diagnostic and curative treatment, treatment for a variety
of injuries and other physical or physiological symptoms (varying from obvious
examples like serious injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents to less
obvious symptoms such as chest pains possibly indicating imminent cardiac
arrest) may be viewed as emergency medical treatment.88  Where a medical
emergency exists, s 27(3) seems to demand that relevant medical services are
available and are adequate to cope with the demands of the situation.  While not
guaranteeing a right to free treatment, s 27(3) further seems to require that
treatment be rendered regardless of a patient’s ability to pay.89
Unless an objectively justifiable reason for non-compliance with the
positive obligations imposed by s 27(3) is offered in terms of s 36,90 non-
compliance with such obligations may conceivably be remedied either through
an order compelling the State to make adequate emergency medical services
available or through an award of preventative damages.  Given the often severe
consequences of non-compliance with s 27(3) for patients in need of emergency
91Argued also by De Wet op cit note 44 at 107; Pillay op cit note 4 at 56.  See further
SAHRC op cit note 49 at 186.
92See Bekker op cit note 4 at 16-17; De Vos op cit note 81 at 55-56; De Vos op cit note
1 at 88; De Wet op cit note 44 at 106; Heyns & Brand op cit note 1 at 161; Willem A Landman
& Lesley D Henley ‘Rationing and children’s constitutional health-care rights’ (2000) 19 SA
Journal of Philosophy 41 at 42-43; Pillay op cit note 4 at 55; Paula Proudlock ‘Children’s socio-
economic rights: Do they have a right to special protection?’ (2002) 3(2) ESR Review 6;
Geraldine Van Bueren ‘Alleviating poverty through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 SAJHR
52 at 55-59; Frans Viljoen ‘Children’s rights: A response from a South African perspective’ in
Brand & Russell (eds) op cit note 2, 201 at 203.
93See De Vos op cit note 1 at 87; ME Klinck & DA Louw ‘A South African perspective
on children’s rights: General principles’ (2000) 19 Medicine & Law 49 at 56-57; Liebenberg op
cit note 79 at 162-163.
94See De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 56 (arguing that these duties are too
onerous to be borne by private hospitals); Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne ‘Du Plessis is not
dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the application of the Bill of Rights to private
disputes’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 25 at 53fn35 (disputing that these duties are inherently incapable of
horizontal application).
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care, it is also necessary that patients who were denied emergency treatment
are afforded effective ex post facto compensatory remedies against relevant
health workers, service providers or establishments.
Under s 28(1)(c), children have the right to ‘basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and social services’.  Section 28(1)(c) is narrower in scope
than s 27(1)(a), since only basic health care services (which, it may be argued,
should at least be understood as entailing an entitlement to primary health care
services91) are guaranteed.  Accordingly, in line with international law, the
subsection should be understood as imposing an immediately enforceable
obligation upon the State to provide children with primary health care services
within the broader framework of progressive realisation.92  Unless non-
compliance with this obligation can be justified under s 36 of the Constitution,
an appropriate remedy to correct for the infringement of s 28(1)(c) may well
require children to be provided with the treatment they need, notwithstanding the
policy or resource-implications of such an order.93
Whether the obligations implied by s 28(1)(c) are fit for application
against the private health care sector is contested.94  Interestingly, significantly
less controversy seems to surround the question whether parents, who typically
command far less resources than private health care establishments, may be
bound by s 28(1)(c).  This is because parents already bear limited socio-
95See Chirwa op cit note 7 at 4; Brigitte Clark ‘Children’s right to support - a public
responsibility?’ (1996) Acta Juridica 82 at 84; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note 4 at
36; 46; Marius Pieterse ‘Reconstructing the private/public dichotomy? The enforcement of
children’s constitutional social rights and care entitlements’ (2003) TSAR 1 at 7-8.
96This accords with the position at common law and international law.  See arts 18 and
27 of the CRC; De Vos op cit note 81 at 256; De Vos op cit note 1 at 87-88; De Waal; Currie &
Erasmus op cit note 8 at 463; Pieterse op cit note 95 at 6-9; Scott & Alston op cit note 1 at 230.
See further 5.3(d) below.
97These include the close physical proximity in which detainees are held and the general
conditions in prisons.  See De Wet op cit note 44 at 110.
98De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 8 at 614. See also De Wet op cit note 44 at
113; John C Mubangizi ‘The constitutional rights of prisoners in South Africa: A critical review’
(2002) 35 De Jure 42 at 48-49.
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economic duties towards their children under international and common law and
because they are well-placed to provide for their children’s needs (as indicated
by the right of children to ‘family care or parental care’ in s 28(1)(b)).95  It may
however be argued that the duties of parents in relation to their children’s health
are no more onerous than those of individuals in relation to their own, meaning
that the State should provide children with primary health care services where
their parents cannot afford to do so.96
Finally, among a cluster of rights awarded to detained persons, s 35(2)(e)
of the Constitution awards a right ‘to conditions of detention that are consistent
with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state
expense of adequate ... medical treatment’, whereas s 35(2)(f)(iv) awards a right
to communicate with and be visited by a medical practitioner of the detainee’s
choice.  Detainees’ health interests have likely been singled out for protection
because of their inability to procure access to medical services for themselves,
and because of the various potential health hazards posed by incarceration.97
The extent of the entitlements conferred by s 35(2)(e) depends on what
is meant by ‘adequate medical treatment’.  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus argue
that ‘adequacy’ of treatment should depend on whether, viewed in conjunction
with other circumstances of confinement, the standard of available treatment
contributes to ‘conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity’.98
More concretely, Ngwena suggests that ‘adequacy’ should be assessed in the
context of a particular prisoner’s medical condition, the capacity of detention
centres’ available health care facilities to provide the medical treatment required
99Ngwena op cit note 49 at 17-18.
100Rules 22-23 of the UN ‘Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’
(1955).  See also rules 24-26.
101De Wet op cit note 44 at 110 argues that, given the particular vulnerability of
prisoners, ‘adequate’ treatment might well amount to more than the ‘basic’ treatment envisaged
by s 28(1)(c).
102See De Wet (ibid); Fanyana ka Mdumbe ‘Socio-economic rights: Van Biljon versus
Soobramoney’ (1998) 13 SA Public Law 460 at 469; Liebenberg (in Chaskalson et al) op cit note
4 at 37; Mubangizi op cit note 15 at 349.
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by the prisoner, as well as the standard of medical treatment available outside
of prisons.99  According to s 12(1) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998,
medical facilities in prisons should be aimed at allowing prisoners to lead
healthy lives and should focus on providing primary health care, whereas s
12(2)(a) of the Act explicitly excludes cosmetic medical treatment from its
conception of ‘adequacy’.  Further, under the UN Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners, prisoners should have access to basic medical,
dental and psychiatric health services rendered by qualified officials, prisoners
requiring specialised treatment should be transferred to facilities which are
capable of meeting their needs, and necessary pre- and post-natal care should
be provided.100
Accordingly, I would submit that s 35(2)(e) encompasses at least an
entitlement to receive primary health care services,101 non-compliance with
which is capable of justification only in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.102  It
may further be argued that s 35(2)(e) entitles prisoners to have their individual
health needs considered in all decisions impacting on the duration, locality and
conditions of their detention.
3.3 SUMMARY: THE POTENTIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH RIGHTS TO RENDER
TANGIBLE BENEFITS
The Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution empowers individuals and groups to
assert a wide range of fully justiciable socio-economic rights against the State
or private entities.  It allows courts to interpret these rights generously,
purposively and in accordance with their meaning in international law.  It
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promotes accountability by requiring of respondents to justify any limitation on
the enjoyment of a right and allows courts to balance individual and societal
interests in deciding whether an infringement of a right was justifiable.  In the
event of an unjustifiable infringement, it allows for the granting of effective relief,
which amounts to adequate reparation for the infringement, without losing sight
of the demands of justice, equity and appropriateness in the particular
circumstances of each case.
Several substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights correspond to
elements of the health rights package in international law.  Section 12(2) of the
Constitution entrenches a variety of health-related freedoms, whereas the
equality element of the right to health, in addition to underlying rights of access
to care, finds protection under s 9 of the Constitution and under the various
legislative enactments that elaborate on its operation.  Rights to determinants
of health are found throughout the Constitution, with s 24(a) embodying a right
to environmental health and various other health-conducive social goods finding
protection under ss 26-29 of the Constitution.  Finally, s 27(1)(a) provides
generically for a right to have meaningful access to primary, secondary and
tertiary health care services of adequate quality, whereas more explicit
entitlements to emergency medical care, basic health care services for children
and adequate health care services for detainees are conferred by ss 27(3),
28(1)(c) and 35(2)(e) of the Constitution respectively.
Whereas the benefits implied by many of these rights appear to be
immediately enforceable (subject, of course, to the provisions of s 36 and the
exercise of courts’ remedial flexibility), rights to most determinants of health as
well as the generic right of access to health care services are limited in the
extent to which they may immediately be claimed.  In relation to these rights, s
27(2) of the Constitution determines that the State is obliged to adopt
reasonable measures aimed at their progressive realisation within its available
resources.  Nevertheless, I have argued in relation to s 27(1)(a) that at least
entitlements associated with the obligation to respect the right as well as with
the obligation to ensure equal access to the amenities it implies are capable of
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immediately being enforced.  Furthermore, I have suggested that additional
minimum core obligations may be inherent in s 27(1)(a) and that non-compliance
with these may amount to an infringement of s 27(1)(a), notwithstanding s 27(2).
This would not necessarily entail that all relevant treatments or benefits may
immediately and without reservation be demanded by all rights-bearers, but
rather that infringements of these entitlements should tangibly be remedied
unless such a remedy would be inappropriate, or the infringement of the right
may be justified in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.
Overall, the Bill of Rights offers sufficient protection to the right to health
and provides an ideal setting for a study of the extent to which individual
benefits may flow from reliance on health rights in litigation.  The following
chapter assesses reported judgments of South African courts in which health
rights have come into play, in an attempt to establish whether the textual
potential of health rights has been realised in cases where tangible health-
related benefits have been claimed before the courts.
1I refer also to findings concerning rights in ss 26(1) and 27(1)(b) and (c), as well as non-
health-related rights in s 28(1)(c) of the Constitution.  To the extent that entitlements awarded
by these provisions are phrased and/or limited in a similar way to health-related rights, courts’
approach to these entitlements will likely also inform their approach to health rights.
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CHAPTER 4
HEALTH RIGHTS IN THE COURTS
4.1 GENERAL
Chapter 3 illustrated the potential of health rights in the 1996 Constitution to
result in meaningful benefits, by discussing the interpretation of constitutional
provisions which firstly enable a benefit-focused approach to socio-economic
rights and secondly embody the various interests represented by the right to
health in international law.  This chapter is concerned with the manner in which
South African courts have thus far dealt with health rights in cases before them.
It considers the content that courts have awarded to health rights as well as the
limitations to which they have subjected them, and comments on the manner in
which courts’ interpretative, evaluative and remedial approaches to health rights
impact upon the potential of these rights to make a meaningful difference to the
lives of their benficiaries.
Of course, socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South Africa is still in
its infancy and there has only been a handful of reported decisions at High Court
level and above that directly involve health rights.  Many of these offer only
tentative and exploratory observations on the content and enforcement of the
rights concerned and many aspects of health rights have thus far received only
minimal judicial attention.  The empirical basis for conclusions drawn in this
chapter is therefore necessarily limited.  However, when viewed together with
judgments on non-health-related socio-economic rights,1 it is possible to identify
aspects of socio-economic rights jurisprudence generally, and of health-rights
jurisprudence specifically, that present cause for concern from a benefit-focused
perspective.
Section 4.2 below analyses the various reported judgments that involve
21998 (1) SA 745 (CC).
32002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
4Minster of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 1) 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC) (‘TAC 1').
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constitutional health rights or that are otherwise relevant to their enforcement.
It concludes that, while a measure of tangible benefits is indeed resulting from
health rights litigation, several aspects of our emerging health rights
jurisprudence unduly limit the potential of health rights in this respect.  Possible
explanations for such unduly limiting aspects are considered in section 4.3.  I
argue that, while constraints imposed by the separation of powers, the
polycentricity of health-related matters and the intricacy of the specialist and
complex medical issues that they involve may justify a degree of judicial caution
in health rights matters, they do not preclude courts from directly and tangibly
remedying infringements of health rights where these occur.  Accordingly, they
do not provide a convincing explanation for courts’ hesitance to interpret and
enforce health rights in a manner that may render tangible benefits more
directly.  The chapter concludes by speculatively considering other factors that
may explain this hesitance.
4.2 SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE FROM A BENEFIT-
FOCUSED PERSPECTIVE
The Constitutional Court has twice decided matters directly involving health
rights.  In Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal2 (‘Soobramoney’),
the Court dismissed an appeal by a chronically ill man in need of life-sustaining
kidney dialysis to have such treatment provided at state expense.  In Minister of
Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2)3 (‘TAC2'), the Court confirmed a
High Court decision that the government’s policy regulating the availability of a
drug used to prevent mother-to-child-transmission of HIV did not satisfy
constitutional standards and issued an order requiring the drug to be made more
widely available.  Health rights were further implicated in a procedural matter
relating to the Treatment Action Campaign challenge,4 in an administrative-law
5Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa CCT 59/04, judgment of 30 September
2005 (unreported) (‘New Clicks’).
62001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
7Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).
82004 (6) SA 505 (CC).
92005 (2) SA 140 (CC).
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challenge to the validity of regulations aimed at making medicines more
affordable5 and in a small number of judgments, including the lower court
decisions in the above matters, by the High Courts and the Supreme Court of
Appeal (SCA).
The context within which these health rights decisions must be
understood further includes judgments relating to other, non-health-related,
socio-economic rights, especially that of Government of the Republic of South
Africa v Grootboom6 (‘Grootboom’), an access to housing case in which the
Constitutional Court first set out its current approach to socio-economic rights
adjudication.  Apart from Grootboom, reference will also be made to dicta in the
First Certification judgment7 pertaining to socio-economic rights adjudication in
general; to the simultaneous vindication of the rights to equality and to have
access to social security in Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule
v Minister of Social Development8 (‘Khosa/Mahlaule’); to the vindication of the
obligation to respect the right of access to housing in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van
Rooyen v Stotlz9 (‘Jaftha’); as well as to assorted lower court judgments
involving particular aspects of non-health-related, socio-economic rights.
Whereas the rights involved in the majority of the judgments classified
here as non-health-related all represent determinants of health, the rights are
not implicated as such in any of the above judgments.  Consequently, judicial
enforcement of determinants of health is not separately discussed in this
chapter.  However, conclusions drawn from the discussion of s 27(1)(a) below
also apply to claims relating to non-medicinal, health-conducive social
amenities.  Given further that the health-related freedoms in s 12(2) and the right
to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being in s 24(a) have not
yet been directly implicated in constitutional litigation, their vindication will not
10Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal 1998 (1) SA 430 (D) (‘Soobramoney
High Court’) at 437A-D; 439E-440D.
11Soobramoney op cit note 2 at paras 17-21.  The Court’s findings in relation to s 27(3)
are discussed in 4.2(c) below.  The socio-economic dimensions of the right to life and its
significance for a benefit-focused approach to all socio-economic rights is beyond the scope of
this dissertation.  I have discussed the potential of the right to life in this regard and have
criticised the manner in which the right to life challenge in Soobramoney was dismissed
elsewhere - see Marius Pieterse ‘A different shade of red: Socio-economic dimensions of the
right to life in South Africa’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 372-385; also Marius Pieterse ‘Possibilities and
pitfalls in the domestic enforcement of socio-economic rights: Contemplating the South African
experience’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 882 at 899-900.
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be discussed in this chapter.
(a) Decisions concerning the right to have access to health care services
The first socio-economic rights matter to reach the Constitutional Court,
Soobramoney, involved a challenge by a man in need of life-sustaining renal
dialysis to the resource-rationing policy of a State hospital according to which
he was excluded from receiving such treatment.  Due to its limited resources, the
hospital could provide dialysis only to a limited number of patients.  It therefore
allowed treatment only for those patients whose conditions could be cured by
dialysis, or whose general state of health made them eligible for a kidney
transplant.  This did not include Mr Soobramoney who, because he would die
if he did not receive dialysis, alleged that his exclusion from treatment
unjustifiably infringed his rights to life and not to be refused emergency medical
treatment.  The challenge was dismissed by the Durban High Court, which held
that Mr Soobramoney’s circumstances did not fall within the ambit of the right not
to be refused emergency medical treatment and that his right to have access to
the relevant health care services was limited by resource scarcity and the
competing rights of other patients.10  On appeal to the Constitutional Court, the
rights to life and not to be refused emergency medical treatment were held not
to be applicable to the matter.11  Instead, the Court considered whether the
rationing policy fell foul of s 27(1)(a).  It held that it did not, mainly because it
found the policy to have been rationally conceived and implemented in good
faith by hospital authorities, which were better placed to take the decision of who
12Soobramoney op cit note 2 at paras 25; 29-30 (per Chaskalson P for the majority); 58
(per Sachs J concurring separately).
13Ibid paras 11; 17.  This aspect of the judgment is criticised by Frank Michelman ‘The
Constitution, social rights and reason: A tribute to Etienne Mureinik’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 499 at
503-504; Craig Scott & Philip Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational
context: A comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 206
at 239.
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was to receive treatment within prevailing resource constraints.12
Soobramoney was far from an ideal case for establishing the potential
reach of s 27(1)(a).  The benefit claimed by the appellant was to be provided
with very expensive tertiary treatment (which would neither cure nor significantly
alleviate his condition, but would merely marginally prolong his life) at State
expense, in the face of relatively convincing evidence that providing such
treatment fell outside of the State’s financial capacity.  It was accordingly to be
expected that the appeal would fail.  Without therefore taking issue with the
outcome of the case, certain aspects of the Court’s engagement with the right
to have access to health care services are nevertheless worrying from a benefit-
focused perspective.
The factual circumstances in Soobramoney explain why the Court
engages more with the limits to s 27(1)(a) than with the content of the
entitlements it awards - the judgment seems to accept that the claimed treatment
falls within the meaning of the concept ‘health care services’, but seeks to limit
the extent to which the provision of such treatment may immediately be
demanded under the provision.  Interestingly, the limitation clause is nowhere
invoked for this purpose.  Instead, the Court attempts to restrict the extent of the
appellant’s entitlement by firstly awarding a narrow and specific meaning to s
27(1)(a)13 and secondly by limiting the right through s 27(2).
Much seemed to turn on the fact that the State could not afford to provide
the requested treatment to the appellant and others in his position.  The Court
was clearly of the opinion that the relevant authorities were doing the best they
could, within their limited resources, by restricting treatment to those who were
most likely to benefit from it.  Moreover, it was understandably concerned that
second-guessing the rationing decision (impacted as it were, by financial as well
14Soobramoney op cit note 2 at para 29.  See also Sachs J’s concurring remarks at ibid
para 58 (‘[t]he provisions of the bill of rights should furthermore not be interpreted in a way which
results in Courts feeling themselves unduly pressurised by the fear of gambling with the lives
of claimants into ordering hospitals to furnish the most expensive and improbable procedures,
thereby diverting scarce medical resources and prejudicing the claims of others’).  See further
4.3(a) below.
15The Soobramoney Court’s narrow and deferent approach to ascertaining resource
availability is criticised by Darrel Moellendorf ‘Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and
the future of socio-economic rights claims’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 at 330-332; Charles Ngwena
‘The historical development of the South African health-care system: From privilege to
egalitarianism’ (2004) 37 De Jure 290 at 309; Jeremy Sarkin ‘Health’ (1997/8) 8 SA Human
Rights Yearbook 97 at 101-02; Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 239; 241; Ferdinand Van Oosten
‘Financial resources and the patient’s right to health care: Myth and reality’ (1999) 32 De Jure
1 at 17.  See also Christa Van Wyk ‘The enforcement of the right of access to health care in the
context of HIV/AIDS and its impact on the separation of powers’ (2003) 66 THRHR 389 at 396;
398.
16Sandra Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights’ in Matthew Chaskalson et al (eds)
Constitutional Law of South Africa (RS5, 1999) ch 41 at 41; Charles Ngwena ‘Access to health
care as a fundamental right: The scope and limits of section 27 of the Constitution’ (2000) 25(1)
Journal for Juridical Science 1 at 7.  See further Pierre De Vos ‘Pious wishes or directly
enforceable human rights?: Social and economic rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’
(1997) 13 SAJHR 67 at 97; Moellendorf op cit note 15 at 332; Charles Ngwena & Rebecca Cook
‘Rights concerning health’ in Danie Brand & Christof Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South
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as medical considerations) would do more harm than good and would amount
to overstepping its institutional boundaries.14
However, two aspects of the Court’s approach to the limiting effect of
resource constraints present cause for concern.  The first is that the Court
seems too readily to accept the respondent’s assertion of scarcity without in any
meaningful manner inquiring into the accuracy of the assertion or reasons for
the alleged scarcity.  In particular, the Court may be criticised for apparently
regarding the inability of the hospital and provincial health department in
question to satisfy the appellant’s claim (due to lack of human, financial and
technological resources) as conclusive proof that satisfying the claim was
beyond the resource capacity of the State as a whole.15  This is patently
defeatist in that it potentially allows the State to shirk its constitutional
responsibilities in relation to the delivery of particular health care services simply
by allocating minimal funds for the purpose.  Failing to subject government
assertions of resource scarcity to meaningful scrutiny allows for the
undifferentiated ‘tolling of the resource-bell’ by the State in every matter where
it falls foul of its socio-economic obligations, thereby stripping socio-economic
rights of much remedial potential.16
Africa (2005) 107 at 137; Sarkin op cit note 15 at 103; Jeremy Sarkin ‘A review of health and
human rights after five years of democracy in South Africa’ (2000) 19 Medicine & Law 287 at
293.
17Soobramoney op cit note 2 at para 28.
18Ibid para 31.
19Ibid para 54.  See also para 58.  Kevin Iles ‘Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond
the internal limitations clauses’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 448 at 454 criticises this dictum for importing
a proportionality inquiry, which typically forms part of a s 36 limitations analysis, into the
definition of the ambit of the right.  See also Fanyana Ka Mdumbe ‘Socio-economic rights: Van
Biljon versus Soobramoney’ (1998) 13 SA Public Law 460 at 467.
20Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 252-253.  See also ibid 241-245 and, in the context of
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Second, in justifying the finding that Mr Soobramoney’s claim was
untenable in the face of competing individual and societal demands for limited
resources, the Court took an overly defeatist stance.  Consider the following
passages from Chaskalson P’s majority judgment:
‘The appellant’s case must be seen in the context of the needs which the health
services have to meet, for if treatment has to be provided to the appellant it
would also have to be provided to all other persons similarly placed....  If all the
persons in South Africa who suffer from chronic renal failure were to be
provided with dialysis treatment ... the cost of doing so would make substantial
inroads into the health budget.  And if this principle were to be applied to all
patients claiming access to expensive medical treatment or expensive drugs,
the health budget would have to be dramatically increased to the prejudice of
other needs which the State has to meet’.17
‘There are also those who need access to housing, food and water,
employment opportunities, and social security....  The State has to manage its
limited resources in order to address all these claims.  There will be times when
this requires it to adopt an holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather
than to focus on the specific needs of particular individuals within society’.18
Along similar lines, Sachs J stated in a separate concurring judgment that
‘[w]hen rights by their very nature are shared and inter-dependent, striking
appropriate balances between the equally valid entitlements or expectations of
a multitude of claimants should not be seen as imposing limits on those rights
(which would then have to be justified in terms of s 36), but as defining the
circumstances in which the rights may most fairly and effectively be enjoyed’.19
Craig Scott and Philip Alston warn against invoking and endorsing such
justifications for restricting the ambit of individual rights to access care, arguing
that this could lead to a situation where ‘[t]he individual is quickly sacrificed to
the amorphous general good on this kind of reasoning which, if taken all the
way, would preclude virtually any adjudication of a claim to resources as
enjoying constitutional priority over other claims’.20  The idea that a particular
the subsequent Grootboom case, David Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The
minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 119 SALJ 484 at 499 (‘[c]ollective goals cannot
outweigh protections for the most basic interests of individuals’).
21See also Sandra Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic
rights: An effective tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 159
at 187 (remarking that the Court’s approach to socio-economic rights is distinguishable from its
approach to civil and political rights, where larger societal concerns at most enter the inquiry
under the limitation clause, and not in the rights-definition stage).
22Soobramoney op cit note 2 at para 42.
23Also pointed out by Nomthandazo Ntlama ‘Unlocking the future: Monitoring court
orders in respect of socio-economic rights’ (2005) 68 THRHR 81 at 82fn2.  See further 4.3(b)
below.
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claim should be unenforceable merely because other similar claims (or
dissimilar claims of equal importance and cost) remain unrealised, is simply at
odds with the notion of individual rights.  One would be hard pressed to imagine
a court similarly rendering a claim based on a civil or political right contingent
upon whether the State could satisfy all similar claims and could meet all its
other constitutional obligations towards society at large.21
Indeed, there are indications in Soobramoney that the Court does not
view s 27(1)(a) as embodying a fully-fledged right at all.  In a separate
concurring judgment, Madala J stated:
‘The Constitution is forward-looking and guarantees to every citizen
fundamental rights in such a manner that the ordinary person-in-the-street, who
is aware of these guarantees, immediately claims them without further ado -
and assumes that every right so guaranteed is available to him or her on
demand.  Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and something to be
strived for.  They amount to a promise, in some cases, and an indication of
what a democratic society aiming to salvage lost dignity, freedom and equality
should embark upon’.22
While this remark was not explicitly endorsed by the majority of the Court, it
reveals an ideological discomfort with viewing socio-economic rights as
embodying immediately enforceable individual claims,23 which could significantly
hinder the potential of socio-economic rights to render tangible benefits for those
who rely on them in litigation.
This discomfort influenced the Court’s subsequent development of a
coherent approach to socio-economic rights adjudication in Grootboom, where
it was at pains to emphasise that the right to have access to adequate housing
24Grootboom op cit note 6 at para 95.
25Ibid para 32.  The Grootboom approach to minimum core has been criticised for
misunderstanding the concept and overstating its complexity, for failing to recognise the
universality of basic subsistence needs and for not insisting that the State prioritise satisfying
the primal needs of vulnerable sectors of society.  See Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 487-489; Pierre
De Vos ‘Substantive Equality after Grootboom: The emergence of social and economic context
as a guiding value in equality jurisprudence’ (2001) Acta Juridica 52 at 58; Liebenberg op cit note
21 at 174; Theunis Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom - A Response to Cass R Sunstein’ (2002)
12(2) Constitutional Forum 41 at 48; 51.
26Grootboom op cit note 6 at para 33.
27Ibid para 83 (‘[t]he proposition that rights are interrelated and are all equally important
is not merely a theoretical postulate.  The concept has immense human and practical
significance in a society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom.  It is fundamental to
the evaluation of the reasonableness of State action that account be taken of the inherent dignity
of human beings.  The Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its paper if the
reasonableness of State action concerned with housing is determined without regard to the
fundamental constitutional value of human dignity’).
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did not entitle people ‘to claim shelter or housing immediately on demand’.24  In
dismissing the amici’s assertion that s 26(1) of the Constitution embodied an
immediately enforceable minimum core obligation, the Court found that
determining the content of such an obligation was overly complex and would be
impossible without ‘having the requisite information on the needs and the
opportunities for the enjoyment of this right’.25  Instead, the Court held that the
‘real question’ in terms of the Constitution was whether the current State policy
in relation to housing delivery was reasonable under s 26(2),26 hence shifting the
focus of its inquiry to the internal limitation on the right.
According to the Grootboom Court, an inquiry into the reasonableness of
State measures must have regard to the value of human dignity.27
Reasonableness of socio-economic measures should be assessed on a case-
by-case basis and depends on the context of the litigation, the broader social,
economic and historical context and the context of the Bill of Rights as a whole.
Reasonableness of measures depends not only on their content, but also on
their implementation.  Measures must be aimed at the effective and expeditious
progressive realisation of a particular right, within the State’s means.  In addition
to the financial resources available, the capacity of relevant State institutions to
implement measures should also be taken into account.  Measures must further
be comprehensive, coherent, balanced and flexible, must be adequate to satisfy
the obligations posed by the relevant right, should clearly set out the
28Ibid paras 39-44. See also paras 46; 66; 68; 82.
29Ibid para 69.
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responsibilities of different spheres of government and must ensure that
appropriate resources are available for their implementation.  Measures may
further not exclude a significant segment of society, must plan, budget and
monitor the fulfillment of immediate needs and the management of crisis
situations, and must cater for the urgent needs of the most vulnerable sectors
of society.  Courts should also be influenced by the extent to which the exercise
of the right in question is being impeded in a particular case.28
The nationwide housing programme evaluated for reasonableness in
Grootboom was held to fall short of the standard, particularly because it did not
cater for the emergency needs of vulnerable groups.29  A declaratory order to
this effect was issued, with the implied demand that government adjust its policy
in order to conform to the dictates of reasonableness.
While the Court’s elevation of one of the terms in the s 26(2) internal
limitation to the central yardstick for measuring compliance with the State’s
obligations in Grootboom might have seemed curious, it became clear in the
subsequent TAC2 that the Court not only viewed ‘Grootboom reasonableness’
as equally applicable to the right to have access to health care services, but that
it considered the State’s obligation to adopt reasonable measures in the quest
for progressive realisation of socio-economic rights to be the primary (if not sole)
justiciable obligation generated by s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.
In TAC2, the amici contended for an interpretation of s 27(1)(a) that
reflected a minimum core obligation inherent in the right.  Since the drug
Nevirapine (the provision of which was central to the TAC2 challenge) appeared
on the WHO’s list of essential drugs (which, according to UNCESCR General
Comment 14, should be provided as part of the minimum core of the right to
health), a minimum core approach to s 27(1)(a) would have entailed elevating
the provision of Nevirapine above the dictates of s 27(2) of the Constitution and
would accordingly have required its availability in the public sector (unless,
presumably, its non-availability could be justified under s 36).  The Court
30TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 29.
31Ibid para 35. See also para 34 ('the socio-economic rights of the Constitution should
not be construed as entitling everyone that the minimum core be provided to them’).
32Ibid paras 37-38.
33Ibid para 39.  See also paras 31-32.
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emphatically dismissed this argument, characterising it as implying that ss 27(1)
and (2) would always engender separate obligations.30  According to the Court,
a purposive approach to s 27 precluded a finding that s 27(1)(a) imposed any
minimum core obligation.  It stated:
‘It is impossible to give everyone access even to a “core” service immediately.
All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the state, is that it act
reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights identified in sections
26 and 27 on a progressive basis’.31
The Court went on to hold that courts were not institutionally equipped to ‘make
the wide-ranging factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what
the minimum-core standards ... should be’, since this would have ‘multiple social
and economic consequences for the community’.32  Finally, the Court indicated
that s 27(1)(a) should never fulfill more than a definitional role:
‘section 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise to a self-standing and
independent positive right enforceable irrespective of the considerations
mentioned in section 27(2).  Sections 27(1) and 27(2) must be read together as
defining the scope of the positive rights that everyone has and the
corresponding obligations on the state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfill”
such right.  The rights conferred by sections 26(1) and 27(1) are to have
“access” to the services that the state is obliged to provide in terms of sections
26(2) and 27(2)’.33
Instead of attempting to award discernible and claimable content to s
27(1)(a), the TAC2 Court followed the Grootboom reasonableness inquiry in
relation to s 27.  The Court reiterated that the extent of the rights-violation in
question must influence the reasonableness inquiry, and again emphasised that
the reasonableness standard required of measures to be coherent, balanced
and flexible, and not to exclude already vulnerable members of society.
Regarding the latter requirement, the TAC2 Court added that inability to afford
treatment is considered indicative of such vulnerability.  The Court further
seemed to add an additional requirement that measures should be transparent
34Ibid paras 68; 70; 123.  On the additional requirement of transparency, see also
Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 184.
35TAC2 (ibid) at paras 80; 95.  The TAC High Court held that the State’s programme was
unreasonable because it was ‘open-ended and leaves everything for the future’ and thus could
not ‘be said to be coherent, progressive and purposeful’.  Treatment Action Campaign v Minister
of Health 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T) (‘TAC High Court’) at 385F-G.
36TAC2 (ibid) at paras 49; 72-73; 120.  For a general discussion of the application of the
Grootboom reasonableness standard in TAC2, see Sibonile Khoza ‘Reducing mother-to-child
transmission of HIV: The Nevirapine case’ (2002) 3(2) ESR Review 2 at 4-5.
37TAC2 (ibid) at para 135.  See also paras 64; 69; 71; 95.
38Ibid para 125.
39Remarked also by Danie Brand ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-
economic rights jurisprudence, or “what are socio-economic rights for?”’ in Henk Botha et al
(eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 at 46; Pierre De Vos ‘So
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in order to satisfy the dictates of reasonableness.34
The Court found that the government policy according to which
Nevirapine could not be administered in the public health care sector except at
certain designated ‘research and training sites’ (regardless of whether the
capacity to administer it existed elsewhere) failed the requirement of
reasonableness primarily due to its rigidity and inflexibility.35  Other factors
influencing the finding of unreasonableness were the negligible cost of
administering the drug, that its safety and efficacy was beyond question, that the
procedure for administering it was simple and that funds to expand its provision
outside of designated sites were available.36  The Court accordingly ordered the
government to take reasonable measures to remove restrictions on
administering the drug in instances where this was medically indicated and
where the capacity to do so existed, to ‘permit and facilitate’ the use of the drug
in these circumstances, to make it available for this purpose and to take
reasonable measures to extend HIV testing and counseling facilities at public
hospitals which still lacked the capacity to administer the drug.37  Despite the far-
reaching terms of this order and despite viewing universal access to Nevirapine
as a goal that needed to be accomplished as soon as possible, the Court was
still at pains to point out that its finding of unreasonableness ‘does not mean that
everyone can immediately claim access to such treatment’.38
In TAC2, the Constitutional Court clearly distanced itself from an
approach to the right of access to health care services that entails the
recognition of enforceable individual claims.39  Instead, it opted for an essentially
much to do, so little done: The right of access to anti-retroviral drugs post-Grootboom’ (2003)
7 Law, Democracy & Development 83 at 89; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 187.
40See for instance S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) at para
37 (Court assumes that s 26(1) of the interim Constitution can be infringed separately from s
26(2), implying that such violation would require justification under s 33 of the interim
Constitution); Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) at
para 27 (Court assumes violation of s 31 of the 1996 Constitution without any consideration of
s 31(2), and continues to conduct a limitations analysis under s 36); Islamic Unity Convention
v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) at paras 32-34 (Court holds
explicitly that limitations on expression which fall outside of the restriction on freedom of
expression in s 16(2) of the 1996 Constitution need to be justified under s 36, accordingly that
s 16(1) is capable of independent violation).
41Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 496.
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procedural inquiry into the reasonableness of measures taken in pursuit of the
progressive realisation of the right.  Its unwillingness to acknowledge an
enforceable individual right flowing from s 27(1)(a) appears to betray the
constitutional text (which clearly separates the right in s 27(1)(a) from the
qualifiers to the positive obligations it imposes in s 27(2)), to contradict the
Court’s interpretative approach to all other internal limitations in the
Constitution40 and to reinforce the dichotomy between socio-economic and civil
and political rights (which the Court has consistently interpreted as conferring
enforceable individual entitlements).  Opting for reasonableness as an
alternative to a rights-based approach also lacks textual support, since it seems
clear from the wording of s 27(2) that the reasonableness standard was intended
to prescribe the content of measures adopted in pursuit of progressively
realising the right, rather than to substitute an inquiry into the meaning of the
right itself or into the implications of the progressive realisation standard or the
resource specification.41  In light of its own objections to reading s 27(1)(a)
independently from s 27(2), it is ironic that the Court has inversely severed a
single requirement in s 27(2) from the remainder of s 27.
Indeed, the Court’s approach has allowed it altogether to avoid engaging
with the ambit and scope of s 27(1)(a).  While TAC2 seems to accept that
provision of Nevirapine legitimately falls within the ambit of s 27(1)(a), the
judgment nowhere explicitly engages with the many interpretative issues raised
by the phrase ‘access to health care services’.  Hence there is no indication as
to when there is considered to be access to health care services, the kind of
42Lamented also by David Bilchitz ‘Placing basic needs at the centre of socio-economic
rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 4(1) ESR Review 2 at 3; David Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable
approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights
jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 at 6; 8; 10; Brand op cit note 39 at 45-46; Iles op cit note 19
at 454.
43Grootboom op cit note 6 at paras 46; 94.
44The affordability of Nevirapine is given significant weight in the TAC reasonableness
inquiry.  See TAC2 op cit note 3 at paras 48-49; 71; 89; 120; 125; TAC High Court op cit note
35 at 386C-G.  See further remarks of Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 173; Van Wyk op cit note 15
at 401; Murray Wesson ‘Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence
of the South African Constitutional Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 284 at 296.
45See Fons Coomans ‘Reviewing implementation of social and economic rights: An
assessment of the ‘reasonableness’ test as developed by the South African Constitutional Court’
(2005) 65 Heidelberg J of International Law 167 at 190-191; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The right to
social assistance: The implications of Grootboom for policy reform in South Africa’ (2001) 17
SAJHR 232 at 255; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 179.
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services to which access may be claimed, the levels at which such services must
be provided or the quality standards to which such services should adhere.
Similarly, TAC2 nowhere clearly articulates the obligations that the State incurs
in relation to these and other aspects of the right.42
Grootboom reasonableness further precludes meaningful engagement
with the other standards contained in s 27(2), with both the progressive
realisation standard and the resource specification functioning only as non-
specific indicators of reasonableness.43  For instance, while it is clear from both
Grootboom and TAC2 that the affordability of a particular social good is central
to whether or not the non-provision of that good will be regarded as
reasonable,44 neither judgment gives any indication of the degree of scrutiny to
which assertions of resource scarcity should be subjected, or of the manner in
which resource-availability should be assessed.45
Declining to ascertain the ambit and scope of the entitlements conferred
by rights also precludes meaningful engagement with their limits.  In particular,
confining the inquiry into compliance with the obligations imposed by s 27(1)(a)
to the reasonableness of measures in terms of s 27(2) seems to preclude (or at
least significantly to complicate) engagement with the limiting effect of s 36.
This is because a finding of unreasonableness under s 27(2) appears to exclude
the possibility of holding that measures which limit a particular entitlement
conferred by s 27(1)(a) are nevertheless reasonable and justifiable in terms of
46Johan De Waal; Iain Currie & Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (4th ed
2001) at 451; Iles op cit note 19 at 451-452; Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a useful role for section
36 of the Constitution in social rights cases? Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern
Metropolitan Local Council’ (2003) 120 SALJ 41 at 43.  The anomalies caused by the duplication
of the reasonableness standard in ss 27(2) and 36 were acknowledged by the Constitutional
Court in Khoza/Mahlaule op cit note 8 at paras 83 (per Mokgoro J for the majority); 105 (per
Ngcobo J partially dissenting).
47Iles op cit note 19 at 464; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Violations of socio-economic rights: The
role of the South African Human Rights Commission’ in Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann
(eds) The Post Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 405
at 424; Pieterse op cit note 46 at 47.  See however M Geldenhuys ‘The rights to health care and
housing: Some aspects of constitutional interpretation’ (2005) 17 SA Mercantile LJ 182 at 185-
187 (arguing that the Court’s approach to reasonableness contains elements of a limitations
inquiry in terms of s 36). A detailed comparison of the standards of scrutiny envisaged by ss
27(2) and 36 is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  It may however be accepted that the s 36
standard is more stringent.  See Iles (ibid) at 456-457; Theunis Roux ‘Legitimating
Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’ (2003)
10 Democratization 92 at 97.
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s 36(1).46  This is unfortunate from a benefit-focused perspective, since courts
will understandably be loath to award meaningful content to s 27(1)(a) if doing
so will always create an entitlement incapable of limitation.  Excluding the
application of s 36 from socio-economic rights matters further means that
relevant policies may never be subjected to the additional scrutiny envisaged by
the standards of justifiablility and proportionality contained in s 36(1) and will
accordingly always pass constitutional muster if they satisfy the (arguably more
lenient) standard of reasonableness.47
Non-application of s 36 to socio-economic rights matters also appears to
preclude courts from following the ‘two-stage’ approach of adjudication when
ascertaining whether there has been an infringement of s 27(1)(a).  Indeed,
Grootboom reasonableness focuses neither on the interpretation of the content
of the right in question nor on the limits to which it may be subjected (as would
be the case under the ‘two-stage approach’).  Instead, it is concerned only with
the internal limitation to s 27(1)(a), which would ordinarily be considered as part
of the first stage of adjudication.  As Sandra Liebenberg indicates, this has the
unfortunate consequence of placing an unfairly onerous burden of proof on
applicants, who have to show that government measures aimed at the
progressive realisation of s 27(1)(a) are unreasonable in terms of s 27(2).  This
would require them to review and evaluate a wide range of complex budgetary
48The nature of this burden of proof and its unfair ramifications for applicants in socio-
economic rights matters is discussed by Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 188; Sandra Liebenberg
‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in Stuart Woolman (ed) Constitutional Law of South
Africa (2ed; 2003) ch 33 at 30; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Basic rights claims: How responsive is
reasonableness review?’ (2004) 5(5) ESR Review 7 at 10; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The value of
human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 1 at 22-23.  See also Iles
op cit note 19 at 464.
49See Chrystal Chetty ‘The right to health care services: Interpreting section 27 of the
Constitution’ (2002) 17 SA Public Law 453 at 455; Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘Non-state actors’
responsibility for socio-economic rights: The nature of their obligations under the South African
Constitution’ (2002) 3(3) ESR Review 2 at 5; and also remarks of Stephen Ellmann ‘A
constitutional confluence: American “State-action” law and the application of South Africa’s
socio-economic rights guarantees to private actors’ in Andrews & Ellmann op cit note 47, 444
at 461; Liebenberg op cit note 16 at 45; Michelman op cit note 13 at 504; John C Mubangizi
‘Public health, the South Arican Bill of Rights and the socio-economic polemic’ (2002) TSAR 343
at 345; Marius Pieterse ‘Beyond the welfare state: Globalization of neo-liberal culture and the
constitutional protection of social and economic rights in South Africa’ (2003) 14 Stellenbosch
LR 3 at 26.
50Bilchitz (SAJHR) op cit note 42 at 8-10.  See also Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 496-499;
Bilchitz (ESR) op cit note 42 at 3; Marius Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement
of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 at 407.
101
and policy processes, which would in turn require them to have access to
complex and specialist information which is typically only available to the State.
Many claimants would be simply incapable of coping with the various logistical
demands associated with satisfying this onus which, under the two-stage
approach, would instead have rested with the State.48
Furthermore, the Court’s exclusive focus on s 27(2) serves to obscure the
horizontal elements of s 27(1)(a), since it complicates the process of
distinguishing obligations capable of horizontal application from the (seemingly
exclusively vertical) obligations contained in s 27(2).  While the obligations
detailed in s 27(2) are probably too onerous to bind private entities, a denial that
s 27(1)(a) also entails obligations beyond those listed in s 27(2) means that
many of the interests served by the right to have access to health care services
are left without adequate protection in many of the settings where they are most
often threatened.49
Overall, when applied without reference to the content of the right it is
meant to qualify, the reasonableness standard becomes ad hoc, amorphous and
incapable of addressing the substantive concerns that arise when social policy
measures are challenged.50  Moreover, divorcing the focus of the
reasonableness inquiry from the right to which it relates in this manner, strips the
51Iain Currie ‘Bill of Rights jurisprudence’ (2002) Annual Survey of SA Law 36 at 72. For
similar characterisations of the Court’s approach see, for example, Bilchitz (ESR) op cit note 42
at 2; Bilchitz (SAJHR) op cit note 42 at 10; Brand op cit note 39 at 36-37; 39; 49; Chetty op cit
note 49 at 461; Coomans op cit note 45 at 188; Pierre De Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of access
to housing and substantive equality as contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 258 at 271; Heinz
Klug ‘Access to health care: Judging implementation in the context of AIDS: Treatment Action
Campaign v Minister of Health’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 114 at 115; Heinz Klug ‘Five years on: How
relevant is the Constitution to the new South Africa’ (2002) 26 Vermont LR 803 at 807-808;
Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 176; Dwight G Newman ‘Institutional monitoring of social and
economic rights: A South African case study and a new research agenda’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 189
at 196; Pieterse op cit note 11 at 898; Roux op cit note 25 at 46; Andre van der Walt ‘A South
African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social justice’ in Botha et al op cit note 39, 163
at 200.  Indeed, in Grootboom op cit note 6 at para 83, the Court stated: ‘Section 26, read in the
context of the Bill of Rights as a whole, must mean that the respondents have the right to
reasonable action by the State in all circumstances and with particular regard to human dignity’.
52Currie op cit note 51 at 72.  It is for this reason that Grootboom reasonableness is
sometimes described as approximating an administrative law inquiry (see, for example, Bilchitz
op cit note 20 at 495; Cass R Sunstein ‘Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa’
(2001) 12 Constitutional Forum 123).  The claim is not (as Wesson op cit note 44 at 289-293
assumes) that Grootboom reasonableness is identical to any particular standard in administrative
law, but rather that the benefits flowing from application of the standard appear to be similarly
confined.
53See Brand op cit note 39 at 49-50; De Vos op cit note 39 at 90; Liebenberg op cit note
21 at 176; Roux op cit note 25 at 46; Wesson op cit note 44 at 293; 295; 297.  This appears
especially from Khosa/Mahlaule op cit note 8.
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right of meaningful content.  As Iain Currie observes:
‘The trouble is that interpreting the rights in the way the Constitutional Court has
done leaves them empty.  They are not a right to anything of substance, only
to reasonableness in the formulation and carrying out of whatever measures
the state has decided to adopt.  Reasonableness is no more than a relational
standard - ends measured against means.  It is not an obligation to provide
something.  Read in this way, the socio-economic rights are not a right to, say,
a roof over your head or anti-retroviral drugs, but only to have evaluated the
reasonableness of a decision to provide or not to provide these things’.51
In affirming only the existence of a right to have measures aimed at addressing
health-related concerns in place and to have such measures evaluated for their
adherence to principles of good governance, the extent of the entitlements
conferred by Grootboom reasonableness appear identical to those implied by
the right to reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action in s 33 of the
Constitution.52  Apart from this, Grootboom reasonableness seems at most to
award a relatively weak claim for inclusion in the ambit of policy aimed at
satisfying health needs generally, which could in any event be claimed under s
9(1) of the Constitution,53 or indeed under common law principles of
administrative law (which, even in the pre-Constitutional era, could be used to
54This is illustrated by Applicant v Administrator Transvaal 1993 (4) SA 733 (W), where
an HIV-positive patient successfully challenged an administrative decision by a State hospital
not to provide him with a particular drug.
55See Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 499; Bilchitz (ESR) op cit note 42 at 3-4; Brand op cit
note 39 at 36-37; 49; 55; Chetty op cit note 49 at 455; Pieterse op cit note 50 at 407; Van der
Walt op cit note 51 at 200.
56Acknowledged by Bilchitz (SAJHR) op cit note 42 at 1; Coomans op cit note 45 at 168;
181; 186; Liebenberg op cit note 45 at 250; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 178; 190.
57See Coomans op cit note 45 at 188; 195; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 176; Liebenberg
(2003) op cit note 48 at 30; Pieterse op cit note 11 at 896.
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obtain access to treatment from which a patient was arbitrarily or irrationally
excluded, or where a legitimate expectation was created that she would receive
such treatment).54  This makes apparent nonsense of s 27's separate inclusion
as a justiciable right in the Bill of Rights.
In focusing on the coherence, rationality, inclusiveness and flexibility of
legislative or policy measures, instead of on the alleviation of the concrete
consequences of socio-economic deprivation, Grootboom reasonableness has
rendered the material needs of socio-economic rights’ subjects extraneous to the
inquiry into constitutional compliance with socio-economic obligations.55  This
inquiry neither concerns itself with evaluating the urgency of applicants’ needs
(unlike, for instance, a minimum core approach to socio-economic rights
adjudication), nor necessarily demands their satisfaction.
The beneficiaries of socio-economic rights stand to gain virtually no
tangible benefit from the outcome of an inquiry into the adherence of law or
policy to essentially procedural standards.  Part of the reason for this is that the
only remedy practically allowed for by a finding that law or policy has failed to
comply with Grootboom reasonableness, appears to be an order declaring the
extent of such non-compliance and calling for the law or policy to be modified
in order to adhere to the standard.  Whereas the adherence of health care policy
to the dictates of Grootboom reasonableness will no doubt have positive
consequences for the progressive realisation of s 27(1)(a) generally and
whereas Grootboom reasonableness accordingly fulfills a valuable ‘directive
principle function’,56 such an order will more often than not be of little use to
people in urgent need of access to particular health care goods, facilities or
services, whose needs will remain unsatisfied.57  This is further exacerbated by
58Dennis Davis ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the Constitutional
Court after ten years’ (2004) 5(5) ESR Review 3 at 6.  See also Mia Swart ‘Left out in the cold?
Crafting constitutional remedies for the poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 215 at 218.
Grootboom, for instance, did not result in an alleviation of the respondents’ housing need,
despite their successful challenge.
59De Vos op cit note 51 at 266; 270-272; Liebenberg (2005) op cit note 48 at 22;
Liebenberg (2004) op cit note 48 at 9; Sandra Liebenberg & Michelle O’Sullivan ‘South Africa’s
new equality legislation: A tool for advancing women’s socio-economic equality?’ (2001) Acta
Juridica 70 at 76.  For instance, Sachs J found in New Clicks op cit note at 5 paras 650-656 that
regulations aimed at making medicines more affordable, despite being aimed at progressively
realising the s 27(1)(a) right, were not reasonable because they failed to take into account the
special needs served by and obstacles faced by rural pharmacies.
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the Constitutional Court’s apparent reluctance to enforce compliance with the
orders it has issued in Grootboom and TAC2 (through, for instance, combining
its declaratory orders with structural interdicts), the result of which has been that
‘litigants have won cases and government has done little to produce the tangible
benefits that these litigants were entitled to expect from their success’.58
Accordingly, it would seem that, despite its ostensible concern for the
protection and safeguarding of human dignity, the manner in which Grootboom
reasonableness depicts the entitlements conferred by the socio-economic rights
in the 1996 Constitution serves to strip the rights of much of their remedial
potential.  Whereas Grootboom reasonableness is potentially useful as an
indicator of State compliance with the obligation to adopt reasonable measures
in terms of s 27(2),59 it becomes problematic when viewed as representative of
the totality of entitlements implied by the socio-economic rights in the 1996
Constitution.  This is simply because a procedural standard such as
reasonableness, by its very nature, cannot and should not fulfill a substantive
role by masquerading as a human right.  As long as the Constitutional Court
insists on depicting the obligation of reasonableness in s 27(2) as exhaustive of
the entitlements implied by s 27(1)(a), the right to have access to health care
services will fail effectively to confront denial of the needs it represents.
It may therefore be tempting to conclude that s 27(1)(a) has become
merely another example of rights discourse’s inability to bring about meaningful
social change and that, as the skeptics predicted, the inclusion of justiciable
socio-economic rights in the 1996 Constitution clearly demanded more of South
African courts than they were capable of delivering.  But such a conclusion
60Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 180; Liebenberg (2005) op cit note 48 at 29; Pieterse op
cit note 11 at 895; Wesson op cit note 44 at 296.
61Grootboom op cit note 6 at para 68.
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would not only be premature (being based, after all, on only three judgments),
it would also ignore the fact that the effect of applying Grootboom
reasonableness in TAC2 has been that many women who were previously
denied access to Nevirapine can now access the drug.  By improving access to
the drug, TAC2 did result in a measure of tangible benefit for rights-bearers,
notwithstanding the Court’s reluctance to depict such benefits as flowing from
an enforceable right.60  The problem is that the procedural nature of the
reasonableness standard obscures the jurisprudential basis for this welcome
result, which is depicted by the TAC2 Court as incidentally flowing from
application of the standard rather than from a discernible notion of individual
entitlement.  Chapter 5 below will further probe the TAC2 decision and order in
an attempt to uncover this basis.
Moreover, there are suggestions in Grootboom and TAC2, supplemented
by indications from Constitutional Court judgments subsequent to TAC2, that
there may well be enforceable obligations lurking in socio-economic rights,
notwithstanding the limits of Grootboom reasonableness.  When these
indications are considered together with a number of High Court judgments
where the ambit and scope of s 27(1)(a) were not made exclusively contingent
on the confines of Grootboom reasonableness, it becomes possible to identify
elements of s 27(1)(a) that may yet, even on the Court’s current restrictive
approach to the adjudication of socio-economic rights, render some of the
tangible benefits they promise.
For instance, the Grootboom Court’s determination that, in order to satisfy
the dictates of reasonableness, policy measures must recognise ‘the obligation
to meet immediate needs’ and should ‘ensure that a significant number of
desperate people in need are afforded relief, though not all of them need receive
it immediately’,61 presents the standard’s strongest acknowledgment of need and
stops just short of actually conferring an enforceable right to (albeit undefined)
62See De Vos op cit note 51 at 266; 270-272; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 172; 175; Van
der Walt op cit note 51 at 202-203.
63Roux op cit note 25 at 47; 49.  See also Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 498; De Vos op cit
note 25 at 58.
64De Vos op cit note 51 at 267 further suggests that this aspect of Grootboom
reasonableness is permeated with the value of substantive equality, and approximates an inquiry
into the impact of unfair discrimination in equality cases.
65TAC2 op cit note 3 at paras 70; 125.
66Khoza/Mahlaule op cit note 8 at paras 53; 82; 85; 89 (per Mokgoro J).
67Ibid paras 42-43; 47; 49.  See critical remarks of Iles op cit note 19 at 452.
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relief in emergency situations.62
Furthermore, while it is true that to insist that policy does not ignore the
needs of vulnerable groups does not in itself confer any tangible benefits on
them,63 the benefit of inclusion in the ambit of social policies that Grootboom
reasonableness seemingly confers on vulnerable sectors of society, appears to
correspond to that implied by the presence of the word ‘everyone’ in s 27(1)(a)
and to the prohibition of irrational differentiation under s 9(1) and of unfair
discrimination under s 9(3).64  These links were seemingly affirmed by TAC2
which, in addition to indicating that the Grootboom benefit of ‘policy-inclusion’
extended to financially vulnerable groups (and accordingly that health policy
may not ignore the needs of those who cannot afford to pay for treatment), held
that restricting the provision of Nevirapine to designated sites was unreasonable
because it excluded people who could reasonably have been included in the
ambit of the policy.65  The outcome of TAC2 further suggests that there are
circumstances in which inclusion within the ambit of a policy will also entail
sharing in the tangible benefits conferred by the policy.
More explicitly, the majority of the Constitutional Court in the subsequent
Khosa/Mahlaule case found that the arbitrary and unfairly discriminatory
exclusion of foreigners from social security benefits conferred by legislation fell
foul of Grootboom reasonableness.  The Court accordingly ordered the reading
of words into the legislation that would explicitly extend the benefits also to the
applicants.66  While acknowledging that equality of access to social goods is
implied by the word ‘everyone’ in s 27(1), the majority (per Mokgoro J)
nevertheless refused to adopt a severed reading of ss 27(1) and (2), instead
conducting a reasonableness inquiry under s 27(2).67  Ngcobo J’s minority
68Khoza/Mahlaule (ibid) at paras 111-112; 134-136 (per Ngcobo J).
69Grootboom op cit note 6 at paras 35-36.
70Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks South
Africa v Minister of Health 2005 (3) SA 238 (SCA) at paras 42; 53; 77.
71New Clicks op cit note 5 at para 706.
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judgment, however, adopted a different approach, locating the infringement in
the ‘everyone’ standard in s 27(1) and proceeding to hold that the exclusion of
non-citizens from certain (but not all) of the benefits in question was justifiable
in terms of s 36.68  Whereas one may disagree with this latter finding, the
minority’s willingness to transcend the confines of Grootboom reasonableness,
by acknowledging that s 27(1)(a) embodies interests capable of infringement
notwithstanding the provisions of s 27(2), is welcomed.
Beyond the equality-threshold of s 27(1)(a), a number of judgments have
hinted that the ‘access’ standard contained in the subsection may be read as
conferring several interrelated entitlements on beneficiaries.  In Grootboom, the
Court recognised that the ‘access’ standard in s 26(1) of the Constitution
required that housing to which people have access must satisfy certain
qualitative requirements, though it did not pursue this further.69  An
acknowledgment that access to health care services must similarly be
meaningful was, however, absent from TAC2.  Somewhat more encouragingly,
the SCA recently remarked in Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v
Tshabalala-Msimang that ‘access’ to health care services required services to
be both physically accessible and affordable, and acknowledged that prohibitive
pricing of medicines may amount to a denial of access.  It also indicated that it
viewed the phrase ‘health care services’ as at least including medicines (hence
representing the first explicit judicial attempt to award content to the phrase).70
In the subsequent appeal judgment in this matter by the Constitutional Court,
these dicta were affirmed in a separate judgment by Moseneke J.71
The question whether the ‘access’ standard requires of health care
services to be of sufficient quality was answered affirmatively by the Pretoria
High Court in Strydom v Afrox Healthcare, where a contractual clause insulating
a health care facility from delictual liability arising from the negligent conduct of
its personnel was declared contra bonos mores and unenforceable.  The Court
72Strydom v Afrox Healthcare [2001] 4 All SA 618 (T) at 626b-h; 627f-g.  Section 27(1)(a)
was also held to be implicated in matters of medical negligence in Korf v Health Professions
Council of South Africa 2000 (1) SA 1171 (T) at 1179B-D.
73See also Currie op cit note 51 at 74.  The only other indication that s 27(1)(a) may
sometimes apply horizontally is to be found in an obiter remark by Madala J in Soobramoney
op cit note 2 at para 48 on the ‘important role’ played by the private sector in rendering complex
medical treatment beyond the resource capacity of the State, where he appeared to indicate that
he would have no difficulty holding the private sector accountable under s 27(1)(a) in matters
where it is duly before the Court.  The majority judgment however appeared to distance itself
from these remarks.  Ibid para 35.
74Afrox Healthcare v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) at paras 13; 15; 19-21.  This finding
will be criticised in 5.3(b)(ii) below.
75First Certification judgment op cit note 7 at para 78.
76Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council 2002 (6) BCLR
625 (W) at paras 11-20; 27.  The Court interpreted s 7(2) of the Constitution with reference to
international law, holding that the obligation to respect s 27(1)(b) was not subject to s 27(2) and
that an infringement thereof required justification.  For discussion, see generally Pieterse op cit
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seemingly viewed s 27(1)(a) as indirectly horizontally applicable to private
hospitals and held that the right of access to health care services awarded
patients a legitimate expectation that the services to which they have access
would be rendered with skill and care by professional and trained health care
personnel.72  This amounts to the most definite affirmation of the horizontal
dimensions and implicit quality standards inherent in s 27(1)(a) thus far and is
welcomed accordingly.73  Whereas the SCA overturned this judgment on appeal
(since it felt that the exclusion clause did not deny access to treatment and did
not explicitly allow for negligent or substandard care), it assumed in favour of the
applicant that the right could be horizontally applied and left open the question
of whether s 27(1)(a) presupposed a minimum level of care.74
Ever since the Constitutional Court stated in its First Certification
judgment that socio-economic rights could at least be protected against
improper invasion,75 there have been arguments that the obligation to respect
s 27(1)(a) could be immediately enforced.  That non-compliance with the
obligation could uncontroversially be remedied was illustrated in relation to the
right to have access to water in Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern
Metropolitan Council, where the WLD granted a temporary interdict ordering the
respondent to restore the water supply to the applicants’ apartment complex,
holding that discontinuing the water amounted in the circumstances to non-
compliance with the obligation to respect the right of access to water.76  While
note 46.
77See Grootboom op cit note 6 at paras 34; 88; TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 46; 135.3(a)
(‘Government is ordered without delay to remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine from
being made available’).  See also TAC High Court op cit note 35 at 384E-F (explicitly stating that
the refusal to make Nevirapine available outside of designated sites breached the obligation to
respect s 27(1)(a)), as well as remarks of Bilchitz (SAJHR) op cit note 42 at 8; Iles op cit note
19 at 462; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 170; 170-178; 183; Liebenberg (2003) op cit note 48 at
18.
78Jaftha op cit note 9 at paras 31-32; 34.  This aspect of the judgment is welcomed by
Liebenberg (2004) op cit note 48 at 7-8.
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the existence of such a negative dimension of socio-economic rights was
affirmed in both Grootboom and TAC2, and while there are at least some
indications in the TAC2 order that the Court regarded the challenged policy as
contravening this obligation,77 it appeared from the Court’s resort to a
reasonableness analysis in both cases and especially from its categorical
refusal to recognise an enforceable entitlement flowing from s 27(1)(a) in TAC2,
that such affirmation would remain at the level of rhetoric only.  Entitlements
associated with the obligation to respect s 27(1)(a) accordingly appeared
beyond the reach of rights-bearers unless their vindication could somehow be
made to resonate with Grootboom reasonableness.
Subsequently however, in a welcome about-turn from its seemingly
uncompromising position in TAC2, the Constitutional Court found in Jaftha that
infringements of negative obligations generated by the right of access to
housing may be remedied without reference to Grootboom reasonableness.
The Court (per Mokgoro J) dismissed the submission by the respondents that,
in line with TAC2, self-standing obligations could never be generated by s 26(1).
It held that the relevant TAC2 dicta pertained only to positive obligations
generated by socio-economic rights and that non-compliance with their implied
negative obligations had to be justified under s 36 of the Constitution.78  Given
the close textual similarities between ss 26 and 27 of the Constitution, it may be
expected that a similar stance may in appropriate cases be adopted in relation
to s 27(1)(a).  It is therefore possible that entitlements associated with the
obligation to respect the right of access to health care services may be
demanded where non-compliance with the obligation cannot be justified under
s 36.
79Grootboom op cit note 6 at para 45.
80See remarks of Coomans op cit note 45 at 194; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 179.
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Finally, the Grootboom Court endorsed UNCESCR’s understanding of
‘progressive realisation’.79  Whereas this may appear superfluous in light of the
fact that the standard is sidelined by Grootboom reasonableness, it may serve
as a basis for finding that deliberately retrogressive measures fall foul of s 27(1)
notwithstanding s 27(2).80  This may render benefits similar to those implied by
the obligation to respect s 27(1)(a).  Given that the minimum core concept also
originated from this understanding of progressive realisation and is arguably
integral to the functioning of the standard, the endorsement may also serve as
basis for future arguments attempting to resurrect judicial sensitivity to the
minimum core dimensions of s 27(1)(a).
Overall, whereas the Constitutional Court’s approach to the interpretation
of socio-economic rights may rightly be criticised as overly restrictive, there
remain indications that the possibility of it adopting a more benefit-conducive
approach to s 27(1)(a) over time is not out of the question.  The Court’s post-
TAC2 judgments, together with the High Court judgments discussed here, further
show that Grootboom reasonableness does not entirely stifle s 27(1)(a)’s
benefit-rendering potential.  In any event, the failure of Grootboom
reasonableness to engage meaningfully with the content of entitlements implied
by s 27(1)(a) means that the subsection in principle remains open for a
generous interpretation approximating that envisaged in chapter 3 above.  The
contextual nature of Grootboom reasonableness further means that it may in
appropriate circumstances be applied in such a way that tangible benefits result
more explicitly from it, or that the approach may be changed or supplemented
to this effect.
(b) Decisions concerning the right to equality
While South African courts are yet to consider the relationship between health
rights and s 9 of the Constitution, the Khoza/Mahlaule judgment indicates
81Khoza/Mahlaule op cit note 8 at paras 62; 74-75; 77; 80.  Irrational exclusion from
social security benefits was also held to fall foul of s 9(1).  Ibid para 53.
82Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 (3) SA 312 (T) at 316A-C.
83Ibid 317D-F.
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beyond question that the right to equality may be used alongside s 27 to secure
benefits from which an applicant was excluded due to unfair discrimination.  In
addition to falling foul of Grootboom reasonableness, Mokgoro J held that the
exclusion of all non-citizens from social security benefits amounted to an
infringement of s 9(3), and could not be justified under s 36.  The benefits
accordingly had to be extended to those unfairly excluded, notwithstanding the
significant financial implications this held for the respondent.81
A finding that health-related benefits were unjustifiably withheld due to
unfair discrimination could therefore be reached without reference to s 27(2) or
to Grootboom reasonableness.  An infringement of s 9(3) in these circumstances
would also not depend on the resource limitation in s 27(2), meaning that
resource scarcity could only justify non-extension of a benefit which was
withheld in contravention of s 9(3) where this is reasonable and justifiable in
terms of s 36.
That s 9 of the Constitution may operate in this way to secure health-
related benefits is also illustrated by the decision in Langemaat v Minister of
Safety and Security, where the TPD held that the exclusion of same-sex partners
from the definition of ‘dependant’ in a medical aid scheme was inconsistent with
the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in s 9(3).
The Court held that this exclusion discriminated unfairly not only against the
person who was refused the status of ‘dependant’, but also against the member
of the medical aid scheme who, as a result of the exclusion, ‘would have to find
the financial means elsewhere to pay for the medical care of excluded
dependants’.82  Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution is nowhere referred to in the
judgment.  The Medical Aid Scheme sought to justify the exclusion under s 36,
arguing that it would face a flood of similar claims from gay and lesbian
members to have their partners registered as dependants on the scheme.  This
argument was also dismissed.83  The Court ordered that the scheme had to
84Ibid 317I.
85Soobramoney op cit note 2 at para 20 (per Chaskalson P).  See also paras 13; 18; 21
(per Chaskalson P); 38 (per Madala J - ‘s 27(3) envisages a dramatic, sudden situation or event
which is of a passing nature in terms of time’); 51 (per Sachs J - ‘[t]he special attention given by
s 27(3) to non-refusal of emergency medical treatment relates to the particular sense of shock
to our notions of human solidarity occasioned by the turning away from hospital of people
battered and bleeding or of those who fall victim to sudden and unexpected collapse’) as well
as Soobramoney High Court op cit note 10 at 440B-C (emergency treatment aimed at alleviating
‘sudden illness or ... unexpected trauma’).
86See Van Oosten op cit note 15 at 12-13 and, more generally, Brand op cit note 39 at
47.
87See Soobramoney op cit note 2 at para 11.
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consider the application for registering the applicant’s same-sex partner as her
dependant afresh, ‘without the complication of a definition of what a dependant
is’.84
(c) Decisions concerning the right not to be refused emergency medical
treatment
Soobramoney remains the only matter in which a South African Court has
considered the ambit and scope of the s 27(3) right not to be refused emergency
medical treatment.  In holding that the appellant’s need for long-term, life-
prolonging kidney dialysis did not constitute a medical emergency and that the
right was accordingly not applicable to the case, the Constitutional Court
described s 27(3) as being aimed at the non-refusal of treatment where
someone ‘suffers a sudden catastrophe which calls for immediate medical
attention’.85  While the Court’s seeming exclusion of life-threatening conditions
not occasioned by a sudden disastrous occurrence has been subjected to some
criticism,86 this definition is arguably wide enough to encompass a relatively
broad range of urgent medical conditions and injuries.  It also adequately carves
out a role for s 27(3) that is distinct from that of s 27(1)(a) and that relates
specifically to the compelling needs it aims to satisfy.
Far more disconcerting is the Soobramoney Court’s reading of resource-
and practical limitations into the scope of s 27(3), from which they are textually
absent.  The Court seemed to hint that s 27(3) should be understood in light of
the limitations espoused in s 27(2),87 though in this regard it may be noteworthy
88TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 30.  This list contained only s 26(1) as well as ss 27(1)(a),
(b) and (c).  A more explicit determination to this effect is to be found in TAC High Court op cit
note 35 at 380E-F.
89Soobramoney op cit note 2 at para 20.  For a similarly limited view of the ambit of the
right, see Soobramoney High Court op cit note 10 at 439H-440B.
90Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 245; 247-248.  See also Brand op cit note 39 at 47;
Ngwena op cit note 15 at 309; Ngwena & Cook op cit note 16 at 136-137; Pieterse op cit note
11 at 901.
91Liebenberg op cit note 16 at 42fn1; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 165.
92Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 165; 167; Geraldine Van Bueren ‘Health’ in MH Cheadle
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that s 27(3) was subsequently absent from the TAC2 judgment’s list of rights
entailing only an obligation to adopt reasonable measures aimed at progressive
realisation.88  However, the Soobramoney majority regarded the negative
phrasing of s 27(3) as significant.  Chaskalson P stated:
‘The purpose of the right seems to be to ensure that treatment be given in an
emergency, and is not frustrated by reason of bureaucratic requirements or
other formalities.  A person who suffers a [medical emergency] ... should not be
refused ambulance or other emergency services which are available and should
not be turned away from a hospital which is able to provide the necessary
treatment’.89
The Court accordingly denied the existence of any positive obligation on the
State to ensure the availability, accessibility and adequacy of emergency
services.  Scott and Alston are severely critical of this, pointing out that the
Court has rendered s 27(3) ‘virtually redundant’ by denying the existence of an
obligation to ensure that emergency services are sufficient to meet the needs of
those in need of care, thereby failing to insist that the rendering of emergency
services be prioritised and accordingly restricting the meaning of s 27(3) as
barely (if at all) extending beyond the scope of s 27(1)(a).90  The practical
consequence of this appears to be, as Liebenberg points out, that the right
neither requires that emergency medical services be established where they did
not exist previously, nor provides any insurance against the culling of existing
emergency services or the reduction of the budget for the provision of such
services.91
The Court’s restrictive reading of s 27(3) also serves to deny (or at least
significantly to limit) the existence of an enforceable individual entitlement that
emergency treatment be rendered when required, outside of the narrow
circumstances described by Chaskalson P.92  Indeed, much like Grootboom
et al (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 491 at 505.
93MA Christianson ‘Health care’ in EML Strydom (ed) Social Security Law (2001) 122 at
134; De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 46 at 450; Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 236.  See
also Brand op cit note 39 at 47.
94See for instance Brand (ibid) at 47; Van Bueren op cit note 92 at 505.
95Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (CC) (‘Grootboom High
Court’) at 290G-H; 291B-D.  See Julia Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’ in Cheadle et al op cit note 92,
507 at 516.
96Grootboom op cit note 6 at paras 71 and 74 respectively.
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reasonableness that was to come after it, Soobramoney appears to view s 27(3)
only as a ‘right not to be arbitrarily excluded from that which already exists’.93
In this respect, the judgment may be criticised for proceduralising the right to
emergency care and for sidelining the critical need underlying its explicit
inclusion in the Constitution.94
(d) Decisions concerning the right of children to basic health care services
The interaction between children’s right to shelter in s 28(1)(c) and the right of
access to adequate housing in s 26 of the Constitution, as well as that between
s 28(1)(c) and the right to parental care in s 28(1)(b), was discussed in
Grootboom.  Due to the overlap between the provision concerned there and
children’s right to basic health care services under the same subsection, this
discussion is also relevant to a benefit-focused analysis of the latter right.
Whereas the Grootboom High Court held that s 28(1)(c) imposed an
immediately enforceable obligation on the State to provide shelter for children
where their parents were unable to do so,95 the Constitutional Court rejected this
interpretation of s 28(1)(c) and instead decided the matter solely on the basis
of s 26.  The Court held that the ‘carefully prescribed constitutional scheme for
progressive realisation of social rights would make little sense if it could be
trumped in every case by the rights of children to get shelter from the State’, and
accordingly that ‘[t]he obligation created by s 28(1)(c) can properly be
ascertained only in the context of the rights and, in particular, the obligations
created by ss 25(5); 26 and 27 of the Constitution’.96  The Court thus seemed to
indicate that the qualifications on the duties of the State under ss 26(2) and
97See also ibid paras 71; 74; 77-78; 95.  For criticism, see Pieterse op cit note 11 at 901;
Paula Proudlock ‘Children’s socio-economic rights: Do they have a right to special protection?’
(2002) 3(2) ESR Review 6 at 8.
98Grootboom (ibid) at paras 71; 75-78.  Note the unfazed manner in which the Court
accepts that s 28(1)(c) does apply horizontally, even to the virtual exclusion of vertical
application.  See Marius Pieterse ‘Reconstructing the private/public dichotomy? The
enforcement of children’s constitutional social rights and care entitlements’ (2003) TSAR 1 at
10.
99Pieterse (ibid) at 10-11.  See also Caroline MA Nicholson ‘The right to health care, the
best interests of the child and AIDS in South Africa and Malawi’ (2002) 35 CILSA 351 at 365;
Pieterse op cit note 11 at 902; Sloth-Nielsen op cit note 95 at 514-515; 517.
100See Roux op cit note 25 at 46.
101Brand op cit note 39 at 48; Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 189; Liebenberg (2003) op cit
note 48 at 51; Julia Sloth-Nielsen ‘Too little? Too late? The implications of the Grootboom case
for state responses to child-headed households’ (2003) 7 Law, Democracy & Development 113
at 121; Sloth-Nielsen op cit note 95 at 515.
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27(2) should also be read into s 28(1)(c).97  Anxious that s 28(1)(c) could be
misused by indigent parents to procure shelter for themselves, the Court further
read down the ambit of s 28(1)(c) to coincide with its interpretation of s 28(1)(b),
holding that the State only incurred a primary obligation for the realisation of s
28(1)(c) rights where children had been abandoned by their parents or had
otherwise been removed from the family environment.  As far as children in the
care of their parents were concerned, the State’s duties were held to be limited
to creating a legal, administrative and infrastructural environment that would
enable children to enforce their rights against their parents.98
I have criticised the judgment elsewhere for rendering the separate
inclusion of s 28(1)(c) in the Bill of Rights purposeless and for delineating the
interaction between parental and State responsibility for child welfare far more
restrictively than is envisaged by common law or the CRC.99  The conflation of
ss 28(1)(c) and 26(2) would seem completely unsupported by the constitutional
text and denies the explicit constitutional prioritsation of children’s basic social
needs over the other competing needs that the State has to address.100
On the positive side, Grootboom does appear to create a directly
enforceable entitlement on the part of orphans or abandoned children for the
satisfaction of their basic needs, though it does not indicate the extent of such
an entitlement.101  Indeed, in the recent Centre for Child Law v Minister of Home
Affairs, the TPD indicated that it understood Grootboom as suggesting that ‘the
State is under a direct duty to ensure basic socio-economic provision for
1022005 (6) SA 50 (T) at para 17.  The case concerned assistance for unaccompanied
foreign children.
103See Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 173; Liebenberg (2003) op cit note 48 at 50; Pieterse
op cit note 98 at 11; Proudlock op cit note 97 at 7-8; SALC Project 110, Discussion Paper 103
Review of the Child Care Act (2001) at 461-462.  J Sloth-Nielsen ‘The child’s right to social
services, the right to social security, and primary prevention of child abuse: Some conclusions
in the aftermath of Grootboom’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 210 at 229-230 adds that Grootboom might
encourage destitute families to abandon their children in order for an enforceable claim against
the State to come into being .  See also Sloth-Nielsen op cit note 101 at 119-120.
104TAC2 op cit note 3 at paras 77-78.
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children who lack family care’.102  What is disconcerting however, is the manner
in which Grootboom leaves a far larger category of poor children, who happen
to be in the care of their parents, without any tangible relief.  A similarly
restrictive reading of the right to basic health services would have potentially
devastating consequences for the health interests of such children, who are
arguably the very objects of s 28(1)(c)’s protection.103
While the Constitutional Court’s concerns with the possible abuse of
children’s right to shelter by indigent parents are perhaps understandable, these
are unlikely to arise in relation to the right to basic health care services, since
parents do not stand to derive comparable benefits from the provision of primary
health care services to their children.  Accordingly, in the health care context at
least, the rationale for the Court’s stringent restriction of State responsibility
towards children in Grootboom falls away, which means that Grootboom, at least
insofar as it describes the interaction between ss 28(1)(b) and (c), should not be
followed in relation to the right of children to basic health care services.  From
the Court’s subsequent judgment in TAC2 it may be inferred that it has at least
implicitly recognised this argument.  Counsel for the Government relied on
Grootboom in arguing that s 28(1)(c) obliges parents, and not the State, to
provide their children with basic health care services.  The Court seemingly
dismissed this contention, emphasising that the State retains some residual
responsibility to children in the care of their parents and describing the interests
of children in the prevention of mother-to-child-transmission of HIV as ‘most
urgent’ and ‘most in peril’.104 It further seemed to expand the Grootboom
definition of children lacking parental care, thereby extending the State’s
responsibilities also towards children of indigent parents.  It stated:
105Ibid para 79.  It is difficult to see how the Court distinguishes between the children in
casu and those in Grootboom, whose parents were also indigent and dependent on the State for
the realisation of their right of access to housing.
106See De Vos op cit note 39 at 97; Geldenhuys op cit note 47 at 189-190; Liebenberg
op cit note 21 at 185; Liebenberg (2003) op cit note 48 at 51; Pieterse op cit note 98 at 11fn61;
Proudlock op cit note 97 at 7; Sloth-Nielsen op cit note 101 at 120-121.
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‘The state is obliged to ensure that children are accorded the protection
contemplated by section 28 that arises when the implementation of the right to
parental or family care is lacking.  Here we are concerned with children born in
public hospitals and clinics to mothers who are for the most part indigent and
unable to gain access to private medical treatment which is beyond their
means.  They and their children are in the main dependent upon the state to
make health care services available to them’.105
While thus going back somewhat on its uncompromising position in Grootboom
regarding the interrelation between ss 28(1)(b) and (c),106 the Court nevertheless
did not explicitly find a violation of s 28.  Rather, TAC2 seemed to turn
exclusively on s 27(2).  It would thus seem that the Court remains unwilling to
read s 28(1)(c) separately from the limitations stipulated in s 27(2), which
remains open to criticism for reasons similar to those advanced in relation to the
Grootboom finding.
(e) Decisions concerning the right of detainees to adequate medical
treatment
The Constitutional Court has not yet decided a matter involving the health rights
of detainees under s 35(2)(e) of the Constitution.  There are however High Court
judgments in which the right has been implicated, which amply illustrate the
potential of the right to result in tangible benefits for its subjects.
In the first of these, Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services, the
Cape High Court ordered that two HIV-positive prisoners had to be provided with
such anti-retroviral treatment as had been medically prescribed to them, at State
expense.  The order flowed primarily from a finding that such treatment
amounted to ‘adequate treatment’ in the circumstances, notwithstanding its cost
and complexity.  The Court pointed out that ‘adequate’ treatment under s
35(2)(e) did not necessarily encompass ‘optimal medical treatment’ or ‘best
107Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 441 (C) (also reported as
B v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (6) BCLR 789 (C)) at paras 49; 52.
108Ibid paras 52-55.  At para 53, the Court stated that ‘the standard of medical treatment
for prisoners in general cannot be determined by the lowest common denominator of the poorest
prisoner on the basis that he or she could afford no better treatment outside’.
109Ibid para 49.
110Ibid paras 56; 60; 65.
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available medical treatment’,107 and proceeded to evaluate the adequacy of the
requested treatment with reference to its medical efficacy and cost-
effectiveness.  It held that ‘adequacy’ of treatment in prisons would not
necessarily be influenced by the standard of medical care to which non-
incarcerated citizens generally have access.  In fact, given prisoners’ particular
vulnerability and the constitutional prioritization of their health interests, it was
held that s 35(2)(e) may well require a higher standard of care than what is
generally available to non-incarcerated citizens in the public health sector.108
However, while finding that resource constraints could under s 35(2)(e)
not justify the provision of inadequate medical treatment, the Court nevertheless
held that such constraints had to be taken into account in determining
‘adequacy’.  It stated:
‘What is “adequate medical treatment” cannot be determined in vacuo.  In
determining what is “adequate”, regard must be had to, inter alia, what the
State can afford.  If the prison authorities should, therefore, make out a case
that as a result of budgetary constraints they cannot afford a particular form of
medical treatment or that the provision of such medical treatment would place
an unwarranted burden on the State, the Court may very well decide that the
less effective medical treatment which is affordable to the State must in the
circumstances be accepted as “sufficient” or “adequate medical treatment”’.109
Since the Court regarded the requested treatment as both beneficial and cost-
effective, and since the respondents could not show that it was unaffordable, the
treatment was regarded as adequate.  The failure of the respondents to provide
it to the first and second applicants therefore amounted to an infringement of s
35(2)(e).  The respondents were accordingly ordered to provide the first and
second applicants with the prescribed treatment.110  The similar application by
the third and fourth applicants was however dismissed, because anti-retroviral
treatment had not been prescribed to them and because the Court was not
111Ibid paras 33-37; 61; 65.  For criticism of this aspect of the order, see Ngwena & Cook
op cit note 16 at 134.
112See Liebenberg op cit note 16 at 37; Ka Mdumbe op cit note 19 at 462-463.
113Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services 2004 (4) SA 43 (C) at paras 125; 129;
132.
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prepared to make an order guiding a decision to prescribe medicine.111
The Van Biljon judgment has not been without criticism.  In particular,
there is some discord over the Court’s decision to import resource limitations
into the ambit of s 35(2)(e), from which they are textually absent.  It has
convincingly been argued that cost-based restrictions on unlimited, ‘priority
rights’ such as s 35(2)(e), rather than impacting on the ambit of the entitlement,
should be viewed as limitations on its enforcement, which would be allowed only
if justifiable in terms of s 36.112  Overall however, the judgment indicates that
courts are capable of interpreting constitutional health rights (and especially
those that are not subjected to limitations imposed by s 27(2)) as conferring
enforceable entitlements on individuals.  Following from such an interpretation,
Van Biljon further illustrates that court orders may grant tangible health-related
benefits to individuals who have succeeded in showing that their rights have
been infringed.
Other than in Van Biljon, s 35(2)(e) has not been used to attain access
to particular forms of medical treatment.  It has however come into play in a
different context - the release of prisoners on parole on medical grounds.  In
Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services, it was held that to insist on the
continued incarceration of a terminally ill prisoner, despite the fact that the
medical facilities at the prison were not adequate to provide the care
necessitated by his condition, affronted his rights to dignity and to dignified
conditions of detention (including the provision of adequate medical care).  The
refusal to grant parole was accordingly overturned.113  Whereas a specific
analysis of s 35(2)(e) was not conducted, it is clear that the Court conceived of
the subsection as essentially requiring an inquiry into whether detention
conditions are consistent with human dignity, the outcome of which inquiry
depended, among other factors, on whether the correctional facility was capable
114Ibid paras 89-91; 119-122; 125.
115[2004] 3 All SA 613 (T).  See paras 23; 26-27.
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of rendering such medical care as was required by the detainee’s condition.114
Section 35(2)(e) similarly, although less explicitly, influenced the
overturning of a refusal to grant medical parole to a prisoner in need of palliative
care (the rendering of which was outside of the capacity of the correctional
institution) in Du Plooy v Minister of Correctional Services.115  Read together,
Stanfield and Du Plooy present a potentially interesting remedial alternative in
cases where a detainee requires medical treatment beyond the financial
capacity of the State.  Reading these decisions together with Van Biljon, it
seems that s 35(2)(e) may operate either to secure prisoners access to such
health care services as has been medically indicated for their conditions, or to
secure their early and conditional release so that they are placed in a position
to access such services for their own account.  In appropriate circumstances,
detainees’ rights in this regard may of course be limited in accordance with s 36
of the Constitution.
(f) Evaluation
The above survey of reported judgments by South African courts involving socio-
economic rights generally and/or health rights specifically has shown that, while
much uncertainty still surrounds the ambit, scope and limits of constitutional
health rights, they may in appropriate circumstances be used successfully to
prevent their imminent infringement, to attain adequate compensation for their
infringement, or to attain access to particular health-related goods and/or
services.
It for instance appears from the Constitutional Court’s judgments in socio-
economic rights matters that citizens may demand to be included in the ambit
of policy which confers health-related benefits (from which inclusion such
benefits will sometimes flow incidentally), may demand to receive health-related
benefits where these are being denied as a result of unfair discrimination and
116See also remarks of Liebenberg op cit note 21 at 190.
117The term ‘negative textual inferentialism’ refers to an overly formalistic interpretative
practice in relation to socio-economic rights, according to which interdependent or related rights
are read together in a way that results in the creation of a crossover ‘ceiling effect’, through using
the restrictive terms of one provision in order to justify the concomitant reading down of another,
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may enforce entitlements associated with the obligation to respect their health
rights.  The Court’s engagement with specific health-related rights in the
Constitution further seems to confirm the existence of an entitlement to obtain
available emergency medical treatment from institutions which are able to
provide it as well an undefined entitlement of orphans and abandoned children
to receive certain health care services at State expense.  Decisions by courts
other than the Constitutional Court further hint at the existence of entitlements
to accessible and affordable medicine and to medical care of a reasonable
quality, have vindicated the guarantee against unfair discrimination in access to
health-related benefits, and have indicated that detainees may in appropriate
circumstances demand to be provided with particular health care services or to
be placed in a position where they may obtain access to such services for
themselves.
However, the jurisprudence surveyed, especially that of the Constitutional
Court, may be criticised for unduly limiting the extent to which tangible benefits
may flow from health rights litigation.116  Not only has the Constitutional Court
categorically denied that health rights embody enforceable, ‘positive’ individual
claims against the State, but its appropriation of Grootboom reasonableness in
socio-economic rights cases has served to proceduralise the inquiry into
compliance with the right to have access to health care services to such an
extent that there has been precious little engagement with the content of health
rights or with the needs that they aim to satisfy.  As a result, it would appear that
the remedy for successfully enforcing s 27(1)(a) in the Constitutional Court will
almost always be at an abstract policy-modification level, from which tangible
benefits would at most result incidentally.  Furthermore, the Court has displayed
a tendency to read down the ambit and scope of health rights guaranteed by
constitutional provisions other than s 27(1)(a) to correspond to its restrictive
understanding of the latter right.  Such ‘negative textual inferentialism’117 not
less restrictive, provision.  See Craig Scott ‘Reaching beyond (without abandoning) the category
of “economic, social and cultural rights”’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 633 at 638-640.
118Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 252 state: ‘The very point of constitutional rights as
priority setters for government would seem to have been missed.  Positive rights and the notion
of core guarantees do have a significant prioritising function.  Trying to interpret the constitution
to remove or neutralise this function thus misses the constitutional point’.  See also ibid 244-245.
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only contradicts the textual positioning and phrasing of these rights, but also
denies the explicit prioritisation of the satisfaction of certain material needs over
others in the constitutional text.118  It further significantly diminishes their
potential to result in tangible benefits for those that successfully enforce them
by closing off a direct remedial avenue that would otherwise uncontroversially
have been open for courts.
4.3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LIMITS OF SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
This section explores the possible reasons behind those aspects of the
Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence that I regard as
overly restrictive of health rights’ benefit-rendering potential.  I firstly consider
the institutional constraints that impact on the manner in which the judiciary
decides socio-economic rights matters.  I argue that the constraints occasioned
by the doctrine of separation of powers, the polycentricity of socio-economic
rights matters and the limited expertise of the judiciary in matters involving the
specialised field of medicine do not preclude courts from interpreting and
enforcing health rights in a manner that renders tangible benefits.  Instead, I
suggest that the Court’s animosity towards adopting an approach towards the
adjudication of socio-economic rights likely relates to outdated and erroneous
perceptions of the nature of socio-economic rights and of the nature of the
judicial role in their enforcement.  These perceptions, I believe, are fuelled by
the formalist and liberal-individualist undertones of South African legal culture
and by discomfort associated with the relative novelty of judicially enforcing
socio-economic rights.  Accordingly, I contend that the obstacles in the way of
a more benefit-friendly approach to health rights are imagined rather than real
119Because it inevitably involves unelected judges striking down legislation or policy
conceived by the ‘democratic’ branches, the institution of judicial review necessarily implies the
sacrifice of a measure of direct or representative democracy.  See generally Nicholas Haysom
‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-economic rights’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 451 at
455-458; Patrick Lenta ‘Democracy, rights disagreements and judicial review’ (2004) 20 SAJHR
1 at 3-4; Jeremy Waldron ‘A right-based critique of constitutional rights’ (1993) 13 Oxford J of
Legal Studies 18-51.  I have discussed these tensions in more detail in Pieterse op cit note 50
at 390-392.
120It is often argued that socio-economic rights are particularly ill-suited for judicial review
because they appear to require judicial involvement in decisions with policy and budgetary
implications, which dramatically departs from depictions of the judicial role under ‘traditional’
conceptions of the separation of powers.  See Chetty op cit note 49 at 458; DM Davis ‘The case
against the inclusion of socio-economic demands in a Bill of Rights except as directive
principles’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 475 at 489; De Waal; Currie & Erasmus op cit note 46 at 433; Erika
De Wet The Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights: The Meaning of the
German Constitutional Model for South Africa (1996) at 108-109; Liebenberg op cit note 16 at
6-7; Frank I Michelman ‘The Constitution, social rights and liberal political justification’ (2003)
1 International J of Constitutional Law 13 at 15; Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem ‘Constitutional
ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? Social rights in a new South African constitution’ (1992)
141 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1 at 41-42; 147-148; Van Wyk op cit note 15 at 394-395.
121See Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein The Cost of Rights (2000) at 94-95;
Liebenberg op cit note 16 at 10; Sheetal B Shah ‘Illuminating the possible in the developing
world: Guaranteeing the human right to health in India’ (1999) 32 Vanderbilt J of Transnational
Law 435 at 448-449 as well as discussion in Pieterse op cit note 50 at 394.
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and urge courts to modify or supplement their current approach to socio-
economic rights adjudication in a manner that will allow for these rights more
concretely to serve their constitutional purpose.
(a) Institutional constraints
Courts are typically regarded as less than ideal fora for enforcing socio-
economic rights.  This is not only due to the counter-majoritarian119 and
separation of powers120 concerns typically raised where courts exercise powers
of judicial review, but also because courts are often regarded as lacking the
expertise to decide on the intricacies involved in socio-economic rights
matters.121  It is therefore to be expected that at least part of the Constitutional
Court’s unwillingness to depict socio-economic rights as entailing enforceable
individual entitlements relates to the confines imposed by its institutional role
and character.
This is apparently affirmed by the Court’s socio-economic rights
judgments, in which it has on more than one occasion expressly justified its
122Soobramoney op cit note 2 at para 29.
123TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 38.
124The term polycentricity refers to decisions that affect an unknown but potentially vast
number of interested parties and that have many complex and unpredictable repercussions,
which inevitably vary for every subtle difference in the decision.  Lon L Fuller ‘The forms and
limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard LR 353 at 395.  See also ibid at 403; Davis op cit note
120 at 478; Liebenberg op cit note 16 at 10; Kate O’Regan ‘Introducing socio-economic rights’
(1999) 1(4) ESR Rev 2 at 3.  Courts are considered ill-suited to make polycentric decisions,
because all affected parties cannot logistically be made part of the proceedings, all possible
consequences of the decision cannot be foreseen and there are limits to the quantity and kinds
of information to which a court has access in a particular case.  For more detailed discussion,
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restrictive stance to the interpretation of socio-economic rights by referring to the
institutional constraints under which it operates.  In Soobramoney for instance,
Chaskalson P defended the Court’s deference to the terms of the challenged
rationing policy by stating:
‘The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in
KwaZulu-Natal has to make decisions about the funding that should be made
available for health care and how such funds should be spent.  These choices
involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health
budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met.  A
court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the
political organs and medical authorities whose responsibilities it is to deal with
such matters’.122
Then, in TAC2, the Court justified its resort to Grootboom reasonableness
instead of adopting a ‘minimum core approach’ to s 27(1)(a) on institutional
grounds.  It stated:
‘Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where Court orders could have
multiple social and economic consequences for the community.  The
Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the Courts,
namely, to require the State to take measures to meet its constitutional
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.
Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary
implications, but are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets.  In this
way the judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate
constitutional balance’.123
It would appear from these passages that, in relation to health rights, the Court
considers itself to be restrained firstly by an imperative that it respect the
boundaries of the separation of powers (by not unnecessarily second-guessing
the decisions of functionaries and/or dictating budgetary and associated policy
processes) and secondly by the inherent polycentricity of socio-economic rights
matters.124  Its order in TAC2 further indicates that it regards itself as not
see NW Barber ‘Prelude to the separation of powers’ (2001) 60 Cambridge LJ 59 at 74-78;
Holmes & Sunstein op cit note 121 at 29-30; 95; Etienne Mureinik ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries:
Economic rights in the Constitution’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 464 at 466-468; Pieterse op cit note 50 at
393.
125Indeed, commentators have sought to distinguish the rationality review adopted in
Soobramoney from the less deferent Grootboom reasonableness followed in TAC2 on the basis
that the policy scrutinised in Soobramoney was conceived by health care professionals.  See
Kam Chetty ‘The public finance implications of recent socio-economic rights judgments’ (2002)
6 Law, Democracy & Development 231 at 249; Klug (SAJHR) op cit note 51 at 118; JC
Mubangizi ‘The constitutional right of access to health care services in South Africa: From renal
dialysis to Nevirapine’ (2003) 24 Obiter 203 at 211-212; Albie Sachs ‘Reflections on emerging
themes’ (1999) 1(4) ESR Rev 14; 23; Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 243.
126Roux op cit note 47 at 107.  See also Jonathan M Berger ‘Taking responsibilities
seriously: The role of the state in preventing transmission of HIV from mother to child’ (2001)
5 Law, Democracy & Development 163 at 169-170; Liebenberg op cit note 16 at 7-8; Charles
Ngwena ‘Access to health care and the courts: A note on Minister of Health v Treatment Action
Campaign’ (2002) 17 SA Public Law 463 at 469; Pieterse op cit note 50 at 404; Scott & Macklem
op cit note 120 at 41-42; 147-148; Yousuf Vavwda ‘Is eleven better than one? Democracy and
the Constitutional Court TAC case’ (March 2003) De Rebus 59-60.
127See Barber op cit note 124 at 68-72.
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possessing adequate medical knowledge to second-guess decisions involving
the expertise of health care professionals, a concern which arguably also
informed its deference in Soobramoney.125  These concerns necessarily impact
on the manner in which courts conduct themselves in health rights matters.  But
do they completely explain the Constitutional Court’s aversion to recognising
enforceable, individual socio-economic rights claims?
As far as separation of powers is concerned, the text of the 1996
Constitution patently mandates a rather drastic departure from the classical
conceptualisation of the doctrine by including justiciable socio-economic rights
and by requiring of courts to ensure compliance with these rights through judicial
review.  The Constitution not only allows judges to get involved in matters of
social and economic significance, it requires them to do so - South African
courts simply ‘cannot afford the luxury of the separation of powers doctrine’.126
In any event, not even the classical conception of the doctrine intended for its
boundaries to be rigidly determined and enforced - the doctrine must always be
responsive to the particular needs of each society it serves.127  Rather than
endeavouring to keep the functions of government branches separate at all
costs, the separation of powers’ concern with preventing an over-concentration
of power often requires the exact opposite - that power should be diffused and
128James Madison ‘The Federalist no 47' in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John
Jay The Federalist, or, The New Constitution (1992) at 247-248.  See also Iain Currie & Johan
De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume 1 - Constitutional Law (2001)
at 92-95.
129See Klug (Vermont LR) op cit note 51 at 818-819; Pieterse op cit note 50 at 405;
Kameshni Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the enforcement of socio-
economic rights’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 255 at 259; 276; Scott & Alston op
cit note 13 at 216; Geraldine Van Bueren ‘Alleviating poverty through the Constitutional Court’
(1999) 15 SAJHR 52 at 69; Van Wyk op cit note 15 at 407.
130The State’s argument is set out at TAC2 op cit note 3 at paras 96-97 and is echoed
by Kevin Hopkins ‘Shattering the divide - when judges go too far’ (March 2002) De Rebus 22-26.
Jonathan Klaaren ‘A remedial interpretation of the Treatment Action Campaign decision’ (2003)
19 SAJHR 455 at 461 describes the argument as ‘an attempt to re-litigate the principle of the
non-justiciability of socio-economic rights ... in the remedy stage of the case rather than in rights
interpretation’.
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kept in check through an intricate network of constitutionally mandated
interferences, of which the power of judicial review is but one example.128
In post-1996 South Africa, courts are constitutionally empowered to award
content to socio-economic rights, to ascertain whether the obligations that they
generate have been complied with and to appropriately remedy the effects of
non-compliance therewith, all the time having due regard to the constitutional
role of the other branches of government in light of the interests of justice and
good governance.  It is up to courts themselves to decide on the appropriate
balance to be struck, in the circumstances of every socio-economic rights case,
between the need for judicial vigilance in the protection of citizens’ rights on the
one hand and the need to respect the constitutional role and powers of the
‘democratic branches’ on the other.129
That courts have significant scope for manoeuvre in this regard, was
affirmed by the Constitutional Court in TAC2, where it dismissed an argument
by the government that courts are constrained by the separation of powers
doctrine from issuing anything but declaratory orders in socio-economic rights
matters.130  The Court found that, while courts should respect the domains of the
legislature and the executive, this did not preclude them from making orders
which impact on policy.  In fact, to the extent that an intrusion of legislative or
executive terrain flowed from a court fulfilling its functions of ascertaining
whether the State has fulfilled its constitutional obligations and of remedying
non-compliance with such obligations, the Court regarded it as ‘an intrusion
131TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 99.  See also paras 98; 100-114.
132Ibid para 113.
133See ibid para 25, also First Certification judgment op cit note 7 at para 77; Grootboom
op cit note 6 at paras 20; 94; TAC1 op cit note 4 at para 20.
134See Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 487-488; 496; Bilchitz (SAJHR) op cit note 42 at 8; 10;
Karl E Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 at 171;
188; Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 219; 253-254; Craig Scott ‘Social rights: Towards a
principled, pragmatic judicial role’ (1999) 1(4) ESR Review 4.  I have argued this more fully in
Pieterse op cit note 50 at 406.
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mandated by the Constitution itself’.131  It stated that 
‘South African Courts have a wide range of powers at their disposal to ensure
that the Constitution is upheld.  How they should exercise those powers
depends on the circumstances of each particular case.  Here due regard must
be paid to the roles of the Legislature and the Executive in a democracy.  What
must be made clear, however, is that when it is appropriate to do so, Courts
may - and, if need be, must - use their wide powers to make orders that affect
policy as well as legislation’.132
These remarks powerfully confirm that the justiciability of socio-economic rights
in the 1996 Constitution is beyond question.  As the Constitutional Court has
stated on several prior occasions, the question is not whether courts may give
effect to socio-economic rights, but rather how they should do so in the
circumstances of each individual case.133
However, this unequivocal affirmation of its powers in socio-economic
rights matters seems at odds with the rather tentative way in which the Court has
exercised these powers to date.  In particular, it seems curious that the Court
has made little effort to define the content of the socio-economic rights it has
been called upon to vindicate.  Both from a separation of powers and
institutional competence perspective, interpretation is the least controversial of
the judicial functions in socio-economic rights matters, since it bears the closest
resemblance to the ‘ordinary’ adjudicative functions of courts, which are
generally considered better equipped at the task of interpretation than other
branches of government.  In exercising this task, courts are accordingly
regarded as owing minimal deference to the legislative or executive branches.134
The Constitutional Court’s reluctance to award enforceable content to s 27(1)(a)
through interpretation cannot therefore be explained by referring to the
separation of powers.
135See Thomas J Bollyky ‘R if C > B + P: A paradigm for judicial remedies of socio-
economic rights violations’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 161 at 162-164; 180-181; Holmes & Sunstein op
cit note 121 at 95-96.
136See Bollyky op cit note 135 at 177; Currie & De Waal op cit note 128 at 115-116;
Liebenberg (2003) op cit note 48 at 40; Pillay op cit note 129 at 259; Swart op cit note 58 at 217;
240 as well as chapter 3 notes 16; 21 and accompanying text.
137TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 129.  For associated criticism of the Grootboom and TAC2
orders, see for instance Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 500-501; Bilchitz (SAJHR) op cit note 42 at 23-
24; Davis op cit note 58 at 5-7; Mark Heywood ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in
South Africa: Background, strategies and outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign case
against the Minister of Health’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 278 at 311-312; Ntlama op cit note 23 at 81-82;
Pillay op cit note 129 at 256; 275-276; Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender ‘Mandatory relief and
supervisory jurisdiction: When is it appropriate, just and equitable?’ (2005) 122 SALJ 325 at 333-
334; Roux op cit note 25 at 51; Swart op cit note 58 at 215-216; 224.
138See, for example, the order in August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) as
well as remarks of Ntlama op cit note 23 at 85; 87-88.
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Similarly, while separation of powers concerns should logically impact on
the manner in which courts choose to remedy violations of human rights,135 the
extent of South African courts’ remedial flexibility in terms of s 38 of the
Constitution means that they are able, without much difficulty, to devise
remedies that balance the need for effective relief with the equally pressing
need to afford the other branches of the State a margin of discretion in deciding
on how to give effect to court orders.136  Despite this, the Constitutional Court
has thus far exercised its remedial powers in socio-economic rights matters with
extreme caution.  In particular, commentators have expressed puzzlement at the
Court’s failure to combine its orders in Grootboom and TAC2 (restricted as they
were to a level of policy-modification) with structural interdicts through which
compliance with their terms could be monitored.  This is curious, especially
since the Court explicitly held in TAC2 that awarding structural relief for socio-
economic rights violations would be permissible under the separation of powers
where it is appropriate in terms of s 38.137  The Court has also, on more than one
occasion, vindicated infringements of civil and political rights through awarding
such structural relief.138
It would therefore appear that, whereas separation of powers concerns
no doubt informed the Constitutional Court’s formulation of Grootboom
reasonableness as yardstick for measuring compliance with s 27(2) of the 1996
Constitution, the model of separation of powers underlying the 1996 Constitution
does not prohibit courts from awarding enforceable content to socio-economic
139 Thomas J Bollyky ‘Balancing private rights and public obligations: Constitutionally
mandated compulsory licensing of HIV/AIDS related treatments in South Africa’ (2002) 18
SAJHR 530 at 544-545; Liebenberg op cit note 16 at 41-11; Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 216;
242.
140August op cit note 138 at para 30.  See also Bollyky op cit note 139 at 541; Sandra
Liebenberg ‘Social and economic rights: A critical challenge’ in Sandra Liebenberg (ed) The
Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective (1995) 79 at 85; Ngwena op cit note 16
at 18; O’Regan op cit note 124 at 3; Pieterse op cit note 50 at 395; Van Bueren op cit note 129
at 61.
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rights beyond Grootboom reasonableness.  Nor, by the Constitutional Court’s
own admission, does it prevent them from providing effective relief for
infringements of socio-economic rights.  The overly restrictive elements of the
Court’s interpretative and remedial approach to health rights can therefore not
be justified by arguing that more direct and affirmative options for giving effect
to socio-economic rights were not institutionally available to the Court.
Similarly, the reluctance to interpret health rights in a more benefit-
friendly manner is inadequately explained by the polycentricity of socio-
economic rights matters.  While the polycentricity of a matter certainly mandates
that courts be aware of the consequences of their judgments, it cannot preclude
their involvement in socio-economic rights matters altogether.139  In any event,
socio-economic rights matters are no more polycentric than cases involving civil
and political rights.  In relation to the latter rights, the Constitutional Court has
indicated that it would not let the potential polycentric consequences of its
judgments prevent it from performing its constitutional duties in vindicating
human rights.  As it stated in August v Electoral Commission:
‘We cannot deny strong actual claims timeously asserted by determinate
people because of the possible existence of hypothetical claims that might
conceivably have been brought by indeterminate groups’.140
As in civil rights matters, courts must manage the potential polycentric
consequences of their socio-economic rights judgments by carefully tailoring the
remedies they confer, rather than by adopting an overly restrictive interpretation
of rights.  The Constitutional Court’s generous and purposive approach to
interpreting civil and political rights, together with the flexibility it often displays
in remedying civil rights violations, show that it is certainly capable of this.
Indeed, at the level of remedy, viewing social rights as conferring
141See Van Biljon op cit note 107 at paras 32; 65 and the critical remarks on the
restricted ambit of the order by Ngwena op cit note 15 at 307-308.
142Langemaat op cit note 82 at 317D-F.  Other examples where the relief for an
infringement of a socio-economic right was limited to the particular litigants include the orders
in Stanfield op cit note 113; Bon Vista Mansions op cit note 76 and the pre-constitutional
vindication of a legitimate expectation to receive treatment in Applicant v Administrator
Transvaal op cit note 54 - see Applicant (ibid) at 739H; 741D as well as remarks of Van Wyk op
cit note 15 at 393.
143Van Biljon op cit note 107 at paras 33-37; 61.
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individual entitlements and accordingly as entitling applicants to individual relief
in appropriate circumstances would pose less polycentricity-related problems
than the Constitutional Court’s current holistic approach.  Section 38 of the
Constitution allows courts to strike a balance between the principle that
individual litigants should generally obtain the relief they seek and the principle
that relief should generally also benefit similarly situated persons, in the
circumstances of every case.  Where an order would clearly have unwanted
polycentric consequences, the dictates of appropriateness require that this
balance be struck to favour the awarding of individual, rather than general,
relief.  The Van Biljon Court, for instance, indicated that it was aware of the
potential polycentric consequences of its order (that the prisoners in casu were
entitled to receive the anti-retroviral drugs they had been prescribed) and
consciously avoided these by limiting the entitlement conferred only to the
successful individual applicants.141  Similarly, in Langemaat, the Court dismissed
arguments that its order (that a Medical Aid scheme had to reconsider an
application by a woman to have her same-sex partner registered as her
dependant on the Scheme) would open floodgates of litigation and similarly
limited its order to the successful applicant only.142
As to the complexities posed by the medical issues often implicated in
health rights matters, it appears from the judgments discussed above that courts
are unwilling to interfere with the clinical decisions of health care professionals.
In Van Biljon, the order that the applicants be provided with medicines was
limited to those medicines that have been medically prescribed to them.143
Similarly, both the High Court and the Constitutional Court orders in the TAC
case were expressly limited to situations where administering Nevirapine was
144TAC High Court op cit note 35 at 387A; TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 135(3)(b).  See
also Chetty op cit note 125 at 249.  In TAC1 op cit note 4 at para 16, the Constitutional Court
found that a drug is to be considered as ‘medically indicated’ where ‘a consulting medical
practitioner considers that a patient he or she is treating would in all the circumstances of health
and social circumstances benefit from the administration of the medication’.
145See TAC1 (ibid) at para 18 as well as TAC High Court (ibid) at 362I-J; 363I-J; 374H
and the discussion in Heywood op cit note 137 at 279; 288; 291; 293-294; 312-313.
146See Van Biljon op cit note 107 at paras 33-34; Mark A Hall & Gerard F Anderson
‘Health insurers’ assessment of medical necessity’ (1992) 140 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1637 at
1650; 1675; Ngwena op cit note 126 at 470; Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 243.
147See for instance conclusions drawn from medical evidence in Hoffmann v South
African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 15; TAC2 op cit note 3 at para 59.
148These include the doctrine of informed consent, the law relating to medical
negligence, legal provisions relating to privacy and confidentiality, rules and standards of
professional monitoring bodies and codes of professional ethics.  See Gregg M Bloche ‘The
invention of health law’ (2003) 91 California LR 249 at 271-272; Mark A Hall ‘Rationing health
care at the bedside’ (1994) 69 New York Univ LR 693 at 756; David Mechanic ‘Professional
judgment and the rationing of medical care’ (1992) 140 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1713 at 1747-
1748; 1750-1751; John A Siliciano ‘Wealth, equity, and the unitary medical malpractice standard’
(1991) 77 Virginia LR 439 at 452; SA Strauss ‘Geneesheer, pasient en die reg: ‘n Delikate
driehoek’ (1987) TSAR 1 at 3-4.
149See Hall op cit note 148 at 715; Hall & Anderson op cit note 146 at 1698-1700;
Christof Heyns & Danie Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African
Constitution’ (1998) 2 Law, Democracy & Development 153 at 164; David Orentlicher
‘Destructuring disability: Rationing of health care and unfair discrimination against the sick’
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medically indicated.144  Indeed, the order in TAC2 was at least partly directed at
removing bureaucratic restrictions that prevented doctors in the public health
care system from prescribing Nevirapine in accordance with their clinical
diagnoses and the dictates of medical ethics.145
Courts obviously lack the scientific knowledge to decide on diagnosis,
prognosis, suitable treatment options and necessity of treatment.146  This does
not mean that they are necessarily ill-equipped to review such decisions, as
attested by their scrutiny of and conclusions from medical expert evidence in a
variety of cases.147  However, their obvious lack of medical expertise justifies
significant deference to clinical decisions taken by health care professionals.
Possible dangers of awarding a wide margin of discretion to health care
professionals in this respect are ameliorated by the existence of various legal
and extra-legal frameworks through which the acceptability, integrity and
efficacy of such clinical decisions may be tested.148  It is accordingly believed
that clinical decisions which are rationally arrived at and consistently applied
should not be interfered with, as long as courts remain vigilant to the possibility
of subliminal racism, sexism and other forms of bias in such decisions.149
(1996) 31 Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties LR 49 at 51-52; 59; 61-62; 71; Alan Parkin
‘Allocating health care resources in an imperfect world’ (1995) 58 Modern LR 867 at 870; 877;
Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at 243; Siliciano op cit note 148 at 480.
150Parkin op cit note 149 at 870.  See also ibid 867; 878; Einer Elhauge ‘Allocating health
care morally’ (1994) 82 California LR 1451 at 1458; 1495-1496; Leonard M Fleck ‘Just health
care rationing: A democratic decisionmaking approach’ (1992) 140 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1597
at 1599; Mechanic op cit note 148 at 1734; Charles Ngwena ‘Access to antiretroviral therapy to
prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV as a socio-economic right: An application of section
27 of the Constitution’ (2003) 18 SA Public Law 83 at 88; Orentlicher op cit note 149 at 60.
151See Soobramoney High Court judgment op cit note 10 at 435D-E; 437E-G;
Soobramoney op cit note 2 at paras 29-30 (per Chaskalson P); 40; 45 (per Madala J); 58-59 (per
Sachs J) as well as arguments of Fleck op cit note 150 at 1606-1607; Dieter Giesen ‘Health care
as a right: Some practical implications’ (1994) 13 Medicine & Law 285 at 293; Parkin op cit note
149 at 870-871; 878.  In TAC2 op cit note 3, government unsuccessfully argued that the policy
decision not to supply Nevirapine at sites other than those designated rested on
medical/scientific determinations that rendered it unsuitable for judicial deliberation.  See Klug
(SAJHR) op cit note 51 at 118; Klug (Vermont LR) op cit note 51 at 811-812.
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This, however, does not mean that all decisions involving health care
professionals should be sacrosanct.  Specifically, health care-related rationing
decisions, such as that challenged in Soobramoney, are not clinical, but political
in nature.  There is no reason why such decisions should not be subjected to the
same level of scrutiny as that appropriated in cases involving ‘purely’ political
decisions - ‘[w]hile it may be the case that lawyers should not make medical
decisions, we might equally suppose that doctors should not make social
decisions’.150  Indeed, courts should guard against political actors attempting to
shield their decisions from judicial scrutiny by depicting them as clinical or
scientific.  The Soobramoney court arguably fell into the trap of falsely equating
a rationing decision (neither taken exclusively by health care professionals nor
based predominantly on medical criteria) as a medical/scientific one, and
accordingly unjustifiably subjected the decision only to limited scrutiny.151
Whereas individual entitlements flowing from rights to access health care
services may accordingly be limited by medical judgments as to whether such
care would be beneficial to a particular patient, the mere fact that health rights
implicate medical issues need not preclude either the judicial interpretation of
rights (a legal, and not medical, function) or the judicial scrutiny of decisions and
policies which are not purely clinical in nature.  Just as the constraints posed by
the separation of powers and by the polycentricity of health rights matters, those
implied by the medical/scientific elements of such matters do not explain the
152Theunis Roux ‘Pro-poor court, anti-poor outcomes: Explaining the performance of the
South African Land Claims Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 511-543.
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overly restrictive approach that the Constitutional Court has adopted towards the
interpretation and enforcement of health rights, even as they justify certain
restrictions inherent in the TAC2 order.  Overall, it would appear that the Court’s
refusal to award enforceable core content to health rights, its refusal to
acknowledge that certain aspects of s 27(1)(a) are independent of s 27(2) and
its negative textual inferentialism in relation to the entitlements afforded by ss
27(3) and 28(1)(c) of the Constitution are not necessitated by institutional
constraints.
(b) Beyond institutional constraints
It would seem that the institutional obstacles referred to by the Constitutional
Court as justification for its restrictive approach towards socio-economic rights
adjudication are, at best, significantly exaggerated.  This makes it all the more
peculiar that the Court, despite its ostensible commitment to the actualisation of
socio-economic rights and despite the significant leeway it is afforded by the text
of the 1996 Constitution to interpret and enforce these rights in a manner
reflective of their rights-based status, is nevertheless choosing to restrict their
benefit-rendering potential.
In interrogating a similarly peculiar tendency of the South African Land
Claims Court to reject plausible ‘pro-poor’ arguments in certain of the cases
before it, Theunis Roux showed that much of the unexpected ‘anti-poor
outcomes’ in these cases could be attributed to the influence of South African
legal culture on the manner in which judges negotiate ‘doctrinal gaps’ when
called upon to decide issues of substantive justice.152  While it may not be the
only reason behind the overly restrictive aspects of the Constitutional Court’s
socio-economic rights jurisprudence, it is worth considering whether this culture
is having a similarly debilitating effect on the benefit-rendering potential of
health-related rights.
153Shown, in relation to liberal legal cultures generally, by M Dlamini ‘The political nature
of the judicial function’ (1992) 55 THRHR 411 at 418; KD Ewing ‘Social rights and constitutional
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Bram Fischer memorial lecture: Transformative adjudication’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 309 at 315-316;
Ziyad Motala ‘Socioeconomic rights, federalism and the courts: Comparative lessons for South
Africa’ (1995) 112 SALJ 61 at 68; 71; 74; Pieterse op cit note 50 at 397-399; Ruti Teitel
‘Transitional jurisprudence: The role of law in political transformation’ (1997) 106 Yale LJ 2009
at 2056; 2075; Robin West ‘Rights, Capabilities and the Good Society’ (2001) 69 Fordham LR
1901 at 1931.  See also chapter 1 note 12 and accompanying text.
154These aspects of South African legal culture are discussed by, for example, Edwin
Cameron ‘Legal chauvinism, executive-mindedness and justice - LC Steyn’s impact on South
African law’ (1982) 99 SALJ 38 at 52-62; Alfred Cockrell ‘Rainbow jurisprudence’ (1996) 12
SAJHR 1 at 35; Dlamini op cit note 153 at 420; John Hlope ‘The role of judges in a transformed
South Africa - Problems, challenges and prospects’ (1995) 112 SALJ 22 at 24-26; Klare op cit
note 134 at 168; Moseneke op cit note 153 at 316; Donald Nicholson ‘Ideology and the South
African judicial process - Lessons from the past’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 50 at 63-65; Pieterse op cit
note 50 at 396-399; Roux op cit note 152 at 531-536.
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note 134 at 168; 170-171; Scott & Macklem op cit note 120 at 136-137; 148; Van Wyk op cit
note 15 at 395.
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South African legal culture shares the classical liberal foundations of
Anglo-saxon legal culture, which are not favourably inclined towards the notion
of enforceable socio-economic rights.  Accordingly, arguments that socio-
economic rights amount to vague, politically loaded and resource-intensive
aspirations that are ill-suited for judicial deliberation, despite having been
conclusively refuted, are bound to resonate with the ideological sensibilities of
many South African lawyers.153  Furthermore, South African legal culture is often
described as being characterised by an almost peculiar formalism, which has in
the pre-constitutional dispensation been accompanied by a culture of virtually
limitless deference to the executive and legislative branches.154  Given that
South African judges were schooled in and influenced by this legal culture, it is
possible that they may intuitively experience ideological discomfort with
enforcing socio-economic rights and would attempt to allay such discomfort by
deferring to the legislative and executive branches.155
This instinctive reaction is likely to be fuelled by the fact that judges, in
most societies, are simply not used to enforcing socio-economic rights, which
remain non-justiciable in the majority of contemporary legal systems.  Given the
novelty of having to vindicate justiciable socio-economic rights and the
concomitant lack of historical or comparative precedent to guide this task, South
156See, for example, Barber op cit note 124 at 79; Tom Campbell ‘Judicial activism -
justice or treason?’ (2003) 10 Otago LR 307 at 324; Mureinik op cit note 124 at 469; Van Bueren
op cit note 129 at 58.
157Argued in relation to the Land Claims Court by Roux op cit note 152 at 534; 542-543.
158See text accompanying note 22 above.
159I have also argued this in Pieterse op cit note 11 at 898-899.  The Court’s objections
in this regard are echoed by Albie Sachs ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The
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African judges are thus bound to experience socio-economic rights matters as
overly complex and intricate, and as posing insurmountable institutional
challenges.  Given further that the very notion of rights-based judicial review was
altogether alien to South African law as recently as 1993, we may accept that
contemporary South African courts remain more comfortable with solving
disputes of ‘formal justice’, rather than with settling issues of ‘substantive justice’
which seem alien to them.156  It may therefore be expected that, in instances
where courts are faced with giving effect to claims which appear alien to their
preconceived notions of rights, justice and their own institutional capacity, and
where they are granted the latitude to decide on the manner in which to do so,
they would instinctively hark back to formalist modes of legal reasoning.157  This
may ultimately impact negatively on the extent to which socio-economic rights
render tangible benefits.
It indeed seems possible to attribute the Constitutional Court’s reluctance
to opt for a rights-based approach to socio-economic rights to the lingering
belief, explicitly voiced by Madala J in Soobramoney that, unlike civil and
political rights, socio-economic rights are ideals to be strived for rather than
rights to be claimed.158  In particular, there are many distinct similarities between
the Court’s objections to recognising minimum core obligations flowing from s
27(1)(a) and the typical (and much discredited) objections by socio-economic
rights’ ideological opponents to their justiciability.  Just as socio-economic rights
have been described as overly vague, moral aspirations that impose
unaffordable positive obligations on states and that require courts to do more
than what they are legitimately capable of, so the Constitutional Court has
characterised minimum core obligations as imposing imprecise, positive
obligations on the State which are ‘impossible’ to deliver and which cannot be
determined by courts without them transgressing institutional boundaries.159
Grootboom case’ (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 579 at 599.
160At least as far as health rights are concerned, there exists a detailed and authoritative
elaboration on minimum core content in UNCESCR General Comment 14, the existence of
which the Court all but ignores.  Furthermore, as chapter 2 has shown, international law does
not conceive of minimum core obligations as trump-cards that may, regardless of context or
severe resource scarcity, always be enforced against states.  See chapter 2 note 66 and
accompanying text.  Moreover, far from being ‘impossible’ to deliver, compliance with minimum
core obligations imposed by the right to health would seem well within South Africa’s current
capacity.  See Bilchitz (ESR) op cit note 42 at 4; Bilchitz (SAJHR) op cit note 42 at 17; Audrey
R Chapman ‘Core obligations related to the right to health and their relevance for South Africa’
in Danie Brand & Sage Russell (eds) Exploring the Core Content of Socio-economic Rights:
South African and International Perspectives (2002) 35 at 49; Scott & Alston op cit note 13 at
250.  Finally, courts are perfectly capable of awarding minimum core content to socio-economic
rights, as is evident for example from the Grootboom High Court’s interpretation of children’s
right to shelter in terms of s 28(1)(c) as requiring, as a ‘bare minimum’, the provision of tents,
portable latrines and safe water. Grootboom High Court op cit note 95 at 293A-B.  See further
Bilchitz op cit note 20 at 487-488; Wesson op cit note 44 at 301.
161It is perhaps also instructive to note the affirmative and rigorous relief awarded in
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC), where the
housing interests of homeless people coincided with the private property interests of landowners.
The order did not, however, flow from a finding that housing or property rights had been
breached.
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Besides at best amounting to a misunderstanding and at worst to a conscious
misrepresentation of the role played by minimum core obligations in international
law,160 this characterisation betrays a measure of ideological discomfort with
vindicating socio-economic rights that clearly resonates with liberal legal
culture’s hostility towards the notion of rights-based, redistributive social reform.
It is further telling in this respect that the Court’s (however slight) post-
TAC2 departures from Grootboom reasonableness related to aspects of socio-
economic rights that either coincide with violations of civil and political rights
(the simultaneous infringement of the right to equality and the ‘everyone’
threshold in Khoza) or correspond to the nature of infringements typically
associated with civil rights (non-compliance with the obligation to respect the
right of access to housing in Jaftha).161  Given that the enforcement of civil and
political rights rests far more comfortably with the foundations of liberalism, it
was perhaps to be expected that the Constitutional Court would feel more
comfortable with vindicating those elements of socio-economic rights that
correspond to its enforcement of civil and political rights.
If one accepts that, due to the classical liberal undertones of South
African legal culture, the Constitutional Court is distinctly uncomfortable with
162See Bollyky op cit note 135 at 182; De Vos op cit note 16 at 74-75; Klare op cit note
134 at 168; 170-171; Pieterse op cit note 11 at 904; Van Wyk op cit note 15 at 395.
163I have also argued this in Pieterse op cit note 11 at 893.  See further Bilchitz op cit
note 20 at 495-496; Brand op cit note 39 at 42.
164Shown also by Sunstein op cit note 52.  See discussion on judicial deference in
relation to reasonableness review in pre-constitutional administrative law by Lawrence Baxter
Administrative Law (1984) at 485-487 and in post-constitutional law by Cora Hoexter The New
Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume II: Administrative Law (2002) at 183.  For
example, in Applicant v Administrator Transvaal op cit note 54 at 738F-G; 739A-C; 741D-E, the
court was at great pains to emphasise that its judgment should not be viewed as questioning the
substantive motive behind a policy-decision no longer to supply a particular drug in the public
health sector nor as supplanting such decision.  See discussion of these aspects of the judgment
by Frans Viljoen ‘Kim Schmidt v Administrator of the Transvaal’ (1993) 26 De Jure 207 at 209.
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having to vindicate interests associated with rights that it (at least subliminally)
views as ill-suited for judicial review, its choice of the essentially procedural
standard of Grootboom reasonableness to give effect to such rights over a more
substantive, rights-based interpretative approach, seems almost predictable.162
In light of South African legal culture’s formalistic undertones, it makes sense for
a court faced with (what it perceives to be) novel and potentially acute
separation of powers-related tensions, to resort to a familiar (and essentially
formalistic) manner of negotiating those tensions.163  It should therefore come
as no surprise that there are close similarities between the judicial role under
Grootboom reasonableness and that which South African courts have for years
played in administrative law, which has always involved walking the tightrope
between ‘legitimate’ review of policy decisions and ‘illegitimate’ substitution of
policy with a judge’s personal vision of what such policy should ideally have
contained.164
Unfortunately, the result of the Constitutional Court’s resort to a method
of adjudicating socio-economic rights claims that rests comfortably both with the
liberal and formalistic leanings of South African legal culture as well as with the
historical role of judicial review in such a culture, is that an application of
Grootboom reasonableness does not yield significantly more tangible benefits
than those which would in any event have resulted from applying administrative
law principles in a constitutional setting where socio-economic rights had either
not been entrenched at all or had functioned only as directive principles of state
policy.
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While this is lamentable, there nevertheless remains hope that, as it is
called upon to adjudicate an increasing number of health and other socio-
economic rights cases, the Constitutional Court may move towards a more
rights-based, and ultimately more benefit-conducive, approach.  Given that it
may well be a culturally ingrained instinctive response to the nature of health-
related rights claims, rather than insurmountable textual or institutional hurdles
to their enforcement, that underlies the Court’s hesitance to tangibly give effect
to the health rights in the 1996 Constitution, the possibility remains that it may
over time be persuaded to modify or supplement its current approach.  In the
following chapter, I attempt to illustrate that such modification or
supplementation is possible without requiring courts to depart radically from the
adjudicative approaches to which they are accustomed.
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CHAPTER 5
ALTERNATIVES AND SUPPLEMENTS TO CURRENT JUDICIAL
APPROACHES TO HEALTH RIGHTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION: LOOKING BEYOND GROOTBOOM REASONABLENESS
Chapter 4 has shown that certain aspects of South African courts’ emerging
health rights jurisprudence have the effect of unduly restricting the extent to
which tangible benefits may result from successful reliance on health rights in
litigation.  This is true especially of Grootboom reasonableness, the standard
developed by the Constitutional Court to measure compliance with all
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights in the Constitution.  I have argued
that, with certain exceptions, Grootboom reasonableness leaves socio-economic
rights empty of enforceable content and obscures the theoretical basis for those
tangible benefits that appear to result incidentally from its application.  In
addition to precluding meaningful engagement with the content of health rights,
Grootboom reasonableness also hinders engagement with their limits and their
horizontal dimensions, and complicates the development of appropriate
remedies to prohibit, correct or compensate for their infringement.
While accepting that Grootboom reasonableness will remain the focus-
point of the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence for the
foreseeable future, this chapter aims to show that there are viable alternative
and/or supplementary approaches to health rights adjudication.  These may
more readily result in tangible benefits for rights-bearers without requiring a
radical overhaul in the manner in which courts conduct themselves in socio-
economic rights matters.  Nor do the approaches considered here preclude the
application of Grootboom reasonableness in appropriate matters.
Commenting on the TAC2 judgment from a remedy-conscious
perspective, Jonathan Klaaren suggests that Grootboom reasonableness ‘does
1Jonathan Klaaren ‘A remedial interpretation of the Treatment Action Campaign decision’
(2003) 19 SAJHR 455.
2Ibid 455; 460-461.  See also Jonathan Klaaren ‘An institutional interpretation of socio-
economic rights and judicial remedies after TAC’ in Henk Botha et al (eds) Rights and
Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 105 at 112-113.
3See Klaaren op cit note 1 at 465.
4The harm suffered by claimants in a particular case may well relate specifically to the
manner in which legislation or policy is phrased or implemented.  For example, terms of
legislation or policy may arbitrarily exclude particular individuals or groups from receiving
benefits that would otherwise accrue to them, or may otherwise unreasonably hinder them from
accessing particular health-related goods or services.  In such circumstances, an order that
legislation or policy be modified to comply with the dictates of Grootboom reasonableness, if
complied with, would correct for the infringement.
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not entirely shut the door on the direct enforcement of socio-economic rights’.1
Instead, he claims, Grootboom reasonableness allows for three distinct remedial
paradigms, none of which preclude the judicial recognition and enforcement of
a direct remedy for an infringement of a socio-economic right.  These are, first,
the judicial evaluation of legislative and other measures for compliance with the
reasonableness standard (where the remedy granted essentially amounts to an
order that reasonable measures be adopted or that existing measures be
modified to comply with the dictates of reasonableness), secondly, the provision
of a legal framework for the vindication of health rights through developing the
common law and, thirdly, the direct enforcement of particular litigants’ rights,
through tailoring appropriate remedies in accordance with s 38 of the
Constitution.2
This chapter engages primarily with the second and third remedial
avenues identified by Klaaren.  The first, which essentially amounts to a reading
of Grootboom reasonableness that sees s 27(2) as the remedy intended by s
27(1),3 is not of direct relevance for my purposes, since tangible benefits would
mostly result only incidentally from a remedy that requires legislative or policy
measures to adhere to the dictates of Grootboom reasonableness.  This is not
to say that the ‘directive principle effect’ of Grootboom reasonableness is of no
concrete value to health rights’ beneficiaries or that its incidental benefits may
not be substantial.  Moreover, there will certainly be matters in which an order
that measures be adopted or modified is both appropriate and sufficient from a
benefit-focused perspective.4  My concern here, however, is to elaborate on
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alternatives to the remedial paradigm most readily associated with Grootboom
reasonableness.
Accordingly, section 5.2 below contemplates the direct remedying of
health rights infringements, which it links back to arguments that health rights
should in appropriate circumstances be interpreted as awarding entitlements
and imposing obligations which are immediately enforceable.  In addition to
arguing that the Constitutional Court should reassess its stance towards the
notion of minimum core obligations, I illustrate that there exist several alternative
ways of identifying and enforcing core-like entitlements inherent to the health
rights package in the 1996 Constitution.  These neither involve courts slavishly
following the international law understanding of the minimum core concept, nor
require of them to ignore the dictates of s 27(2) of the Constitution or to
transgress their institutional boundaries.
Thereafter, section 5.3 explores the extent to which tangible benefits may
result from the application or development of existing common law principles in
matters where health rights are implicated.  I argue that there is significant
unexplored potential for the actualisation of health rights through their indirect
application.  This is so firstly because of the fairly extensive body of common law
principles applicable to the doctor-patient relationship and other ‘special
relationships’ from which socio-economic obligations may flow.  Secondly, South
African courts would likely be more comfortable with the evaluative and remedial
paradigms associated with common law adjudication than with the direct
application of socio-economic rights.  Common law not only offers a wide array
of potential remedies that may amount to adequate reparation for infringements
of health rights, but also provides the ideal environment for an exploration of the
horizontal dimensions of health rights in accordance with s 8(3) of the
Constitution.  I accordingly discuss instances in which the current state of
common law adequately serves the interests underlying health-related
constitutional rights, as well as instances in which these interests may be
furthered through relatively uncontroversial developments to existing common
law rules and doctrines.
5Klaaren op cit note 1 at 461; 464; 467; Klaaren op cit note 2 at 113.
6Sandra Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’
(2005) 21 SAJHR 1 at 22.
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5.2 DIRECTLY REMEDYING INFRINGEMENTS OF HEALTH RIGHTS: TOWARDS
ENFORCEABLE ENTITLEMENTS
Despite the TAC2 Court’s rejection of the argument that s 27(1)(a) of the 1996
Constitution awards an immediately claimable minimum core right outside of the
parameters of Grootboom reasonableness, Klaaren views the Court’s
simultaneous affirmation of its powers to order a remedy that amounts to
appropriate relief for each infringement of a socio-economic right, as it reserving
the option to vindicate individual or group-based entitlements where this is
called for in the circumstances of a particular case.  Klaaren adds that such
appropriate relief may well, in suitable circumstances, correspond to the
enforcement of a minimum core obligation, though it would probably follow from
a finding of unreasonableness under subsec 27(2) of the Constitution, rather
than from a finding that subsec 27(1)(a) thereof has been breached.5
While the direct remedying of health rights infringements in this manner
would be welcome, the basis of a direct judicial remedy for the infringement of
a health-related right would remain concealed unless it is related specifically to
an understanding of the entitlements awarded by the right in question and of the
extent to which these may be claimed or limited in particular circumstances.
Declining to situate a remedy within such an understanding would complicate
the monitoring of its effectiveness, through obscuring the links between such a
remedy and the needs that underlie the right it serves to vindicate.  Moreover,
detaching remedy from right in this manner would fail to provide any practical
guidance to applicants in future health rights matters as to the extent of their
entitlements and to their likelihood of success.  Given the onerous burden of
proof that such applicants face under Grootboom reasonableness and given that
‘[t]he stakes are high for the individuals and groups who approach the Court for
relief, entailing threats to life, health and the ability to function in society’,6
7See also Sandra Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic
rights: An effective tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 159
at 188 (‘recognising an individual entitlement to ... relief would be of immense practical benefit
to litigants who seek the courts’ assistance in situations of severe socio-economic deprivation.
They would not be required to review a wide range of measures adopted by the state and to
assess their reasonableness in the light of its available resources.  Instead they would enjoy the
benefit of a presumption that placed the burden on the state to justify why it is unable to provide
direct relief.  Furthermore, it would ensure that, in appropriate circumstances, they are entitled
to direct individual relief’).
8Argued also by Darrel Moellendorf ‘Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the
future of socio-economic rights claims’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 at 331-332 and, in relation to
minium core entitlements specifically, by David Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the
minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19
SAJHR 1 at 16-18; Kevin Iles ‘Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal limitations
clauses’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 448 at 458; Liebenberg op cit note 7 at 188; Liebenberg op cit note
6 at 25.
9See, for example, Iles op cit note 8 at 463-465; Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a useful role
for section 36 of the Constitution in social rights cases? Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v
Southern Metropolitan Local Council’ (2003) 120 SALJ 41 at 45-48; also chapter 3 notes 85-86
and accompanying text.
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uncertainty as to whether the relief they seek is actually capable of resulting is
bound to impact negatively on such applicants’ willingness to assert their rights
through the judicial process.  The argument therefore remains that, if its
jurisprudence is to have any tangible significance for socio-economic rights’
beneficiaries, the Constitutional Court needs to reverse its stance against the
recognition of enforceable claims.7
In particular, the Court’s reasons for rejecting the argument that s 27(1)(a)
of the Constitution encompassed an enforceable minimum core obligation simply
do not hold water.  Contrary to the Court’s assertions, affirming the existence of
minimum core entitlements would not require respondents immediately to satisfy
claims to core goods or services, even in circumstances where this would
patently be impossible or would lead to injustice.  It would merely require the
Court to insist that respondents justify the non-satisfaction of core needs, and
to pronounce on the constitutional acceptability of such justification, in exactly
the same manner as it decides and pronounces on the justifiability of apparent
infringements of civil and political rights.8  This it could achieve either by viewing
non-satisfaction of core needs as an infringement of s 27(1)(a) that requires
justification in terms of s 36 of the Constitution9 or, if it insists on involving s
27(2), by viewing such non-satisfaction as triggering a presumption of
10As suggested by Liebenberg op cit note 6 at 23.  Whereas such a presumption would
serve to relieve applicants of the unfair burden of proof they currently bear in terms of a
Grootboom reasonableness analysis, it would nevertheless amount to a less stringent insistence
on justification than a s 36 inquiry.  Given the vitality and urgency of the interests at stake,
Liebenberg accordingly suggests that an inquiry into the rebuttal of the presumption
approximates a proportionality analysis in terms of s 36.  Ibid at 24; 27-28.
11See Bilchitz op cit note 8 at 18; Liebenberg op cit note 7 at 175fn90; also chapter 3
note 24 and accompanying text.
12Murray Wesson ‘Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 284 at 303-305 for
instance argues that the UNCESCR conception of minimum core excludes many needs of
vulnerable sectors of South African society, inflexibly prescribes the State’s response to social
needs and frustrates the satisfaction of legitimate needs that UNCESCR regards as falling
outside of the minimum core.  See also Liebenberg op cit note 6 at 31.  Furthermore, it may be
argued that it is unwise to incorporate an interpretation of a provision in a treaty that Parliament
has not ratified and that is enforced by way of a reporting mechanism only, into a justiciable
constitutional right of which the content corresponds only partially to the treaty-provision.
13Liebenberg op cit note 7 at 174; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-
economic rights’ in Stuart Woolman (ed) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2ed; 2003) ch 33
at 31.
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unreasonableness in terms of s 27(2).10  Moreover, in circumstances where
adequate justification for non-satisfaction of core needs is lacking, the Court
would retain the flexibility to minimise any unreasonable, unrealistic or otherwise
undesirable consequences of a finding to this effect, through tailoring the
remedy it awards to suit the circumstances of the case and the interests of
justice.11
I concede that it may possibly be unwise for South African courts blindly
to incorporate the UNCESCR’s understanding of the minimum core content of
the international law right to health into an interpretation of s 27(1)(a) of the
1996 Constitution, since the latter provision operates in an entirely different
legal, institutional and social context from article 12 of the ICESCR.12  However,
there is nothing that prohibits domestic courts from themselves incrementally
awarding context-sensitive and need-specific core content to s 27(1)(a) on a
case-by-case basis.13  Whereas I would still argue that UNCESCR’s elaboration
of the core content of the right to health provides invaluable guidance for courts
in this respect, several other interpretative options also present themselves.
For instance, courts could choose to align their understanding of core
entitlements in terms of s 27(1)(a) to the understanding evident from legislation
or health policy that confers health care-related benefits upon citizens.  For
14Section 28(1)(c) is viewed as illuminating part of the core content of s 27(1)(a) in this
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example, s 4(3)(b) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 determines that the
State must provide free primary health care services to all persons except to
those who are members of medical aid schemes or to their beneficiaries, or to
persons receiving compensation in terms of relevant occupational health laws.
Section 4(3)(a) of the same Act determines that the State must provide free
health services (ie extending beyond primary care) to all pregnant and lactating
women and to all children below the age of six years, subject to similar
limitations.  Viewing the entitlements conferred by provisions such as these as
constituting the enforceable core of s 27(1)(a), would minimise the (already
slight) separation of powers tensions that may otherwise be occasioned by this
interpretative exercise.  However, adopting such an approach obviously runs the
risk of depicting core entitlements as being contingent on the existence of the
legislative provisions or policy documents in question.  Nor would such an
approach assist in relation to the satisfaction of those vital and urgent needs that
are not similarly the subject of legislative or policy provisions.
Alternatively, should courts insist on adopting a holistic approach to the
health rights package in the 1996 Constitution, it would appear possible for them
to locate the core of the right to health outside of s 27(1)(a).  As chapter 3 has
shown, the constitutional scheme as a whole supports the prioritisation of certain
essential health services, regardless of resource limitations, the dictates of
progressive realisation or the existence of reasonable measures.  The absence
of a s 27(2)-style modifier in ss 12(2)(a), 24(a), 27(3), 28(1)(c) and 35(2)(e)
could therefore be read to suggest that the minimum core of the right to health
in South Africa could be viewed as entailing entitlements to emergency medical
treatment for all, basic health care services for children, adequate medical care
for detainees, such services as are necessary to constitute an environment that
is not harmful to health and such reproductive health care services as are
necessary for the unfettered exercise of the right to reproductive freedom.  In
line with the two-stage approach to adjudication, non-satisfaction of such core
needs would be capable of justification only in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.14
manner by Craig Scott & Philip Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational
context: A comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 206
at 260; Geraldine Van Bueren ‘Alleviating poverty through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15
SAJHR 52 at 57.  See further Liebenberg op cit note 13 at 49.
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Constructing a ‘constitutional core’ for the right to health in this manner
would seem to serve the same purpose as the minimum core approach in
international law.  Following this approach would also minimise separation of
powers tensions inherent in the recognition and enforcement of minimum core
entitlements since courts are, under this approach, deriving their conception of
core entitlements from the explicit provisions of the constitutional text.  However,
much like Grootboom reasonableness and the ‘negative textual inferentialism’
that characterises the Constitutional Court’s current approach to ‘priority’ health
rights, this approach appears to drain s 27(1)(a) of independently enforceable
content.  While the argument that access to particular health care services
implied by s 27(1)(a) may not immediately be claimed unless it is also
guaranteed by another, unlimited, provision of the Constitution, is certainly
plausible in light of s 27(2), it may be criticised for unduly restricting the benefit-
rendering potential of s 27(1)(a).
Accepting therefore that the rights guaranteed in ss 12(2)(a), 24(a), 27(3),
28(1)(c) and 35(2)(e) of the Constitution are capable of resulting in the
population obtaining access to the health-related benefits they promise,
regardless of whether a minimum core approach is adopted in relation to s
27(1)(a), it should nevertheless be possible to award a measure of claimable
content to the latter right, over and above the entitlements associated with the
obligation to respect it and with its egalitarian threshold.  Even on a conjunctive
reading of ss 27(1)(a) and 27(2), courts should at least be capable of delineating
a set of circumstances in which entitlements implied by s 27(1)(a) could be
viewed as immediately claimable.
In an attempt to establish when direct, mandatory relief would amount to
an appropriate remedy to correct for the infringement of a socio-economic right,
Thomas Bollyky examined a range of orders made by the Constitutional Court
in cases involving civil and political, as well as socio-economic rights.  He
15See generally Thomas J Bollyky ‘R if C > B + P: A paradigm for judicial remedies of
socio-economic rights violations’ (2002) 18 SAJHR 161 at 163-177.  Bollyky expresses this
paradigmatically in algebraic terms as R if C > B + P (where R = remedy; C = constitutional
violation; B = budgetary implications and P = Policy implications). He summarises the paradigm
as follows: ‘The “positive” mandate created by the constitutional violation (C) - as a product of
its quantitative and qualitative elements - is weighed against the “illegitimacy” of a court issuing
the relief - as defined by the sum of its qualitative and quantitative interference in policy and
budgetary decisions (P + B).  The common unit, or the basis of comparison, for the variables in
this paradigm is whether they add, or detract, from the legitimacy of granting that form of relief.
Judges intuitively weigh these competing normative values and ultimately make an assessment
of remedies based on their proportionality’.  Ibid 175.
16Danie Brand ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights
jurisprudence, or “what are socio-economic rights for?”’ in Botha et al (eds) op cit note 2, 33 at
50-51.  See also Kathryn Garforth ‘Canadian “medical necessity” and the right to health’ (Dec
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concluded that the Court would go beyond ordering mere declaratory relief in
circumstances where the egregiousness of the constitutional violation
outweighed the sum-total of the budgetary and political consequences of the
order in question.15  If Bollyky is correct, it should be possible to derive a set of
circumstances under which tangible relief may be expected to result from
reliance on s 27(1)(a), through engaging with the manner in which the
Constitutional Court struck the balance between these competing normative
values in TAC2.  This is so because, even as its use of Grootboom
reasonableness in TAC2 obscured the basis for its order that restrictions on the
provision of Nevirapine must be lifted and that its provision must under certain
circumstances be permitted and facilitated, that order resulted in a measure of
tangible relief for HIV-positive pregnant women.  It should therefore be possible
to recast the terms of the TAC2 order, read with the Court’s justifications for its
finding of unreasonableness in that case, in terms that reflect a notion of
entitlement at the core of s 27(1)(a).
In his critique of the ‘proceduralising’ effect of Grootboom
reasonableness as evident from TAC2, Danie Brand remarks that the TAC2
Court’s finding of unreasonableness was essentially motivated by its
dissatisfaction with the lack of rational coherence of the challenged policy.  The
perception that the policy lacked rational coherence, argues Brand, was in turn
based on the fact that the policy prohibited the drug being administered in
situations where it was medically indicated and where the capacity to administer
it clearly existed, despite the drug being affordable, safe and efficacious.16  That
2003) 8(3) Canadian HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review 63 at 67-68 (reaching a similar conclusion
after probing the judgment and order in TAC2).
17See, for example, Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (no 2) 2002 (5) SA
721 (CC) (TAC2) at paras 48 (‘[i]n deciding on the policy to confine Nevirapine to the research
and training sites, the cost of the drug itself was not a factor’); 64 (‘[h]owever, this is not a reason
for not allowing the administration of Nevirapine elsewhere in the public health system when
there is the capacity to administer it and its use is medically indicated’); 80 (‘[a] potentially
lifesaving drug was on offer and where testing and counselling facilities were available it could
have been administered within the available resources of the State without any known harm to
mother or child’); 120 ('we were informed ... that the government has made substantial additional
funds available for the treatment of HIV, including the reduction of mother-to-child
transmission’); 125 (‘[w]e have held that its policy fails to meet constitutional standards because
it excludes those who could reasonably be included where such treatment is medically indicated
to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV’); 135(2)(c) (‘[t]he policy ... fell short of
compliance with [the Constitution] in that ... [d]octors at public hospitals and clinics other than
the research and training sites were not enabled to prescribe Nevirapine ... even where it was
medically indicated and adequate facilities existed for the testing and counselling of the pregnant
women concerned’); 135(3) (‘Government is ordered without delay to:(a) Remove the restrictions
that prevent Nevirapine from being made available for the purpose of reducing the risk of
mother-to-child-transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and
training sites.  (b) Permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk
of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and to make it available for this purpose at hospitals and
clinics when in the judgment of the attending medical practitioner acting in consultation with the
medical superintendent of the facility concerned this is medically indicated, which shall if
necessary include that the mother concerned has been appropriately tested and counselled. ...
(d) Take reasonable measures to extend the testing and counselling facilities at hospitals and
clinics throughout the public health sector to facilitate and expedite the use of Nevirapine for the
purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV’).
18Klaaren op cit note 2 at 113 adds that the Court will likely order direct relief in these
circumstances only where there is sufficient information before it to justify the order and where
there is not a significant ‘diversity of needs and claimants’.
19The principle of ‘non-abandonment’, which is sometimes advanced as an appropriate
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this indeed appears to have been the basis for the TAC2 decision is borne out
by several passages from the judgment and the order.17
It is possible to recast this basis of the TAC2 finding as an entitlement to
receive safe and efficacious medical treatment where such treatment has been
medically indicated, as long as the treatment is affordable and where capacity
to administer it exists.18  A basic entitlement to medically indicated, safe and
efficacious treatment (s 27(1)(a)) is thus carved down by restraints imposed by
affordability and capacity (s 27(2)).  Whereas this conception of the s 27(1)(a)
entitlement may easily be reconciled with the distinction between primary,
secondary and tertiary care (in that claims to be provided with primary health
care services will more often succeed on this model than claims for secondary
and tertiary care), it is also consistent with the progressive realisation standard
and with the principle of non-abandonment,19 in that it does not rule out direct
directive for health resource rationing processes, involves that, despite an emphasis on the
satisfaction of primary health care needs, a health system should not abandon attempts to
satisfy more complex health needs where it is capable of providing more advanced secondary
and tertiary health services.  See Willem A Landman & Lesley D Henley ‘Rationing and
children’s constitutional health-care rights’ (2000) 19 SA Journal of Philosophy 41 at 43-44.
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relief for claims to more sophisticated forms of treatment where this is within the
State’s financial and human resource capacity.  Explicitly enunciating and
demarcating an entitlement to direct relief under s 27(1)(a) in such terms would
be consistent with the refusal of such direct relief in Soobramoney (where
treatment was neither effective nor affordable).  It would further resonate with
findings such as that in Van Biljon (where the provision of expensive and
complex treatment was ordered since it was medically indicated and efficacious,
and because the State could not show that it was unaffordable) and in the pre-
constitutional Applicant v Administrator Transvaal (where a decision not to
provide a patient with medically indicated and beneficial treatment within the
financial capacity of the respondent was overturned), despite the very different
remedial contexts of these decisions.
The nature and extent of the entitlement inherent in s 27(1)(a) admittedly
remains relatively vague and unspecific in terms of this interpretative approach.
The approach also does not assist courts in devising a sufficiently robust
standard of scrutiny for assessing resource-availability and capacity.  However,
making the implicit basis for the TAC2 judgment explicit in this manner provides
a discernible foundation from which future courts may depart in their efforts to
tease out the enforceable content of the right of access to health care services
on a case-by-case basis.  Using this foundation, rather than Grootboom
reasonableness, as the point of departure in cases where access to a particular
form of medical treatment is claimed would serve to focus the attention of the
judicial inquiry on factors directly related to the claim (the medical
appropriateness, safety, efficacy and affordability of treatment claimed by the
applicant and the financial and other capacity of the respondent to provide it)
rather than on abstract overarching policy factors which are only of indirect
relevance to the claimant.  It would also force courts to articulate their findings
in terms reflecting either an entitlement to particular forms of care or the limits
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of such entitlement, which will be more conducive than Grootboom
reasonableness to the incremental development of a health rights jurisprudence
that is sensitive to need.
Whereas the minimum core approach to s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution and
all of the other approaches to interpreting the subsection discussed here may
all have their drawbacks, it is clear that, over and above enforcing the
entitlements to specific kinds of health care services afforded by several other
constitutional provisions, there are a variety of ways in which courts could
interpret s 27(1)(a) that would amount to the recognition of an individual
entitlement to direct relief that effectively and adequately compensates for
infringements of the right.  Courts should accordingly be encouraged to look
beyond Grootboom reasonableness in appropriate cases and to engage instead
in the incremental development of an entitlement orientated approach to s
27(1)(a), as well as to other health-related rights.  Such an approach would not
only assist present and future applicants who would in appropriate
circumstances be able to assert their rights with greater ease, but would prove
beneficial also to respondents, who would have a clearer notion of what is
expected of them under each of the implicated rights.
An approach to health rights that vindicates core-like entitlements, such
as those discussed here, would neither exclude the application of Grootboom
reasonableness in appropriate cases (such as challenges to the form and
content of particular health-related legislation or policies), nor require a drastic
reconceptualisation of the manner in which courts conduct themselves in socio-
economic rights matters.  It would merely expect of courts to explicitly articulate
the basis of their findings and to situate this within an entitlement-based and
need-sensitive interpretation of the rights concerned.  Not only are courts
perfectly institutionally capable of awarding such content to rights through
interpretation, they also remain empowered under an entitlement-orientated
approach to limit the extent of health rights’ enforcement where this is called for.
They further retain the flexibility to award less than tangible relief in
circumstances where, all factors considered, the interests of justice dictate that
20Bilchitz op cit note 8 at 21.
21See further ibid 21-22.
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this is appropriate.
A finding that a legitimate health-related entitlement has been limited in
particular circumstances, or that tangible relief is not appropriate
(notwithstanding the infringement of a health-related right) admittedly involves
a loss or an empty victory for a particular claimant.  However, the articulation of
this loss or empty victory in entitlement-orientated or benefit-centered terms
remains preferable over Grootboom reasonableness’ denial of the existence of
a valid, claimable entitlement in the first place.  As David Bilchitz explains:
‘The idea that people have rights even when these are not presently capable
of being fulfilled thus helps to express the idea that there is a moral loss,
something deeply disturbing that occurs when not all can be provided with life-
saving health care, food, water, and shelter.  It enjoins us to change this
situation as soon as we can so that people can be given what they are entitled
to.  Without such a recognition, the failure to meet basic needs under
conditions of scarcity does not violate any claim people have.  The situation
does not demand reform as it does in a position where people have rights that
are not fulfilled.  The recognition that a person’s fundamental rights are being
abrogated ... thus provides a strong sense that there is some injustice or moral
tragedy involved in the inability to realise those rights.’20
Recognising the existence of a valid and enforceable entitlement inherent to a
right, even in circumstances where the right is considered to have been limited,
or where it is not appropriate to directly remedy its infringement, further opens
the door for future applicants to succeed with similar claims in different or
altered circumstances (eg where resources have become available, where
relevant policy measures have been put in place, etc).  Were courts to indicate
that they regard particular aspects of health-related rights as being enforceable
(whether or not they are actually enforced in a particular case), this would likely
also have positive ‘directive-principle’-like spinoffs, in that the other branches of
government would be given an incentive to satisfy the needs in question in order
to avoid future litigation.21
Overall, there appears to be sufficient textual backing and institutional
leeway for courts directly to remedy infringements of particular health-related
rights in appropriate circumstances, whether or not such remedies flow from
22Klaaren op cit note 1 at 460-461.  See also Klaaren op cit note 2 at 112.
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endorsement of the minimum core standard as enunciated in international law.
It is hoped that courts would, where the circumstances of a particular case lend
themselves to this, venture beyond Grootboom reasonableness to directly
enforce certain health-related rights, or aspects of a particular health-related
right.  This would significantly enhance the practical relevance of their
judgments for the intended recipients of the protection awarded by health rights
in the Constitution, without diminishing the judiciary’s institutional integrity.
5.3 GIVING EFFECT TO HEALTH RIGHTS THROUGH DEVELOPING THE COMMON
LAW
In addition to an order that requires the State to adopt reasonable measures
aimed at progressively realising a socio-economic right, or an order that directly
remedies an infringement of such right, it is possible for a court indirectly to give
effect to the interests served by a particular socio-economic right, by making an
order that amounts to a development of the common law in terms of s 39(2) of
the Constitution.  Klaaren argues that, on a reading of the phrase ‘reasonable
legislative and other measures’ in s 27(2) of the Constitution as including also
judicial measures, it is possible to view the judicial task under s 27(2) of the
Constitution as in addition comprising an obligation to ensure that the common
law, as part of the general legal framework for the realisation of socio-economic
rights, is ‘reasonable’.  Hence, courts are constitutionally required to develop the
common law in situations where this is necessary for the effective enjoyment of
socio-economic rights.22
It is further generally accepted that development of the common law is the
preferred avenue through which to give horizontal effect to human rights.  Given
the prevailing opposition to applying socio-economic rights directly in private
disputes, it may be expected that their horizontal dimensions will for the
foreseeable future, be limited either to the vindication of statutory socio-
economic duties against private entities or to the development of relevant
23See chapter 3 notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
242002 (6) SA 21 (SCA).
25See also remarks of Iain Currie ‘Bill of Rights jurisprudence’ (2002) Annual Survey of
SA Law 36 at 74; Klaaren op cit note 2 at 115.  Apart from Afrox, health rights were relied on in
Ntsanwisi v Mbombi 2004 (3) SA 58 (T) at 61G where it was argued that enforcing a restraint of
trade clause on a health care professional would impact detrimentally on patients’ right to access
health care services.  However, the judgment nowhere addresses this argument.
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common-law rules or doctrines that regulate private relationships.23  A survey of
South African common law reveals that it gives effect to health rights to an
extent far greater than what is acknowledged by most critics of horizontal
application of socio-economic rights.
Given that South African courts have for many years engaged in
developing the common law in accordance with the changing social mores and
are now under an explicit constitutional mandate to ensure that the common law
resonates with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, they should be
able to fulfill the remedial aspects of their role in this regard with relative ease.
While an attempt to allign the common law regulating contractual exclusion
clauses with the values associated with s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution in Afrox
Healthcare v Strydom24 (‘Afrox’) was ultimately unsuccessful, that case
illustrates that it would be possible for courts to enforce certain aspects of health
rights in such an indirect manner, without straying too far from their institutional
comfort zone.25
This section will show that there are a significant number of instances in
which courts may adequately give effect to health rights through applying and/or
developing the common law.  Courts are accordingly encouraged to explore the
remedial avenue of ‘law provision’ or development more closely, as it presents
a potentially viable supplement to Grootboom reasonableness, especially in
cases where there is an attempt to assert a health-related right in a ‘private’
relationship.
The examples of common law developments discussed here are not
exhaustive of the possibilities posed by this remedial avenue for the
actualisation of health rights.  Nor are they held forth as the only, or necessarily
the best, manner in which the relevant common law provisions may be altered
26Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para 40.
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to give effect to particular health-related interests, or to facilitate access to
direct, tangible remedies for successful claimants.  In Carmichele v Minister of
Safety and Security, the Constitutional Court determined that any court which is
called upon to develop the common law in accordance with s 39(2) must first
establish whether and to what extent the current state of the common law
requires development, in light of the circumstances of the case.  Thereafter, it
should decide on the manner in which developments that are necessary for the
common law to reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution should
be effected in the context of the particular matter.26  The examples provided here
present but some of the spectrum of possible common law developments which
may result in more tangible benefits in matters where health-related rights are
directly or indirectly implicated.
(a) The common law and s 12(2)
As set out in 3.3(a) above, the health-related freedoms protected in terms of s
12(2) of the Constitution include a right to individual control over physical and
mental health status.  One way in which individuals exercise such control is
through making informed and independent lifestyle-related choices that impact
on their personal health status.  These include the choice to seek medical
attention in the event of illness.  Where medical attention is sought, health-
related autonomy finds expression within the doctor-patient relationship through
patients’ participation in decisions by health care professionals as to whether
patients should receive particular forms of medical treatment.  In order for this
aspect of health-related autonomy to have practical significance for patients in
this context, legal mechanisms are necessary not only to prevent the unjustified
infringements of health-related autonomy interests by health care professionals,
but also to compensate patients for damage suffered in cases where such
infringements have occurred.
One such mechanism is to be found in the common law, which has long
27See J Neethling; JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (1996) 29-30;
Christa Van Wyk ‘Die regte van gevangenes met HIV’ (1997) 60 THRHR 699 at 704.
28See Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) at 721B-E, also Dieter
Giesen ‘From paternalism to self-determination to shared decision-making’ (1988) Acta
Juridica107 at 109; DJ McQuoid-Mason & SA Strauss ‘Medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and other
health professions’ in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa Volume 17 (1st
Reissue 1999) 129 at 146 and authorities cited there; Charles Ngwena ‘Health care decision-
making and the competent minor: The limits of self-determination’ (1996) Acta Juridica 132 at
134-135; FFW Van Oosten ‘Castell v De Greef and the doctrine of informed consent: Medical
paternalism ousted in favour of patient autonomy’ (1995) 28 De Jure 164 at 166-167.
29Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) at 420J and 421C-D respectively.  See also
427D-E, where the doctrine is described as follows: ‘It is in accord with the fundamental right of
individual autonomy and self-determination to which South African law is moving.  This
formulation also sets its face against paternalism, from many other species whereof South Africa
is now turning away’.  For discussion of these dicta, see Van Oosten op cit note 28 at 176; 178-
179.  Castell’s understanding of informed consent as integral to autonomy has been endorsed
in the post-constitutional era in C v Minister of Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 292 (T) at
300F-H; Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T) at 1092H-
1095J; Oldwage v Lourens [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C) at paras 87-91.
30Castell op cit note 29 at 425G-J; 426F-H.  For a detailed exposition of the common-law
position in this regard, see NJB Claassen & T Verschoor Medical Negligence in South Africa
154
regarded physical and mental health as part of the individual’s physical integrity,
which is in turn recognised and protected as a personality right that is capable
of infringement  by public or private actors.27  Further linked to this
understanding of physical integrity is the notion of individual autonomy and self-
determination, which common law in turn views as encompassing the doctrine
of informed consent to medical treatment. Accordingly, where a patient receives
medical treatment without her informed consent, this is viewed as an actionable
breach of her physical integrity, which may found delictual liability and may
accordingly warrant an award of compensatory damages against a medical
practitioner.28
The legal position in this regard has authoritatively been set out in Castell
v De Greef, where Ackermann J spoke of the requirement that medical treatment
may proceed only with the informed consent of a patient, as flowing from a
patient’s ‘fundamental right to self-determination’ and ‘rights of bodily integrity
and autonomous moral agency’.29  He found that, for consent to constitute a
defence against a delictual claim arising from medical treatment, the medical
practitioner in question must have informed the patient, as fully and clearly as
is practicable, of her diagnosis and prognosis, as well as of the nature,
importance and effects of proposed treatment.30  Patients would further be
(1992) at 59-71; Murray Earle ‘ “Informed consent”: Is there room for the reasonable patient in
South African law?’ (1995) 112 SALJ 629-642; Van Oosten op cit note 28 at 170-171.
31The Court further indicated that it would regard a risk as ‘material’ where, in the
circumstances of the case, ‘a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk,
would be likely to attach significance to it; or ... the medical practitioner is or should reasonably
be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance
to it’.  Castell op cit note 29 at 426F-H.  The import of a patient-orientated test for determining
whether informed consent was present in a particular matter has been hailed as a triumph for
patient autonomy over medical paternalism in South African law.  See Van Oosten op cit note
28 at 176.
32For instance, common law regards it as lawful to proceed with treatment in the absence
of informed consent where this is necessary for the protection of public health, or where
assistance is rendered in a medical emergency.  See Giesen op cit note 28 at 123-125; Van
Oosten op cit note 28 at 172.  Castell furthermore does not exclude the withholding of health-
related information where disclosure would do more harm than non-disclosure.  Castell op cit
note 29 at 426H; Van Oosten op cit note 28 at 172; 177.
33See provisions discussed in chapter 3 notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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regarded as having consented to treatment only where they have understood
and appreciated any material risk relevant to it.31  Where a medical practitioner
proceeds with treatment without a patient’s informed consent, thus understood,
her conduct is regarded as wrongful and can accordingly found delictual liability,
unless the medical practitioner can show that she was justified in the
circumstances, to proceed with treatment notwithstanding the lack of informed
consent.32
The legal position in this regard has recently been supplemented by the
provisions of ss 7-9 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, which set out the
consent-related duties of parties to the doctor-patient relationship and list
circumstances in which treatment may proceed without informed consent.33
While these provisions therefore function both as a statutory expression of
patients’ right to bodily integrity in terms of s 12(2) of the Constitution and as a
limitation on its ambit, they seemingly do not add any rights or obligations to
those identified in Castell.  They further appear not to provide an independent
remedial avenue for patients whose integrity-related rights have been infringed
in the rendering of medical treatment.  Such patients will likely still make use of
the common law to attain compensation for damages suffered as a result of
having received medical treatment without their informed consent.  The current
state of common law, as set out in Castell, clearly allows for adequate reparation
in this regard.
34See McQuoid-Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 143 and authorities cited there; SA
Strauss ‘Medical and health law’ in Francis Bosman (ed) Social Welfare Law (1982) 511 at 519.
35Factors listed by McQuoid-Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 145.  See also Magware
v Minister of Health 1981 (4) SA 472 (Z) at 475A-B; Dieter Giesen ‘A right to health care? A
comparative perspective’ (1994) 4(2) Health Matrix 277 at 290; Aart C Hendriks ‘Patients’ rights
and access to health care’ (2001) 20 Medicine & Law 371 at 376; Bruce E Leech ‘The right of
the HIV-positive patient to medical care: An analysis of the costs of providing medical treatment’
(1993) 9 SAJHR 39 at 48; Strauss op cit note 34 at 517.
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(b) The common law and s 27(1)(a)
(i) Access to care
An obvious barrier to accessing health care services, especially in the private
health care sector, occurs where health care practitioners or establishments
refuse to render treatment to particular patients or groups of patients.  Such
refusal is typically justified on a variety of grounds, including the failure by
patients to satisfy hospital admission requirements (such as having to produce
proof of medical aid membership or having to sign indemnity forms), the inability
of health care practitioners or facilities to render treatment of the kind requested,
the inability of patients to pay for treatment and health care professionals’
conscientious objection to rendering particular forms of treatment.  It is
conceivable that, whereas such a denial of care would often be legitimate, it may
sometimes be viewed as an unjustifiable barrier to accessing health care
services and accordingly as an infringement of s 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.
At common law, a health care professional is as a general rule free to
refuse to accept a particular person as a patient.34  Once accepting a patient
however, a contractual, moral and ethical duty obliges the health care
professional to continue providing treatment, unless it can feasibly be left to
another health care professional who is willing to treat; or sufficient instructions
for further treatment are issued; or further treatment is medically unnecessary,
futile or likely to do more harm than good; or the patient refuses further
treatment; or the practitioner gives the patient reasonable notice of her intention
to discontinue treatment while simultaneously ensuring that alternative treatment
options are available.35  It is thus possible to hold a health care professional
delictually liable for withholding treatment unreasonably, in circumstances where
36McQuoid-Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 145.
37See in this regard also Hendriks op cit note 35 at 377; Leech op cit note 35 at 67.
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a doctor-patient relationship has come to be established.  In determining
whether or not a refusal of treatment was reasonable, courts must take into
account factors such as the doctor’s knowledge of the patient’s condition, the
nature and seriousness of the patient’s condition, the ability of the doctor to
assist the patient, the availability of alternative treatment, the interests of the
doctor’s other patients as well as ethical considerations.36
The constitutionalisation of health rights must necessarily influence the
above assessment.  I would argue that the right to have access to health care
services challenges the foundation of the common law position that health care
professionals are regarded as always being free to refuse treatment, unless a
doctor-patient relationship has already been established.  At the very least, the
horizontal operation of the right to equality and the concomitant equality
guarantee underlying the right of access to health care services should have the
effect of precluding any arbitrary refusal of treatment or any refusal that is
motivated by unfair discrimination.37  The common law should accordingly be
developed to reflect this.  In addition, I would argue that the values associated
with the right to have access to health care services would be better served by
reversing the starting point of the common law inquiry.  This would entail that a
health care professional is regarded as duty-bound to provide treatment,
regardless of the presence of a pre-existing doctor-patient relationship, unless
he or she can offer constitutionally acceptable justification for refusing to do so.
Accordingly, health care professionals would incur delictual liability for damages
suffered as a result of an unjustifiable refusal to render treatment.
Developing the common law in the manner described here would serve
either to secure access to health care services for patients who were at risk of
being denied access without constitutionally acceptable justification, or to
tangibly compensate such patients for damages suffered as a result of such
denial of access.  Whereas there obviously has to be guarded against placing
an undue burden on health care professionals to render care regardless of the
38See cases discussed by C Ngwena ‘Conscientious objection and legal abortion in
South Africa: Delineating the parameters’ (2003) 28(1) Journal for Juridical Science 1 at 4.
39Ngwena (ibid) at 9-10.  See also remarks of Stephen Ellmann ‘A constitutional
confluence: American “State-action” law and the application of South Africa’s socio-economic
rights guarantees to private actors’ in Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann (eds) The Post-
Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 444 at 458.
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circumstances or their reasons for refusal, it is submitted that health care
professionals’ interests in this regard could be adequately protected by
developing rules of common law to limit patients’ right of access to care, in
accordance with s 8(3)(b) of the Constitution.  The accepted common law
grounds of justification for refusal to continue treating existing patients and the
factors to be taken into account in determining the reasonableness or otherwise
of such refusal, could serve as a useful starting point in this respect.
An inquiry into the reasonableness and justifiability of a refusal to render
particular treatment would often boil down to weighing interests of health care
professionals against those of their would-be patients.  One particularly
controversial example of this is where the refusal to treat relates to a health care
professional’s moral, religious or ethical objection to rendering particular
treatment.  The context in which such conscientious objection appears to arise
most often is the provision of abortion services under the Choice on Termination
of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.  Especially in rural areas, several instances of
health care professionals refusing to perform abortions out of moral or religious
objection have been documented.  This has resulted in a de facto denial of
access to termination services in situations where the requested treatment is not
accessible or available elsewhere in the vicinity.38  An inquiry into the
constitutional acceptability of justification for refusing to perform a termination
of pregnancy due to conscientious objection must necessarily involve a balance
between the implied right of health care professionals to conscientious objection
(derived from the right to freedom of conscience, religion, belief and opinion in
s 15 of the Constitution) and the express right of patients to have access to
reproductive health care services.39
The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act does not indicate how this
balance should be struck, though the determination in s 6 that women who
40See Charles Ngwena ‘Accessing abortion services under the Choice on Termination
of Pregnancy Act: Realising substantive equality’ (2000) 25 Journal for Juridical Science 19 at
39; Ngwena op cit note 38 at 5; 9; 11-13; 16.
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request termination services should be informed of their rights in terms of the Act
does impose limited restrictions on rights of conscientious objection.  Similarly,
Charles Ngwena argues that refusal to perform a termination of pregnancy out
of conscientious objection would generally amount to a reasonable and
justifiable limitation on the right of access to reproductive health care services,
unless the termination is required as a matter of medical emergency.  However,
Ngwena regards health care professionals as duty-bound, notwithstanding their
rights of conscientious objection, to refer the patient to a facility where a
termination service may in the alternative be accessed.  Ngwena further hints
that rights of conscientious objection may more readily be limited in rural areas
where such alternative facilities are not available or accessible.40
I would go further to suggest that, in circumstances where a refusal to
provide medical treatment due to conscientious objection amounts to a de facto
denial of access, implied rights of conscientious objection should be overruled
by the express right of access to health care services.  In other words, the
interests of patients should generally outweigh those of medical practitioners in
this context.  Refusal to treat due to conscientious objection would, on my
suggestion, be regarded as reasonable and justifiable only in circumstances
where alternative services are practically available and accessible to the patient
and where the patient was alerted to such options by the health care
professional.
(ii) Quality of care
As shown in 3.3(d)(i) above, the s 27(1)(a) right to have access to health care
services must necessarily imply a justiciable standard of quality of care, for it to
comply with relevant international human rights norms and to have practical
significance for those who suffer damages through receiving negligent or
substandard care.  Furthermore, the State’s duty to protect citizens from private
41See Strydom v Afrox Health Care [2001] 4 All SA 618 (T) at 626b-e; 627f-g; Korf v
Health Professions Council of South Africa 2000 (1) SA 1171 (T) at 1179B-D.
42See, for example, Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal op cit note 28 at 723C-E;
Blyth v Van den Heever 1980 (1) SA 191 (A) at 193B-194A; 221A; 221D-E; Magware v Minister
of Health op cit note 35 at 477A-B; Correira v Berwind 1986 (4) SA 60 (ZHC) at 63E-F; I; 66C-D;
S v Kramer 1987 (1) SA 887 (W) at 893E-894J; Pringle v Administrator, Transvaal 1990 (2) SA
379 (W) at 385A-D; 396H-I; Applicant v Administrator, Transvaal 1993 (4) SA 733 (W) at 738D-
F; Collins v Administrator, Cape 1995 (4) SA 73 (C) at 81J-82B; Oldwage v Lourens op cit note
29 at paras 40-46; Van der Walt v De Beer 2005 (5) SA 151 (C); also Claassen & Verschoor op
cit note 30 at 13-14; McQuoid-Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 152-153; 198-199; SA Strauss
Doctor, Patient and the Law (3ed 1991) at 95-96; 252; Strauss op cit note 34 at 517; Neil Van
Dokkum ‘Hospital consent forms’ (1996) 7 Stellenbosch LR 249; Neil Van Dokkum ‘The evolution
of medical malpractice law in South Africa’ (1997) 41 J of African Law 175 at 190; Ferdinand
Van Oosten ‘Financial resources and the patient’s right to health care: Myth and reality’ (1999)
32 De Jure 1 at 4-5; 8.
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infringements of the right to have access to care requires the presence of
effective and practicable remedial avenues which ensure that rights-bearers are
in the position to demand that the health care services they receive satisfy at
least minimum standards of professionalism and scientific appropriateness.
Patients should further be entitled to adequate compensation for damages
suffered as a result of receiving care which falls short of such standards.  There
have been welcome obiter remarks by South African High Courts which
acknowledge that the actual enjoyment of the right of access to health care
services is significantly compromised where quality standards are not adhered
to or are not enforced.41
The task of establishing when the quality of treatment received is to be
regarded as adequate, so as to satisfy the quality standard inherent in s
27(1)(a), has been significantly simplified by the development of a quality
yardstick in common-law cases dealing with medical negligence.  This standard
involves that failure by a health care professional to exercise a degree of skill
and care that may reasonably be expected of the average, reasonably skilled
practitioner in his or her field of medical expertise in similar circumstances, can
lead to contractual or delictual liability.42  I would submit that the implied
standard of ‘reasonable care’ is sufficiently flexible to accommodate quality
concerns in relation to s 27(1)(a), while simultaneously remaining realistic and
sensitive to the context within which health care services are rendered.  The
standard thus strikes a fair balance between the competing interests of health
43See Claassen & Verschoor op cit note 30 at 27; Lorraine Hebblethwaite ‘Mishap or
malpractice? Liability in delict for medical negligence’ (1991) 108 SALJ 38 at 38-39; 43.  On the
various difficulties associated with the imbalances in knowledge and bargaining power in the
doctor-patient relationship see also Einer Elhauge ‘Allocating health care morally’ (1994) 82
California LR 1451 at 1542; David M Frankford ‘Privatizing health care: Economic magic to cure
legal medicine’ (1992) 66 Southern California LR 1 at 15-16; 55-57; 59-60; 93; Paul Gertler &
Jacques Van der Gaag The Willingness to Pay for Medical Care: Evidence from Two Developing
Countries (1990) at 16-17; 21; Giesen op cit note 28 at 114; Mark A Hall ‘Rationing health care
at the bedside’ (1994) 69 New York Univ LR 693 at 700-701.
44See Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519; Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438; also authorities
cited and discussed by PA Carstens ‘Die toepassing van res ipsa loquitur in gevalle van mediese
nalatigheid’ (1999) 32 De Jure 19 at 21-24; Claassen & Verschoor op cit note 30 at 28-20;
McQuoid-Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 204.
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care professionals and patients in this regard.  Common law accordingly
presents a viable remedial avenue for recipients of negligent or substandard
care.
However, there are practical impediments regarding the application of the
common law quality standard to concrete cases, that significantly restrict its
remedial potency and accordingly diminish its effectiveness.  The spirit, purport
and objects of a Constitution which takes health rights seriously require that
these be acknowledged and addressed, either through a development of the
relevant legal principles or through a change in the manner in which courts
currently apply these principles.
One such impediment, relating to the application (rather than the content)
of the medical negligence standard, is occasioned by the inherent imbalance in
scientific knowledge (and other resources) between patients and doctors.  This
imbalance, coupled with the discipline-specific and scientific nature of a test
inquiring into ‘reasonable care’ rendered by a ‘reasonable practitioner’, make it
notoriously difficult for a patient to prove negligence or wrongdoing on the part
of a health care professional.43  An obvious manner in which to alleviate this
difficulty would be to apply the maxim of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence
cases where an inference of negligence seems justified by the circumstances
of the case.  However, South African courts have historically been unwilling to
apply the maxim in cases of alleged medical negligence, out of deference to the
medical profession and in empathy with the often difficult conditions under which
health care professionals operate.44
45Claassen & Verschoor op cit note 30 at 28.  See also authorities cited there.  Carstens
op cit note 44 at 21-22; 24; 26 further lists several examples of cases clearly calling for
application of res ipsa loquitur.  These include cases where there has been physical injury to a
body part other than that which was treated, where the wrong body part was treated, where the
wrong limb was amputated, where there is operated on the wrong patient or the wrong operation
is carried out on a patient, where a patient is given the wrong medication or an over-dosage of
medication, or where medical instruments are left inside the body after an operation.
46As argued by Carstens (ibid) at 26-27.
47See Danie Brand ‘Disclaimers in hospital admission contracts and constitutional health
rights’ (2002) 3(2) ESR Review 17 at 18.  For an exposition of the relevant principles from the
common law of contract applicable here see Van Dokkum (1996) op cit note 42 at 250-253.
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Whereas one must remain sympathetic to these circumstances, I agree
with suggestions that res ipsa loquitur should, at least where ‘the prejudicial
result is clearly in contrast with the acknowledged therapeutic objectives and
technique of the operation or treatment in question’, find application in cases of
alleged medical negligence.45  This is required not only by the constitutional
guarantees of equality and a fair trial,46 but also by the values associated with
s 27(1)(a).  The application of the maxim in such cases would significantly
enhance the potential of s 27(1)(a) to address the imbalances in power inherent
to the doctor-patient relationship and to result in adequate compensation for
those whose rights to receive care of an appropriate quality have been infringed.
A further, and arguably more pernicious, impediment to the effectiveness
of the relevant common law principles in securing tangible relief for patients
whose rights to receive care of an adequate quality have been infringed, is that
the principles are increasingly excluded from application in the majority of
doctor-patient relationships in the private health care sector.  The great majority
of private health care institutions indemnify themselves against damages
resulting from substandard or negligent care administered by their personnel,
by insisting that patients waive their remedies in this regard upon entering into
a contract of admission to the institution.  So prevalent is this practice that
virtually no patient of a private health care institution can nowadays successfully
hold  the institution liable for rendering negligent or substandard care.47
In Afrox Healthcare v Strydom, the SCA overturned a finding of the High
Court that the terms of such an exclusion clause were contra bonos mores and
unenforceable by virtue of infringing s 27(1)(a), since it felt that the terms of the
48Afrox op cit note 24 at paras 13; 15; 19-21.  The SCA emphasised that s 27(1)(a) would
not preclude private hospitals from charging fees or from setting conditions for rendering care.
See also remarks of Pieter Carstens & Anton Kok ‘An assessment of the use of disclaimers by
South African hospitals in view of constitutional demands, foreign law and medico-legal
considerations’ (2003) 18 SA Public Law 430 at 439.
49Refusing to admit a patient who refuses to agree to an exclusion clause may however
fall foul of s 27(1)(a).  Carstens & Kok (ibid) at 441; 444.
50See Brand op cit note 47 at 18; Carstens & Kok op cit note 48 at 444; 452; RM Jansen
& BM Smith ‘Hospital disclaimers: Afrox Healthcare v Strydom’ (2003) 28(2) Journal for Juridical
Science 210 at 215; Patrick van den Heever ‘Exclusion of liability of private hospitals in South
Africa’ (April 2003) De Rebus 47 at 47-48.  Such disclaimers are also incompatible with medical
ethics.  Carstens & Kok op cit note 48 at 450.
51See Jansen & Smith op cit note 50 at 218.
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exclusion clause did not deny access to treatment and did not explicitly allow for
the rendering of negligent or substandard care.  The argument that s 27(1)(a)
presupposed a minimum level of care was accordingly held not to be relevant
in the circumstances.48  While the Court was arguably correct that exclusion
clauses do not themselves deny access to care or condone negligent or
substandard care,49 it failed to appreciate that such clauses prevent patients
from availing themselves of their only meaningful remedy where the quality
guarantee underlying their right to have access to health care services has been
dishonoured.50  This is patently incompatible with the ethos of a Bill of Rights
that entrenches justiciable health rights and promises appropriate relief for their
infringement.
Such a de facto expurgation of the common law pertaining to medical
negligence from private doctor-patient relationships may clearly be avoided, by
limiting the ambit of the common law understanding of freedom of contract in
order for it to resonate with the values associated with s 27(1)(a) of the
Constitution.  It has for example been argued that, given that exemption clauses
amount to a de facto waiver of the quality-guarantee underlying the right of
access to health care services, private hospitals should be under an obligation
to alert prospective patients to their existence.51  I would, however, argue that
exclusion clauses in hospital admission contracts should per se be viewed as
being against public policy (given that the concept of public policy must be
understood as also embodying the values underlying the rights in the Bill of
Rights, including the various rights associated with the right to health) and as
52See also ibid 215-216 and authorities there cited.  For a pure contract-law argument
to the same effect, see Tjakie Naude & Gerhard Lubbe ‘Exemption clauses - A rethink
occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom’ (2005) 122 SALJ 441 at 456-457.  Carstens &
Kok op cit note 48 at 455 call on the legislature to outlaw disclaimers in standard-form hospital
admission contracts.  The position of patients in this regard will likely be ameliorated somewhat
by the National Health Act 61 of 2003, s 46 of which determines that ‘[e]very private health
establishment must maintain insurance cover sufficient to indemnify a user for damages that he
or she might suffer as a consequence of a wrongful act by any member of its staff or by any of
its employees’.
53On the English position, see Kevin Williams ‘Medical samaritans: Is there a duty to
treat?’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 393 at 393-394; Kevin Williams ‘Doctors as
good samaritans: Some empirical evidence concerning emergency medical treatment in Britain’
(2003) 30 Journal of Law & Society 258 at 258-259.
54The common law position is set out in Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590
(A).  See also PQR Boberg The Law of Delict Vol 1 (1984) 211 and authorities cited there; J
Neethling; JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict (3ed 1999) 56-57 and authorities cited there.
164
accordingly being unenforceable.52  It is hoped that Afrox will not be the last
word on the constitutionality of such exclusion clauses and that the SCA or the
Constitutional Court will adopt an approach that is more sympathetic to the
dilemma of individual patients attempting to assert their health rights against the
powerful collective of the private health care sector.
(c) The common law and s 27(3)
Due to the nature of medical emergencies and the urgency of receiving
appropriate treatment during such emergencies, the consequences when such
treatment is refused or cannot be obtained are often severe.  Vindication of the
right not to be refused emergency treatment will therefore often involve ex post
facto claims for compensation in relation to damages suffered as a result of
having been denied necessary emergency treatment.  As such, the common law
of delict seems to be the logical route for obtaining appropriate relief.
However, like English law, South African common law does not recognise
the existence of a blanket duty to act in order to prevent harm to another
person.53  Instead, whether or not a person should have acted to prevent harm
to another is determined on a case-by-case basis with reference to the boni
mores, taking into account all relevant circumstances of the matter, including
whether a ‘special relationship’ could be said to exist between the parties in
question.54  Like in England, this general position has always been regarded
55See Williams (2001) op cit note 53 at 395; 413.
56See for instance the events detailed by SA Strauss ‘Twee mediese regsvrae: Die
aanspreeklikheid van private hospitale met ongevalle-afdelings en die aanspreeklikheid van
sportpromotors en skeidsregters teenoor beseerde spelers’ (2000) TSAR 205 at 209-210,
recalling the death of a Pretoria cyclist who sustained critical injuries in a road accident.  The
cyclist was brought by a passer-by to an emergency room of a private hospital, where staff
refused to admit him, since his identity could not be established.  The cyclist was subsequently
admitted to a public hospital, where he died shortly after arrival.
57The European and American positions are discussed by Dieter Giesen ‘Health care as
a right: Some practical implications’ (1994) 13 Medicine & Law 285 at 287-288.  See also the
various authorities cited there.
58Kent v Griffiths [2000] 2 WLR 1158 and Lowns v Woods [1996] Aust Tort Reports 81-
376, as discussed by Williams (2001) op cit note 53 at 401-402.  On the requirement of physical
proximity generally, see Williams (ibid) 401-403; 409-410; Williams (2003) op cit note 53 at 271;
Giesen op cit note 57 at 287-288.
165
with a measure of moral (and legal) unease.55  This unease is especially acute
in the case of medical emergencies, with (all too often true) urban legends
describing patients in desperate need of medical attention being ignored by
health care professionals in the vicinity, or being turned away by hospital
emergency rooms for failure to indicate ability to pay for treatment.56
The English legal position in this regard (from which several
commonwealth countries, such as South Africa and Australia, have derived the
same stark general rule) may rightly be described as peculiar and as by far the
most patient-unfriendly in a continuum of approaches to the issue of ‘medical
samaritans’.  In several European countries for instance, public and private
health care professionals are under a statutory duty to render emergency care
when circumstances require them to do so, breach of which leads to civil liability,
or even criminal sanction.  In the United States, several state legislatures have
similarly codified a duty to treat in medical emergencies, whereas others have
taken a more passive approach of encouraging emergency assistance, by
statutorily indemnifying health care professionals from possible malpractice
liability arising in the process of rendering emergency care.57  Even in England
and Australia, recent years have seen reported cases of private health care
institutions which were in the physical proximity of a medical emergency and
were able and qualified to render care, being held liable for failing or refusing
to do so.58
In South Africa, there is a well-established moral and ethical duty on
59McQuoid-Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 193-194.  On the existence of a similar
ethical duty on English and European doctors, see Giesen op cit note 57 at 287; Williams (2001)
op cit note 53 at 413; Williams (2003) cit note 53 at 259; 270; 275; 280.
60Op cit note 54.
61See Leech op cit note 35 at 48; McQuoid-Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 193 and
authorities there cited; Strauss op cit note 34 at 519; Strauss op cit note 42 at 90-91; Strauss op
cit note 56 at 208; 210.  As regards payment, the renderer of emergency care would be able to
claim payment under negotiorum gestio.  Strauss op cit note 56 at 210.
62Strauss (ibid) at 208; Strauss op cit note 34 at 519.
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health care professionals to provide emergency medical treatment to
strangers,59 although such a duty is not legally enforceable.  Even before the
advent of the constitutional era, there were several calls for doctors (or, at least,
emergency rooms in private hospitals) to be held delictually liable, in
accordance with the common law position set out in Minister van Polisie v
Ewels,60 for failing to render emergency medical treatment in circumstances
similar to those in the English and Australian cases mentioned above.  It has
been argued that the contemporary boni mores requires from persons who are
able and qualified to render emergency medical assistance without harming
themselves, to do so, regardless of the prospective patient’s personal
characteristics or ability to pay for treatment, unless it is reasonable to refuse
care in the circumstances of the case.61  Suggested factors influencing a
determination of the reasonableness of refusing to render treatment in a medical
emergency include the health care professional’s knowledge of the patient’s
condition, the urgency of the condition, the health care professional’s expertise
in treating similar cases, the possibility of alternative treatment and ethical
considerations.62
As set out in 3.3(d)(ii) above, s 27(3) of the Constitution’s determination
that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment is generally accepted
to be horizontally applicable to private emergency services and hospitals.  This
is affirmed by the National Health Act 61 of 2003, which determines in s 5 that
‘[a] health care provider, worker or health establishment may not refuse a person
emergency medical treatment’.  The Act’s definitions of the terms ‘healthcare
provider’, ‘health worker’ and ‘health establishment’ include private health care
professionals and establishments.  The existence of a statutory duty to provide
63For a similar argument in the English context (in light of the domestic force of the
European Convention on Human Rights), see Williams (2001) op cit note 53 at 393; 395; 400;
413.
167
emergency medical care therefore now counteracts the common law
presumption against holding health care professionals or institutions liable for
failure to render such care.  But even beyond the parameters of this statutory
duty, I would argue that, in order for the common law of delict effectively to
provide a remedy for patients who have been denied emergency medical
treatment, a complete overhaul of the basis of an inquiry into the
reasonableness or otherwise of such a denial is required by the constitutional
presence of s 27(3).63  It would appear necessary to start from the premise that
emergency services, private hospitals and health care professionals in the
vicinity of medical emergencies should be regarded as duty-bound to render
emergency medical assistance.  Failure to render such treatment should
accordingly be viewed as unlawful, unless it can be shown to have been
reasonable in light of the boni mores.  The boni mores should in turn be recast
to represent the legal and moral convictions of a community in which health
rights, and specifically the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment,
are constitutionally enshrined.  In other words, instead of the absence of a duty
to render emergency medical treatment being presumed and the presence of a
duty having to be established with reference to the boni mores, an inquiry
reverberating with the values associated with s 27(3) would presume the exact
opposite.
Lest such a position appear overzealous or unrealistic, it needs to be
remembered that it will remain possible (and arguably easy) to escape liability
by showing that a duty of care did not reasonably arise in the circumstances of
a particular case.  Further, a finding of wrongfulness based on non-compliance
with a duty to render emergency care would satisfy but one of the requirements
for delictual liability.  Health care professionals who are unable to show that they
were absolved of the duty to render care in accordance with the boni mores will
therefore be held liable only if the other requirements (such as the presence of
an omission, damage suffered and causation) are also satisfied.
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(d) The common law and s 28(1)(c)
(i) Parental responsibility for child health
Section 4.2(d) above criticised the Grootboom decision for its restrictive
delineation of the interaction between parental and State responsibility for child
welfare.  While Grootboom acknowledges that orphans and abandoned children
have an unspecified entitlement to socio-economic support from the State, it
excludes children who are in the care of their parents from such entitlement.
Instead, Grootboom depicts such children as only being able to enforce their
constitutional claims for nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and basic
social services against their parents.  I criticised this finding for placing an overly
onerous burden on indigent parents and for effectively barring children in poor
households from meaningfully exercising their s 28(1)(c) rights.
Grootboom’s acknowledgment that parents bear some responsibility for
the socio-economic welfare of their children does, however, present a useful
starting point for thinking about the horizontal dimensions of s 28(1)(c) within the
parent-child relationship.  Whereas these dimensions indeed need to be
explored, it is necessary to keep in mind that, despite an inherent power
imbalance in the parent-child relationship, parents are often in a similarly
vulnerable position to their children in relation to the State and to other powerful
private actors.  For this reason there should be guarded against holding parents
responsible for facilitating the exercise of their children’s health rights in
circumstances where, due to their own socio-economic vulnerability, they are
unable to do so.  This said, where parents are in the position to provide for their
children, it makes sense to hold that they are responsible for meeting their
children’s health needs.  Productive ways of transgressing the law’s reluctance
to intervene in the private sphere of the family environment, in order to enforce
the duties of parents in this respect, must be sought.  The current state of
common law presents a useful starting point.
Common law provides that parents are, by virtue of their duty of support
towards their children, responsible for their children’s physical welfare and
64See Brigitte Clark ‘Duties of support of living persons’ in Belinda Van Heerden; Alfred
Cockrell; Raylene Keightley et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (2ed 1999) 233 at
243-244 and Roman-Dutch authorities cited there; also Brigitte Clark ‘Child support: Public or
private?’ (1992) 55 THRHR 277 at 278; Brigitte Clark ‘Children’s right to support - a public
responsibility?’ (1996) Acta Juridica 82 at 84; Marius Pieterse ‘Reconstructing the private/public
dichotomy? The enforcement of children’s constitutional social rights and care entitlements’
(2003) TSAR 1 at 7-8; J Sloth-Nielsen ‘The child’s right to social services, the right to social
security, and primary prevention of child abuse: Some conclusions in the aftermath of
Grootboom’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 210 at 225; Julia Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’ in MH Cheadle et al
(eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 507 at 515.  The same applies
for other relationships that trigger a common-law duty of support.  For instance, in Thomson v
Thomson 2002 (5) SA 541 (W), it was found that the duty to maintain current or former spouses
may include facilitating access to health care.  See specifically 545B-546A.
65See Clark (1996) op cit note 64 at 84; Clark (1999) op cit note 64 at 245; Pieterse op
cit note 64 at 8.
66Article 27 of the CRC determines that, while parents bear the primary burden to
support their children, they should in appropriate circumstances be assisted by the State.
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socio-economic well-being.  This obligation includes facilitating access to health
care services for their children, and providing for their other health-related
needs.64  Whereas common law has thus always allowed for the horizontal
application of children’s socio-economic rights against their parents, the
obligation that this imposes on parents has always been regarded as limited by
the extent to which parents are capable of providing for their children’s needs.
Where parents can prove that they do not have the means to fulfill the
obligations associated with their duty of support, they are relieved of the duty,
which then vests instead in the State.65
Unlike Grootboom therefore, common law awards an enforceable
entitlement to be provided with basic health care services against the State to
all children who find themselves unable meaningfully to enforce this entitlement
against their parents, regardless of whether they are in the care of their parents.
The common-law position is therefore capable of resulting in tangible benefits
for a whole additional category of children (those in poor families) than those
who stand to benefit from the Grootboom interpretation of s 28(1)(c).  It is also
more realistic, in line with relevant international law authority66 and sensitive to
the reality in which parents and children find themselves than Grootboom’s stark
demarcation of public responsibility for children’s socio-economic needs.  The
position subsequently taken  by the Constitutional Court in TAC2, which appears
to depart from the Grootboom interpretation of s 28(1)(c) and instead bears
67See, for instance, Clark (1996) op cit note 64 at 83; 86; Clark (1992) op cit note 64 at
280.
68See C Nicholson & A Politis ‘The life and death lottery: Tipping the scales in favour of
the child’s best interests’ (2001) 34 De Jure 594 at 601.  It is an offense in terms of s 50 of the
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 to let children suffer harm through neglect, which would include
neglect of their health-related needs.  Parents have been criminally prosecuted under at least
two of s 50's statutory predecessors for causing the death of their children by refusing that the
children receive medical care.  See R v Botha 1918 TPD 133 (father convicted for causing the
death of child due to father’s refusal to let child receive ‘conventional’ medical care and opting
instead for healing through prayer); S v Fell 1971 (3) SA 667 (C) (father appeals successfully
against conviction for causing death of child by insisting that child receive homeopathic
treatment instead of ‘conventional’ medical care).  In cases where children suffer harm other
than death through their parents’ mala fide neglect of their health-related needs, compensatory
or similar relief may sometimes be more appropriate than criminal sanction.
69Sloth-Nielsen (2002) op cit note 64 at 515.
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closer resemblance to the common-law position, is accordingly welcomed.
This is not to say that the current state of common law is always reflective
of social reality or conducive to children being able effectively to enforce their
entitlements against parents who do not fulfill their socio-economic obligations.
Indeed, its effectiveness is significantly compromised by the severe structural
deficiencies of statutory mechanisms aimed at ensuring that recalcitrant parents
comply with their obligation to support their children.67  Beyond the obvious
urgent need to reform these (the contemplation of which is beyond the scope of
this dissertation), attempts should be made to enhance the practical significance
of s 28(1)(c) by considering ways in which the common-law position set out here
can be coupled with effective and context-sensitive civil remedies against
parents who do not fulfill their responsibilities towards their children.  In relation
to health rights, one option that has been suggested is to explore the question
of compensatory remedies against parents where children suffer harm due to a
lack of parental responsiveness to their health needs.68  It has also been
suggested that, due to a variety of social realities, thought must be given to
extending the common law obligation to satisfy children’s socio-economic needs
beyond biological parents, to rest also on extended family members and other
(non-biological) primary caregivers.69
(ii) Parental co-operation in facilitating children’s access to health care services
70See generally Esterhuizen v Adminstrator, Transvaal op cit note 28; also McQuoid-
Mason & Strauss op cit note 28 at 148 and authorities cited there; Nicholson & Politis op cit note
68 at 597.
71On the functioning and impact of these provisions, see Ngwena op cit note 28 at 139;
Strauss op cit note 34 at 521.
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Whereas the common law conception of the parent-child relationship may serve
as useful basis for enhancing the effectiveness of children’s health rights, there
are also aspects of the manner in which the common law regulates the
interaction between children’s rights and parental interests which may
conceivably frustrate the exercise of children’s health rights.  A prime example
of this is the extent to which children’s access to health care services is
dependent on the co-operation of their parents.  At the same time as obliging
parents to fulfill their children’s health-related needs, common law awards them
the right to determine the manner in which such needs must be satisfied, within
the parameters of the principle that the best interests of a child are paramount.
This aspect of parental power prominently includes the principle that parental
consent must be obtained before medical treatment may be administered to any
minor child.70  Children’s rights of autonomy in health-related decision-making
and of access to health care services are thus limited by the extent to which the
co-operation of their parents is required before treatment may be obtained.
Whereas the extent of parental power in this respect is carved down
significantly by statutory provisions (so for example may children over the age
of 14 consent to medical treatment, other than an operation, independent of their
parents and may children over the age of 18 independently consent to an
operation in terms of s 39(4) of the Child Care Act 74 of 198371), it poses a
potentially significant barrier to children (especially younger children) accessing
appropriate health care services.  While it makes sense to involve parents in
decisions concerning their children’s health interests and general welfare (since
they are usually best placed to ascertain the extent of their children’s health
needs, as well as to seek and obtain care for their children, and since they
typically have the best interests of their children at heart), there are at least two
sets of circumstances in which their control over their children’s access to health
care services is constitutionally problematic.
72See, for example, Michael Katz ‘The doctor’s dilemma: Duty and risk in the treatment
of Jehova’s Witnesses’ (1996) 113 SALJ 484 at 492-495.
73Nicholson & Politis op cit note 68 at 597; 601-603.  See also Gerhard Van der Schyff
‘The right to religious objection in South African law’ (2002) 119 SALJ 526 at 533.
74See David McQuoid-Mason & Lloyd Lotz ‘Religious beliefs and the refusal of blood
transfusions for children: What should doctors do?’ (2005) 68 THRHR 315 at 320-321; Nicholson
& Politis op cit note 68 at 599; Van der Schyff op cit note 73 at 532-533.
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The first is where parents refuse medically beneficial or necessary
treatment on behalf of their children.  The right of autonomy in health-related
decision-making, as implied by s 12(2) of the Constitution and vindicated by
common law, logically includes a right to refuse beneficial, or even necessary
or life-sustaining, medical treatment.  Given that parental power encompasses
the right to consent to medical treatment on behalf of a child, it logically extends
also to refusing treatment on behalf of the child.  While an individual’s choice to
waive necessary, life-sustaining or life-saving treatment is often regarded as
controversial,72 this is significantly more so where the rights waived are those of
a child who is often powerless to insist on access to health care in contravention
of his or her parents’ refusal.
At common law, courts attempt to strike a balance between the respective
interests of parents and children in this regard by evaluating the reasonableness
of the parents’ refusal of the treatment in question.  Nicholson and Politis argue
that courts are today constitutionally mandated to make the best interests of the
child the central focus of this inquiry.73  It may, perhaps uncontroversially, be
suggested that parents’ right to refuse consent to medical treatment on behalf
of their children should accordingly be overruled in favour of a child’s right to
access care in medical emergencies or in circumstances where the refusal
would lead to the death or disability of the child.74  This view finds support in the
recent decision in Hay v B, where the WLD ordered that health care
professionals could proceed with a blood transfusion on a child (without which
it was common cause that the child would likely die) notwithstanding the parents’
religious objections against blood transfusions and other subjective fears that
motivated them to refuse consent.  The Court found that, as upper guardian of
all minors, it could overrule parents’ refusal to consent to medical treatment on
75Hay v B 2003 (3) SA 492(W) at 494H-495E; 495I-J.  For discussion of the case, see
McQuoid-Mason & Lotz op cit note 74 at 315-316.  At common law, the Court’s power as upper
guardian would extend also to overruling the express wishes of the child on whether or not to
receive treatment.  Ngwena op cit note 28 at 145.
76See McQuoid-Mason & Lotz op cit note 74 at 316-317; Nicholson & Politis op cit note
68 at 599.
77On the need to respect parents’ position in this context, see Ngwena op cit note 28 at
134.
78On the extent of this problem, see Liesl Gerntholtz & Marlise Richter ‘Access of
abandoned children and orphans with HIV/AIDS to antiretroviral therapy - a legal impasse’
(2004) 94(11) SA Medical Journal 910.
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behalf of their children, and that the parents’ religious beliefs could not trump the
best interests of the child in light of the child’s constitutional right to life.75
Beyond situations where refusal of treatment would lead to death or
disability however, a significant grey area remains, with courts guided only by
the notoriously vague and amorphous best interests principle.  Factors to be
taken into account in determining the balance of interests in such matters should
include the consequences of refusing treatment, the extent to which alternative
treatment options could accommodate the parents’ objections to specific
treatment, the wishes of the child (where ascertainable) and the reasonableness
of the parents’ refusal.76  Whereas I would argue that the constitutionalisation
of health rights should tip the scale in favour of treatment in most cases, the
reasons for parents’ objection to treatment should nevertheless remain an
important factor influencing the inquiry (lest deference to parents’ wishes be
replaced by deference to the treatment whims of health care professionals).77
A second set of circumstances in which the requirement of parental
consent for children’s access to health care services becomes constitutionally
problematic arises in relation to the treatment needs of orphans for whom
alternative guardians have not been appointed or in relation to children whose
parents or guardians cannot be located.  The nature and extent of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic has exponentially increased the number of children in this position
who, due to the fact that they are frequently themselves HIV-positive, are often
also in urgent need of medical attention.78  The common-law requirement of
parental consent to medical treatment for children has, in at least one case,
been recognised as posing a significant hurdle to such children acquiring
79Ex parte Meyers WLD29172/03, cited and discussed by Gerntholtz & Richter op cit
note 78 at 911-912.
80See Christian Lawyers’ Association op cit note 29 at 1095A-J; 1103 F-J; 1104I-1105B;
1105D-J; 1106A-D.
81See clauses 32; 129(2) of the Children’s Bill contained in SALC Project 110 Report
Review of the Child Care Act (2002), discussed by Gerntholtz & Richter op cit note 78 at 912.
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timeous access to necessary, life-prolonging, medical treatment.  In an
unreported judgment in Ex parte Meyers, the WLD granted consent to a
pediatric working group to provide appropriate anti-retroviral treatment to HIV-
positive orphans in circumstances where such treatment was medically indicated
and where their de-facto caregivers consented to them receiving the treatment.79
Whereas courts’ common law powers as upper guardians of minors are
arguably wide enough to ensure that children receive necessary treatment both
in cases where they have been orphaned or abandoned and where their parents
unreasonably refuse treatment on their behalf, it is hoped that the
constitutionalisation of health rights would lead to the development of more
express rules that limit parents’ common-law rights to guide their children’s
exercise of rights to access health care services.  The presence of health rights
in the Constitution have already been used to justify the limitations on parental
power (and the concomitant right to parental care) occasioned by s 5(3) of the
Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act, according to which parental consent
is not required where a minor wishes to terminate a pregnancy.80  They also
arguably underlie recommendations by the South African Law Commission that
primary caregivers (other than parents) should also be allowed to consent to
medical treatment on behalf of children and that the statutory age at which
children are allowed to consent to treatment independently of their parents
should in appropriate circumstances be lowered to 12 years.81  Regardless of
whether these recommendations become law, there are bound to be
circumstances in which courts are called upon to decide whether particular
health care services should be provided to children who are for some reason
unable to consent to treatment themselves, either in parents’ absence or against
their express wishes.  It is hoped that the inquiry into the children’s best
interests in these circumstances would afford due weight to their constitutional
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health rights.
5.4 CONCLUSION: SUPPLEMENTING GROOTBOOM REASONABLENESS
This chapter has explored remedial avenues for infringements of health-related
rights outside of the remedial paradigm of policy-formulation or -modification that
is most readily associated with Grootboom reasonableness.  It has shown that
courts can significantly enhance the actual significance of health rights by
recognising, in appropriate circumstances, that there has been an infringement
of an individual, health-related, constitutional entitlement and by remedying such
infringement directly where to do so would satisfy the constitutional dictates of
appropriateness, justice and equity.  It has also explored the possibility of
indirectly enhancing the efficacy of health rights in real-life interactions through
the application and development of common law rules and principles that impact
on the exercise of health rights.
In doing so, the chapter has illustrated that Grootboom reasonableness
does not entirely shut the door on a benefit-focussed approach to health rights.
Neither the vindication of core-like aspects of constitutional health rights nor the
development of the common law to reverberate with their spirit, purport and
objects preclude or undermine judicial resort to Grootboom reasonableness in
circumstances where its application is called for.  Rather, these remedial
paradigms may be seen as viable supplements to Grootboom reasonableness,
and it is hoped that courts will explore the possibilities posed by them where the
circumstances of particular cases allow.
1Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at para 8 (per
Chaskalson P).
2Preamble to the 1996 Constitution.
3See chapter 1 note 14 and accompanying text.
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CHAPTER 6
THE IMPACT OF HEALTH RIGHTS
6.1 THE SATISFACTION OF HEALTH-RELATED NEEDS AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY
‘We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth.  Millions of
people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty.  There is a high
level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have
access to clean water or to adequate health services.  These conditions already
existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them,
and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity,
freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order.  For as
long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow
ring’.1
This often quoted passage from the Soobramoney judgment acknowledges that
the adjudication and enforcement of socio-economic rights takes place in the
context of, and forms an integral part of, a larger societal transformation ‘project’.
This ‘project’ purports, inter alia, to ‘[h]eal the divisions of our past and establish
a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental rights’ and
to ‘[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each
person’.2  The society envisaged as end-product of this transformation is one in
which the values of freedom and equality flourish and in which the inherent
human dignity of all citizens is equally affirmed and protected.  A vital
precondition for the achievement of such a society is that citizens enjoy at least
a minimal level of material well-being, in the sense that their vital and legitimate
material needs are met.3  The tangible improvement of the living conditions of
socially and economically vulnerable members of South African society thus
forms a central pillar of the transformation ‘project’ at the heart of its
constitutional dispensation.
4See Pierre De Vos ‘Substantive Equality after Grootboom: The emergence of social and
economic context as a guiding value in equality jurisprudence’ (2001) Acta Juridica 52 at 68-69;
Sandra Liebenberg ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: An effective
tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy & Development 159 at 162.
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Given that health is a highly valued commodity in a society founded on
human dignity, equality and freedom, one of the goals associated with the
achievement of social justice and the improvement of South Africans’ quality of
life is the achievement of the highest attainable state of physical and mental
health.  This dissertation has focused on a specific aspect of this latter objective.
It has considered the extent to which the various health-related rights enshrined
in the 1996 Constitution can enable citizens to gain access to tangible material
benefits that either assist them in their quest for health-maximisation through
satisfying their health-related needs, or compensate them for harm suffered
through the denial or frustration of such needs.
It has been said that the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the 1996
Constitution contribute to the social and economic transformation of South
African society in three ways.  First, they do not stand in the way of political
projects aimed at social transformation and buttress such projects by affirming
the constitutional legitimacy of their objectives.  Secondly, they oblige the State
to prioritise and actively pursue socio-economic transformation (by, for instance,
requiring the State to fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights and to take reasonable
legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights).  Thirdly, the provisions of the Bill of Rights themselves
function as vehicles for transformation through the tangible effects of their
interpretation and application by courts in concrete cases.4  Whereas the first
and second contributions listed here may be viewed as the ‘directive principle
effect’ of rights, which may result regardless of whether constitutional
guarantees are actually capable of judicial enforcement, the third contribution
can only be made where the guarantees in question are articulated as justiciable
rights.
Given that the health-related rights in the 1996 Constitution are fully
justiciable, they should be capable of contributing to the achievement of the right
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to health (and hence of furthering the constitutional transformation project) both
through their ‘directive principle effect’ and through the concrete impact of their
judicial enforcement on the lives of their beneficiaries.  This chapter is
concerned with the extent to which this has perceptibly been the case.  It firstly
considers the extent to which constitutional health rights have contributed to the
actualisation of the right to health in South Africa through their ‘directive
principle effect’.  Subsequently, it summarises and integrates the findings of this
dissertation in an attempt to illustrate the limited extent to which the health rights
have functioned as a direct vehicle for the achievement of the right to health.
Thereafter, I indicate areas in which further research is necessary in order to
overcome theoretical lacunae that continue to inhibit the effectiveness of health
rights in this regard.  In conclusion, I reiterate the need for courts to overcome
their unease with enforcing socio-economic rights and to acknowledge that
health rights embody a wide array of individual entitlements that may, in
appropriate circumstances, immediately be enforced.  Failure to do so, I argue,
threatens to deflate the potential of health rights to confront the denial of health-
related needs and stifles the ability of the rights to contribute meaningfully to the
social and economic transformation of South African society.
6.2 THE ‘DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLE EFFECT’ OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH RIGHTS
Regardless of whether they are justiciable, constitutional rights demand due
consideration of the interests they aim to protect or advance in legislative and
policy processes.  It is therefore possible that the constitutional presence of
health-related rights would have an impact on a wide array of legislative and
policy processes relating to the regulation of the South African health system
and to the reform of South African health law.  This possibility is enhanced by
the constitutional directives that the State must respect, protect, promote and
fulfill all rights in the Bill of Rights and must adopt measures aimed at the
progressive realisation of the right to have access to health care services.
It may therefore be expected that the constitutionalisation of justiciable
5These include the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 (giving effect
to women’s right of reproductive freedom and clarifying the right of access to reproductive health
care services); the Pharmacy Amendment Act 88 of 1997 and the Medical, Dental and
Supplementary Health Service Professions Amendment Act 89 of 1997 (prescribing compulsory
community service for medical graduates); the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act 90 of 1997 (including various initiatives to make medicines more accessible and
affordable); s 12 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (reaffirming and awarding content
to detainees’ rights of access to adequate medical care); the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998
(having the effect, inter alia, of increased access to medical insurance); the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (bolstering protection of the right
to equality in the health care setting, amongst others); the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002
(expressing commitment to the provision of appropriate mental health care services) and,
perhaps most significantly, the National Health Act 61of 2003 (containing several provisions
aimed at increasing the availability, accessibility and quality of health care services and explicitly
affirming the State’s obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the various health rights
in the 1996 Constitution).
6These prominently include Department of Health National Drug Policy for South Africa
(1996); Department of Health White Paper for the Transformation of the Health Care System in
South Africa (1997) and Department of Health The Primary Health Care Package for South
Africa - a Set of Norms and Standards (2000), the latter of which contains the Patients Rights
Charter (ibid at 10).
178
health rights would lead to the enactment of legislative and policy measures that
award content to, supplement or give effect to particular health-related rights.
This seems indeed to have occurred.  A myriad of legislative provisions that
contribute to the fulfillment of constitutional health rights were enacted
subsequent to the adoption of the 1996 Constitution.5  Many of these create or
affirm specific health-related entitlements and many explicitly supplement health
rights in the Constitution.  Several executive policies that similarly appear to
resonate with the spirit, purport and objects of constitutional health rights, have
also been issued during this time.6  Whereas one can only speculate as to
whether and to what extent the constitutional presence of health rights indeed
motivated or impacted on any one of these statutes or policies, their multitude
and their ostensible affirmation of relevant constitutional health rights seem to
indicate that the ‘directive principle effect’ of these rights has not been
negligible.
At least, the constitutional presence of health rights and the associated
obligations on the State have served significantly to enhance the legitimacy of
these legislative and policy measures in the face of challenges to their
constitutionality.  A prominent ‘directive principle effect’ of socio-economic rights
is that, where State measures aimed at fulfilling such rights infringe upon or limit
7See Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘The right to health in international law: Its implications
for the obligations of state and non-state actors in ensuring access to essential medicine’ (2003)
19 SAJHR 541 at 562-563; CH Heyns ‘Extended medical training and the Constitution:
Balancing civil and political rights and socio-economic rights’ (1997) 30 De Jure 1 at 14-16;
Marius Pieterse ‘Beyond the welfare state: Globalization of neo-liberal culture and the
constitutional protection of social and economic rights in South Africa’ (2003) 14 Stellenbosch
LR 3 at 13; 26.
8See Stephen Ellmann ‘A constitutional confluence: American “State-action” law and the
application of South Africa’s socio-economic rights guarantees to private actors’ in Penelope
Andrews & Stephen Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South
Africa’s Basic Law (2001) 444 at 467; Heyns op cit note 7 at 15-16.
9See Paul Gertler & Jacques Van der Gaag The Willingness to Pay for Medical Care:
Evidence from Two Developing Countries (1990) at 15-16; 21-22.  Also remarked in relation to
the extent of state intervention in the affairs of medical schemes in terms of the Medical
Schemes Act by MA Christianson ‘Health care’ in EML Strydom (ed) Social Security Law (2001)
122 at 147-148; Mark Heywood ‘Debunking “Conglomo-talk”: A case study of the amicus curiae
as an instrument for advocacy, investigation and mobilisation’ (2001) 5 Law, Democracy &
Development 133 at 138.
10The best known example of this ‘legitimating effect’ of socio-economic rights in South
African case-law is Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 2001
(3) SA 1151 (CC), where the Constitutional Court regarded the State’s duties to make housing
progressively accessible in terms of s 26(2) as a prominent factor justifying the limitation of
environmental and commercial interests of private property owners through the construction of
emergency housing for flood victims on adjacent land.  See paras 29; 37-39; 51; 68; 103; 107
and 114 of the judgment as well as the discussion of these dicta by Frank I Michelman ‘The
Constitution, social rights and liberal political justification’ (2003) 1 International J of
Constitutional Law 13 at 17-18.
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other private rights or interests, the State is afforded an opportunity to justify
such limitations and/or infringements by arguing that it is constitutionally obliged
to increase access to relevant socio-economic amenities and to ensure that
private interests do not unreasonably impair the enjoyment of socio-economic
rights.7  Of course, not every such limitation of private rights will pass
constitutional muster.  Also, the constitutional purpose of legal measures is but
one factor to be taken into account when deciding whether a limitation on a
constitutional right is permissible in terms of s 36 of the Constitution.8  Be this
as it may, the constitutional presence of socio-economic rights likely allows the
State more leeway in limiting private commercial or other interests in pursuit of
social justice than would otherwise have been the case.9  By clothing the
purpose of the limitation of private rights or interests in constitutional legitimacy,
socio-economic rights play an important role in countering the extent to which
civil and political rights may be used to thwart State attempts at social
transformation.10
As far as health rights are concerned, two examples from recent case-law
11See also Thomas J Bollyky ‘Balancing private rights and public obligations:
Constitutionally mandated compulsory licensing of HIV/AIDS related treatments in South Africa’
(2002) 18 SAJHR 530 at 531-532; 539; 556-557.
12Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association v President of the Republic of South Africa
TPD 4183/98.
13See for instance Pierre De Vos ‘So much to do, so little done: The right of access to
anti-retroviral drugs post-Grootboom’ (2003) 7 Law, Democracy & Development 83 at 101-102;
Sarah Joseph ‘Pharmaceutical corporations and access to drugs: The “fourth wave” of corporate
human rights scrutiny’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 425 at 442-443.
14See for instance APS Van der Merwe ‘Amendment of the South African Medicine and
Related Substances Control Act in relation to the exhaustion of rights in patent law’ (2000) 33
De Jure 68-75.
15There were significant international law dimensions to this argument, since strong
intellectual property rights over pharmaceutical products are awarded by the WTO’s TRIPS
agreement.  The provisions of this agreement and its detrimental impact on the right of access
to affordable medicine falls beyond the scope of this dissertation.  In any event, most
commentators agree that the challenged provisions in the PMA case were TRIPS compliant.
See authorities cited in note 16 below.
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illustrate that, while not indiscriminately trumping private entitlements or curing
all deficiencies in health-related legislation or policy, the obligations implied by
ss 7(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution have had the effect of bolstering State
attempts at facilitating increased access to health care services.11
The first is the litigation between the South African government and the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA)12 concerning several
provisions of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90
of 1997, the aims of which include facilitating more affordable medicines.  In
particular, ss 10 and 14 of the Amendment Act (inserting ss 15C and 22F-G
respectively into the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 1 of 1965)
allowed inter alia for the limited exhaustion of patents and the parallel
importation of patented medicines, the generic substitution of certain patented
medicines, a more transparent pricing system for pharmaceutical products and
the restriction of profit margins on pharmaceutical products sold in the country.
While lauded for its potential to increase access to essential medicines,13 the
provisions of the Amendment Act were also severely criticised for limiting the
commercial interests and intellectual property rights of the national and
international pharmaceutical industry.14  The PMA instituted litigation, claiming
that the relevant provisions violated the rights of its members to intellectual
property under s 25 of the Constitution,15 to freedom of trade, occupation and
profession and to freedom of expression (in that it compelled pharmacists to
16On the arguments advanced in and the outcome of the PMA case, see De Vos op cit
note 13 at 102; James Thuo Gathii ‘Construing intellectual property rights and competition policy
consistently with facilitating access to affordable AIDS drugs to low-end consumers’ (2001) 53
Florida LR 727 at 767-768; Shubha Ghosh ‘Pills, patents and power: State creation of gray
markets as a limit on patent rights’ (2001) 53 Florida LR 789 at 814-816; Heywood op cit note
9 at 135-158; Joseph op cit note 13 at 443; Harrison Mwakyembe & George Mpundu Kanja
‘Implications of the TRIPS agreement on the access to cheaper pharmaceutical drugs by
developing countries: Case study of South Africa v The Pharmaceutical Companies’ (2002) 34
Zambia LJ 111-147; Yousuf A Vawda ‘Tripped-up on TRIPS: The story of shrinking access to
drugs in developing countries’ (2002) 13 Stellenbosch LR 352 at 360.
17Shown by Heywood op cit note 9 at 157.
18Regulations relating to a Transparent Pricing System for Medicines and Scheduled
Substances GN R553 (30 April 2004).
19New Clicks South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; Pharmaceutical Society of South
Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang 2005 (2) SA 530 (C) at 545F-546C; 570G-571A (per Yekiso J for
the majority).  See also the minority judgement at ibid 582F-583B.
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inform customers of cheaper generic alternatives to prescribed medicines).  In
reply, the government contended that it was obliged by ss 27(2), 28(1)(c) and
the rights to life and dignity to facilitate increased access to essential medicines,
and hence to enact the legislation.  Crumbling under pressure from worldwide
public activism and the strength of these arguments, the PMA unconditionally
withdrew its claims, and the matter was accordingly halted.16  The cost of AIDS
medications in South Africa significantly diminished in the aftermath of the
litigation,17 illustrating that tangible benefits can indirectly result from the
‘directive principle effect’ of health rights.
The second example of s 27(2)’s ‘legitimating’ function relates to the
controversial price control regulations recently promulgated pursuant to s 22G
of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, in terms of which limits
are set on the profit margins of retail pharmacists in relation to prescribed
medicines.18  In dismissing a variety of (predominantly administrative law)
challenges to the validity of the regulations brought by retail pharmacy chains
and the South African Pharmaceutical Society, the Cape High Court affirmed the
legitimacy of the purpose of the regulations, which it saw as obviously being
aimed at complying with the State’s obligations to increase access to medicines
through assuring their affordability in terms of s 27(2).19  The regulations were
subsequently invalidated by the SCA for not having adhered to the legality
principle and for not having prescribed an ‘appropriate’ fee for pharmaceutical
products.  The SCA nevertheless acknowledged the legitimacy of the
20Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks South
Africa v Minister of Health 2005 (3) SA 238 (SCA) at para 77.  The SCA’s finding that the fees
were inappropriate was at least in part informed by a belief that the rigidity of the regulations
would lead to the closure of pharmacies which would in turn have a detrimental impact on the
accessibility of medicines.  The Court nevertheless indicated that a more flexible prescribed fee
structure (conducive to accessibility as well as affordability of medicines) would survive judicial
scrutiny.  Ibid paras 79-80.
21Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa CCT 59/04, judgment of 30 September
2005 (unreported).  See paras 1; 16 (per the entire Court); 32 (per Chaskalson CJ); 437; 514-517
(per Ngcobo J); 650-651 (per Sachs J); 704-706 (per Moseneke J).
22See also Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 (6) BCLR 529 (CC),
where the legitimacy of measures that restrict the dispensing of medicines by health care
professionals, which were aimed at increasing access to safe medicines, was not questioned.
See paras 21; 100.
23See s 24A of the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 (introduced by s 22 of the Medical,
Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Amendment Act 89 of 1997); s 14A of
the Pharmacy Act 53 of 1974 (introduced by s 13 of the Pharmacy Amendment Act 88 of 1997),
which prescribes compulsory, remunerated community service terms for medical and
pharmaceutical graduates respectively.
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regulations’ purpose in line with s 27(2), stating that the public’s constitutional
entitlement to access affordable medicines was a crucial interest to be weighed
against the commercial viability-interests of pharmacies, in deciding whether the
prescribed fees were appropriate.20  In partially upholding an appeal by the
Minister of Health against the SCA judgment, the Constitutional Court stated
that, due to the constitutional obligation on the State to progressively facilitate
access to health care services, the legitimacy and necessity of the regulations
were beyond question.  While the Court found that certain of the regulations
were defective and had to be modified, it emphasised that to restrict the profit
margins of pharmacies, as envisaged by the regulations, was in principle
constitutionally permissible.21
Apart from the above examples,22 s 27(2) may be expected to play a
similar legitimating role in relation to a range of measures seeking to limit
commercial and liberty-interests of health care professionals and other entities
that are implicated in the actualisation of health rights.  For instance, the view
has been expressed that s 27(2) significantly strengthens arguments purporting
to justify limits occasioned by statutorily imposed terms of compulsory,
remunerated community service23 on health science graduates’ rights of freedom
from forced labour, freedom of movement and residence and freedom of trade,
24See Heyns op cit note 7 at 5-17. These limits are not always extensive, and are
counterbalanced by, for example, the limited time period of the service, the remuneration of
participating health care professionals, and a measure of choice as to where the community
service is performed.  In Europe, challenges to community service for legal graduates have been
dismissed since the interests limited by the service were found to have been counterbalanced
by the right of the indigent to have access to justice. See Van der Mussele v Belgium [1983]
ECHR 13 and other cases discussed by Heyns (ibid).  Provided that conditions of community
service are not overly onerous, a similar finding would seem likely in the context of access to
health care services in South Africa.
25In Re Wilson and Medical Services Commission of British Columbia 53 DLR (4th) 171
(1989) the British Columbia Court of Appeal found that a virtually identical provincial regulatory
scheme was unconstitutional, for unjustifiably limiting the liberty interests of health care
practitioners.  The Court emphasised that the finding of unconstitutionality resulted mainly
because the State offered no justification for the scheme, because less restrictive means were
available to achieve its purpose and because the government could not show that the
geographical distribution of health services was so problematic as to require interference with
liberty interests.  See specifically 174-181; 186-187; 195; 197-198.
26Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees?
Social rights in a new South African constitution’ (1992) 141 Univ Pennsylvania LR 1 at 32 argue
that Wilson would have been decided differently had the government been able to rely on a
constitutional duty in justification of the scheme.
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occupation and profession.24
A more controversial current example concerns s 36 of the National
Health Act 61 of 2003, which determines that health establishments may not
operate without having been issued a certificate of need by the Director General
of Health, who must take into account a variety of factors, most of which relate
to the transformation of the health care sector, the need to increase the
geographical accessibility of health care services and the need to address other
lingering inequities in access to care, before issuing or renewing such a
certificate.  This is bound to spark a constitutional challenge, since the provision
appears to entail a significant limitation of health care professionals’ rights to
freedom of movement and residence and freedom of occupation, trade and
profession.  The success of a similar constitutional challenge before a Canadian
court25 indicates that the State will have some difficulty in convincing a court that
there are no less restrictive means to achieve its purpose of reducing
urban/rural discrepancies in the physical accessibility of health care services.
However, the fact that, unlike in Canada, the South African government is under
a constitutional obligation to address such discrepancies in progressively
facilitating the increased accessibility of health care services, may be expected
significantly to strengthen the State’s defense of the measures.26
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Overall, it would seem that the health rights in the 1996 Constitution have
had a discernible ‘directive principle effect’.  To the (however slight) extent that
health rights have served to inspire or direct the content of measures that confer
health-related benefits on citizens, they may be said to have indirectly
contributed to the attainment of the right to health.  More concretely, whether or
not they actually inspired or directed the content of the legislative or policy
measures in question, health rights have usefully bolstered the social
transformation process through clothing the purpose of such measures in
constitutional legitimacy, thereby providing a degree of insulation against
constitutional attack that the measures would otherwise have lacked.
Through the mere fact of their constitutional presence therefore, health
rights may result in some indirect benefit for their subjects.  However, if the
constitutional drafters intended for the impact of health rights to be limited to this
‘directive principle effect’, there would have been no need for them to make the
rights justiciable.  Evaluating constitutional health rights’ contribution to the
social and economic transformation of South African society, while viewing them
as fully justiciable rights, must involve more than an assessment of their
discursive impact in the political arena.  In addition to incidental benefits
resulting from their ‘directive principle effect’, rights should in appropriate
circumstances enable their beneficiaries to attain the tangible benefits that are
necessary for them to effectively enjoy the rights.
6.3 CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH RIGHTS AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
RIGHT TO HEALTH: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THIS DISSERTATION
Making socio-economic rights justiciable significantly increases their potential
to confront denial of the needs they embody.  Rather than functioning simply as
rhetorical devices that draw attention to particular needs, justiciable rights are
capable of being used as tools to attain the satisfaction of such needs.  Because
justiciable socio-economic rights embody enforceable claims to the goods or
services that are necessary to satisfy the needs they represent, their use in
27See for instance KD Ewing ‘Social rights and constitutional law’ (1999) Public Law 104
at 122-123; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Social and economic rights: A critical challenge’ in Sandra
Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective (1995) 79 at 84.
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litigation has the effect of disrupting, or at least challenging, existing societal
power structures that determine the distribution of such services and goods.27
As such, their judicial vindication can contribute to the dismantling and
reconstitution of such power structures and accordingly to the social and
economic transformation of society.
The enforcement of socio-economic rights further tangibly advances a
central goal of social transformation - the improvement of the quality of life of the
population.  This dissertation focused on this latter aspect of constitutional
health rights’ contribution to the overarching constitutional transformation
project.  I argued that, because of their status as justiciable rights, successful
reliance on health rights should, in appropriate circumstances, produce tangible
benefits for individual litigants.  This means, I contended, that Courts should in
principle regard health rights as enforceable and should award tangible relief
that effectively compensates for infringements of health rights unless such
infringements can somehow be constitutionally justified or unless it would be
demonstrably inappropriate to award tangible relief in the circumstances of the
case.
The dissertation accordingly set out to identify the rights that are relevant
to the achievement of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health, to locate these rights within the protection awarded by the South African
Bill of Rights and to ascertain the extent to which the benefits implied by them
are capable of resulting from South African constitutional litigation.
Chapter 2 showed that the international law right to health consists of an
interrelated package of rights, each constituent element of which imposes a
myriad of obligations on states and implies a variety of interrelated claims to
have access to (and/or undisrupted enjoyment of) health-conducive goods or
services.  I identified several health-related freedoms, entitlements to a variety
of determinants of health, entitlements to various health care services as well
as an underlying guarantee of equality as comprising the main constituent
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elements of this package.  I further showed that, while not all benefits implied by
the right to health may immediately be demanded, rights-bearers are at least
entitled to protection of their current enjoyment of health-related rights and to
adequate remedies against private infringements thereof.  Entitlements to
goods, services and facilities aimed at the satisfaction of basic and urgent
health-related needs further appeared to be more readily claimable than
entitlements to more sophisticated, more expensive and less urgent forms of
care.
Moving the focus to the South African context, chapter 3 proceeded to
show that the basic features of the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution are
conducive to a benefit-orientated approach to socio-economic rights.  The
structure of the Bill of Rights allows for a broad, permissive and need-focused
interpretation of socio-economic rights and requires justification for non-
compliance with the obligations they impose.  Where such justification is
inadequate, the Constitution awards courts significant flexibility to devise
remedies that appropriately compensate for infringements of the rights.  The Bill
of Rights therefore not only requires of courts to effectively enforce health rights,
but also awards them the scope to negotiate any institutional tensions that may
otherwise have been occasioned by this task.
Thereafter, the chapter showed that all elements of the international law
health rights package enjoy adequate constitutional protection in South Africa.
I identified and described the interests underlying several constitutional
provisions that guarantee different aspects of the right to health and proposed
a generous and purposive interpretation of these provisions which enables them
to cater effectively for the satisfaction of the needs they represent.
Chapter 4 then evaluated the handful of South African judgments in which
health rights have come into play.  I argued that the Constitutional Court’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence thus far has been overly restrictive of the benefit-
rendering potential of health rights.  By denying that socio-economic rights
embody immediately enforceable, individual claims and by opting instead for an
inquiry that focuses on the coherence, rationality and inclusivity of government
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policy aimed at giving effect to socio-economic rights, the Court has drained
health rights of discernible content and has removed the focus of its inquiry from
the needs that the rights aim to satisfy.  Moreover, the remedy most logically
implied by its approach (namely that legislation or policy be modified in order to
conform with predominantly procedural standards) is at most of indirect and
marginal relevance to health rights’ beneficiaries, whose interests in tangibly
improving their living conditions remain sidelined.
I proceeded to explore possible reasons for the overly restrictive aspects
of the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence.  I concluded
that, whereas constraints imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers, the
inherent polycentricity of socio-economic rights matters and the need for judges
to respect the specialist knowledge of health care professionals must
necessarily impact on the manner in which courts conduct themselves in health
rights matters, they do not restrain courts from, in appropriate circumstances,
recognising and enforcing individual health-related entitlements.  Accordingly,
they do not justify the Constitutional Court’s overly restrictive stance towards
socio-economic rights.  Instead, I speculated, this stance is likely attributable to
a lingering unease on the part of the Court with enforcing ‘positive rights’, which
the Court seems to have appeased by resorting to an essentially formalist model
of adjudication.
Despite this, certain aspects of the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic
rights jurisprudence, especially when considered in light of the more benefit-
conducive approach adopted in some High Court judgments, indicate that the
obstacles hindering a need-focused and benefit-conducive approach to socio-
economic rights are not insurmountable.  In addition, chapter 5 showed that
there are viable alternative and/or supplementary approaches to socio-economic
rights adjudication which could enhance the benefit-rendering potential of health
rights without requiring a radical departure from the manner in which courts
currently conduct themselves in socio-economic rights matters.
Overall, in addition to indicating the content and benefit-related
implications of the various provisions in the Bill of Rights that award health-
28On the various associated interpretative and logistical problems in the international law
context, see generally Audrey R Chapman ‘A “violations approach” for monitoring the
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related entitlements, this dissertation has shown that these provisions are
capable of being enforced in a manner that delivers the benefits that they
promise.  Accordingly, the rights in question are capable of being used to satisfy
the needs they represent, and hence to function as tools of transformation.
Much of their potential to make a concrete difference in the lives of their
beneficiaries currently goes unrealised.  Even so, there appear to be ways in
which this potential can be resurrected or enhanced without sacrificing the
institutional integrity of the judiciary.
6.4 TOWARDS A BENEFIT-ORIENTATED APPROACH TO HEALTH RIGHTS:
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The benefit-focused vantage point adopted in this dissertation has allowed me
to demonstrate the remedial possibilities inherent in the health rights contained
in the 1996 Constitution and to show, through uniting the various criticisms of
South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, the shortcomings of the
Constitutional Court’s current approach to their vindication.  It also usefully
highlights certain lacunae in socio-economic rights theory and scholarship and
indicates aspects of the enforcement of socio-economic rights that require
elaboration through further research.
First, this dissertation has shown that health rights generate certain
immediately claimable benefits and has identified a fair number of these.
Further enforceable obligations likely lurk in the non-immediate dimensions of
these rights, with which this dissertation has engaged only cursorily.  For
instance, whereas I have argued that adopting a minimum core approach to s
27(1)(a) read with s 27(2) of the Constitution would provide a discernible starting
point for an inquiry into compliance with the progressive realisation standard,
further research is clearly necessary on measuring compliance with the standard
beyond this baseline.28  Notwithstanding the significant gains that have been
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights
Quarterly 23-66.  For a discussion of similar problems in relation to the standard as contained
in s 27(2) of the South African Constitution, see Sandra Liebenberg ‘Violations of socio-
eocnomic rights: The role of the South African Human Rights Commission’ in Andrews &
Ellmann op cit note 8,405 at 422-423; Craig Scott & Philip Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional
priorities in a transnational context: A comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s
promise’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 at 254 and generally Conrad Barbeton ‘“Progressive realisation”
of socio-economic rights: Shifting the focus to outcomes’ (1999) 2(2) ESR Review (accessed
online at <http://www.communitylaw centre.org.za/ser/esr1999/1999nov_progressive.php>).
29See chapter 3 notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
30On the development and implementation of benchmarks, time-frames and indicators,
see Maria Green ‘What we talk about when we talk about indicators: Current approaches to
human rights measurement’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 1062 at 1080-1081; 1085-1087;
1091.
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made in international law towards countering problems occasioned by the
vagueness and context-specific nature of the progressive realisation standard,29
there is a dearth of domestic scholarship on the development of appropriate
benchmarks, time-frames and indicators with which to measure State
compliance with the standard.30  Given that the extent of (secondary and tertiary)
benefits that are immediately claimable under s 27(1)(a) is dependent on the
progress that has been made towards full realisation of the right, it is important
that South African socio-economic rights scholarship show increased
engagement with the obligations implied by its progressive elements.
It is further apparent from many of the arguments advanced in this
dissertation that there is a need for further clarification of the limits of health
rights in various settings.  I have shown that it is important to deliberate these
limits, both in terms of s 27(2) of the Constitution and under the general
limitations clause, because it allows courts to indicate the extent to which
benefits implied by a health right may be demanded at a particular point in time
and to balance the interests of individual claimants in this regard against
competing societal interests.  It appears that at least part of the Constitutional
Court’s hostility towards the notion of enforceable entitlements flowing from s
27(1)(a) of the Constitution is grounded in the fear that this would lead to
untenable demands for the benefits implied by the right, regardless of the factual
or legal context within which such demands are made and of the availability of
human and financial resources to meet the demands.  The extent of the Court’s
discomfort in this regard appears to be fuelled by uncertainty over whether and
31Also argued by Kevin Iles ‘Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal
limitations clauses’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 448 at 464; Marius Pieterse ‘Towards a useful role for
section 36 of the Constitution in social rights cases? Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v
Southern Metropolitan Local Council’ (2003) 120 SALJ 41 at 47. See for instance the remarks
of Mokgoro J on behalf of the majority of the Court in Khosa v Minister of Social Development;
Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para 83.
32On the latter issue, see chapter 3 note 85 and accompanying text.
33Iles op cit note 31 at 465.
34See Liebenberg op cit note 4 at 188; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The value of human dignity
in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 1 at 26-27; Pieterse op cit note 31 at 47.
On the importance of insisting on justification for rights-violations generally and infringements
of social rights specifically, see Etienne Mureinik ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries: Economic rights
in the Constitution’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 464 at 471-473; also generally Etienne Mureinik ‘A bridge
to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 at 31-32; 48.
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to what extent the general limitations clause in s 36 of the Constitution may be
invoked to limit socio-economic rights claims and, in relation to claims in terms
of s 27(1)(a), over how such invocation would dovetail with an internal limitations
inquiry in terms of s 27(2).31
The application of s 36 to socio-economic rights matters may indeed yield
several complications (caused by, for instance, s 36's insistence on a ‘law of
general application’ and its apparent duplication of the ‘reasonableness’
standard also found in s 27(2)32).  However, the Court’s current alternative
approach, which instead restricts the ambit of the rights in question, is inimical
not only to the benefit-rendering potential of these rights but also to the spirit,
purport and object of the Bill of Rights as a whole.  Further research on the
potential role to be played by s 36 in health rights matters is therefore essential:
‘For the state to have a proper understanding of its constitutional obligations
under the socio-economic rights clauses, for litigants to be able to determine
what they are entitled to under the socio-economic rights clauses, and for
courts to ensure that socio-economic rights remain meaningful and actionable
rights in South Africa, our courts need to be properly aware of s 36's special
and limited role in constitutional jurisprudence, and the special relationship
between that section and the socio-economic rights clauses’.33
Research on the application of s 36 to socio-economic rights matters would
further yield increased clarity on the standards of scrutiny to which State
justifications for non-compliance with socio-economic obligations should be
subjected.  This would in turn have the effect of enhancing the contribution of
socio-economic rights to achieving the ‘culture of justification’ envisaged by the
1996 Constitution for all exercises of State power.34
35Shadrack Gutto ‘Modern “globalisation” and the challenges to social, economic, and
cultural rights for human rights practitioners and activists in Africa’ (Oct-Dec 2000) Africa Legal
Aid 2.  See also Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘Non-state actors’ responsibility for socio-economic
rights: The nature of their obligations under the South African Constitution’ (2002) 3(3) ESR
Review 2 at 6; Chirwa op cit note 7 at 559; 561-562; Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa ‘Socio-
economic rights and the privatisation of basic services in South Africa’ (2003) 4(4) ESR Review
4 at 6-7; Iain Currie & Johan De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Volume
1 - Constitutional Law (2001) at 93-94; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The interpretation of socio-economic
rights’ in Stuart Woolman (ed) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2ed; 2003) ch 33 at 58-59;
Pieterse op cit note 7 at 25-26; Adam McBeth ‘Privatising human rights: What happens to the
State’s human rights duties when services are privatised?’ (2004) 5 Melbourne J of International
Law 133-154.
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Apart from health rights’ constitutional limits, their effective vindication is
hindered significantly by the relative dearth of research relating to their
horizontal dimensions.  The combination of liberal rights discourse’s aversion
to the horizontal application of fundamental rights and its specific hostility
towards socio-economic rights has meant that private violations of socio-
economic rights often remain undetected and unremedied.  In order for health
rights effectively to render the benefits they promise, it is essential that they be
capable of enforcement against those who are most directly implicated in their
realisation.  As the extent of the private sector’s involvement in essential service
delivery increases, so does the need for research on the horizontal dimensions
of socio-economic rights:
‘Failure to develop and implement practical strategies for holding non-state
persons legally responsible for protecting and promoting social, economic and
cultural rights would imply that human rights activists are content to allow those
who own and control the bulk of the material resources and means of social
and economic production to continue operating outside the mainstream of
human rights while states that are increasingly losing ownership and control of
such resources and means are being pressured to “deliver”.  It goes without
saying that under such conditions the “delivery” would be greatly circumscribed
and limited’.35
I have shown that there are a variety of private relationships which are integral
to the effective enjoyment of health rights and that there exist several common-
law rules that may be developed to give proper effect to health rights within
these relationships.  Further research remains necessary on the kinds of private
entities that may be held directly responsible for infringing health rights, the
circumstances in which and degree to which they may be held responsible for
such infringements and the extent to which they may be co-opted in the
36See Marius Pieterse ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic
rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 at 414-415 and authorities cited there; also chapter 4 note 137 and
accompanying text.
37On the need for such research, see also Liebenberg op cit note 34 at 29; Mia Swart
‘Left out in the cold? Crafting constitutional remedies for the poorest of the poor’ (2005) 21
SAJHR 215 at 239.
38See Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) at para 19; Thomas
J Bollyky ‘R if C > B + P: A paradigm for judicial remedies of socio-economic rights violations’
(2002) 18 SAJHR 161 at 177; Currie & De Waal op cit note 35 at 115-116; Jonathan Klaaren ‘A
remedial interpretation of the Treatment Action Campaign decision’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 455 at
458; Sandra Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic rights’ in Matthew Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional
Law of South Africa (RS5, 1999) ch 41 at 52; Kameshni Pillay ‘Implementation of Grootboom:
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progressive realisation of health rights.
Both in relation to private infringements and more ‘traditional’ State
violations of health rights, there is a need for increased scholarly engagement
with courts’ remedial function.  This dissertation has shown that the remedial
flexibility that courts enjoy in terms of s 38 of the Constitution allows them to
devise remedies that would appropriately vindicate the interests of litigants while
simultaneously remaining mindful of other compelling societal interests and of
the judiciary’s institutional limitations.  However, it appears that the
Constitutional Court has thus far made limited use of the latitude it is afforded
by this flexibility in socio-economic rights matters.36  This is at least in part
because its approach to the interpretation of socio-economic rights precludes
it from exercising remedial options other than broad declaratory orders that
instruct the State to conform to the dictates of Grootboom reasonableness.
The content of the remedy awarded in the wake of an infringement of a
health-related right and the manner in which compliance with such remedy is
secured directly determines the extent to which a successful litigant derives
tangible benefit from a ‘victory’ in a health rights matter.  It is therefore essential
that further research be conducted into what would constitute appropriate relief
for infringements of health rights.37  Such research should explore the
possibilities of productive inter-institutional interaction, the interests of both
applicants and respondents in health rights matters, the dictates of the doctrine
of separation of powers and manners in which existing remedies (such as
interdicts and awards of damages) may be utilised or developed in order to
adequately prevent or compensate for infringements of health rights.38  Given
Implications for the enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy &
Development 255 at 259; Craig Scott ‘Social rights: Towards a principled, pragmatic judicial role’
(1999) 1(4) ESR Review 4 at 5; Scott & Alston op cit note 28 at 224; Wim Trengove ‘Judicial
remedies for violations of socio-economic rights’ (1999) 1(4) ESR Review 8 at 9-10.
39See Mark Heywood ‘Contempt or compliance? The TAC case after the Constitutional
Court judgment’ (2003) 4(1) ESR Review 7-10.
40For discussion of the need to ensure that orders are given effect to and for associated
criticism of the Grootboom and TAC2 orders, see David Bilchitz ‘Towards a reasonable approach
to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’
(2003) 19 SAJHR 1 at 24-26; Liebenberg op cit note 34 at 30; Pieterse op cit note 36 at 414-416;
Pillay op cit note 38 at 276; Theunis Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom - A Response to Cass R
Sunstein’ (2002) 12(2) Constitutional Forum 41 at 51.  In Kate v MEC for the Department of
Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 (1) SA 141 (SECLD) at para 25, Froneman J remarked: ‘It is one
thing to realise the possibility as a matter of fact that the Government might refuse to comply
with court orders.  It is something completely different to hold as a matter of law that courts are
powerless to devise ways to ensure compliance with court orders in a constitutional State such
as ours.  In the former case the Government would, in refusing to comply with court orders,
place itself outside the ambit of constitutional government and a constitutional crisis would be
created.  For the courts to do the latter would be to aid and abet unconstitutional government,
the very antithesis of the courts’ duty in terms of the Constitution’.
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further that the Grootboom order did not result in any tangible improvement of
the successful litigants’ living conditions and that the Treatment Action
Campaign had to resort to contempt of court proceedings in order to secure
compliance with the TAC2 order,39 research should further explore ways in
which courts may take more effective control over compliance with their orders,
both in the remedial stage of proceedings and thereafter.40
Whereas it is necessary that court orders are structured in a manner that
facilitates legislative and executive compliance, there should simultaneously be
guarded against unnecessarily disrupting the already fragile relationship
between the courts and the other branches of government.  Whereas this
dissertation has deliberately under-emphasised institutional dimensions of
giving effect to health rights through the judiciary (in its belief that these
dimensions have tended, in most literature on the subject, to overshadow the
issues of need and entitlement that belong at the centre of a study of health
rights), I acknowledge that institutional tensions are bound to arise when courts
are empowered to dictate, in however limited a fashion, the terms of socio-
economic transformation.  Legislative and executive commitment to securing
enjoyment of health rights and to co-operating with the judiciary in this regard
is essential if the rights are to end up as more than paper guarantees.
41See Bilchitz op cit note 40 at 25; Christof Heyns ‘Taking socio-economic rights
seriously: The “domestic reporting procedure” and the role of the South African Human Rights
Commission in terms of the new Constitution’ (1999) 32 De Jure 195 at 209-210; Jonathan
Klaaren ‘Structures of government in the 1996 Constitution: Putting democracy back into human
rights’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 3 at 26; Liebenberg op cit note 38 at 8; 10; Geraldine Van Bueren
‘Alleviating poverty through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 52 at 64.
42See Liebenberg op cit note 4 at 189; Pieterse op cit note 36 at 417.
43Bongani Majola ‘A response to Craig Scott: A South African perspective’ (1999) 1(4)
ESR Rev 6 at 7.
44On the need for such research, see further Dwight G Newman ‘Institutional monitoring
of social and economic rights: A South African case study and a new research agenda’ (2003)
19 SAJHR 189 at 190; 194.
194
Accordingly, it is necessary for a judicial approach to health rights to enable co-
operation and ongoing dialogue between all three branches of state.41
Achieving the appropriate balance between judicial deference and vigilance in
structuring and orchestrating this dialogue is bound to prove challenging (though
by no means impossible, or even always difficult) and it is hoped that future
research on the institutional dimensions of socio-economic rights enforcement
will increasingly focus on the achievement of this balance.42
Finally, it needs to be remembered that ‘[f]ocusing only on judicial
enforcement will not win the battle for the poor’.43  Most beneficiaries of health
rights will never see the inside of a courtroom and, while the judgments handed
down there may vicariously decide their fate, it is whether these judgments
actually translate into tangible, ground-level realities that is of interest to them.
It is accordingly crucial that the theoretical research conducted here be
supplemented by research focusing on the practical implementation of
constitutional guarantees and judicial pronouncements, as well as on the role
of non-judicial institutions (ranging from constitutionally sanctioned bodies such
as the SAHRC, through statutory bodies such as health care professionals’
councils to ‘private’ NGO’s and other interest groups) in facilitating, monitoring
and ensuring such implementation.44
6.5 CONCLUSION
Through ostensibly reconciling notions of right and need, socio-economic rights
have the potential to contribute tangibly to the achievement of social justice.
45See chapter 1 notes 23-24; 39 and accompanying text, and also remarks of Dennis
Davis ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the Constitutional Court after ten
years’ (2004) 5(5) ESR Review 3 at 5; Sandra Liebenberg ‘The right to social assistance: The
implications of Grootboom for policy reform in South Africa’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 232 at 233.
46See Davis (ibid) at 7.
47These and other strengths of the judiciary in this regard are discussed by, for instance,
NW Barber ‘Prelude to the separation of powers’ (2001) 60 Cambridge LJ 59 at 79; John
Ferejohn ‘Judicializing politics, politicizing law’ (2002) 65 Law & Contemporary Problems 41 at
55; 63; Mario Gomez ‘Social economic rights and human rights commissions’ (1995) 17 Human
Rights Quarterly 155 at 156; Liebenberg op cit note 38 at 11; Pieterse op cit note 36 at 395; Ruti
Teitel ‘Transitional jurisprudence: The role of law in political transformation’ (1997) 106 Yale LJ
2009 at 2033.
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However, the success of socio-economic rights in this respect ultimately
depends on their potential to improve the quality of life of those whose
deprivation and vulnerability they seek to address.  Indeed, the legitimacy of the
Bill of Rights as a whole depends on whether socio-economic rights are capable
of rising to this challenge.45  This dissertation has shown that the health rights
in the 1996 Constitution, despite their inherent capacity to make a tangible
difference in the lives of their beneficiaries, have only partially succeeded in
delivering what they promise.  This has been attributed neither to an inherent
flaw in their formulation nor to the existence of insurmountable institutional
hurdles to their enforcement, but instead to the hesitance of South African courts
to give effect to the rights-based nature of health-related claims.
Discussions of the institutional difficulties associated with giving effect to
socio-economic rights often overlook that many features of the judicial process
equip courts rather well for this task.  While remaining inaccessible to a
disconcerting number of people, courts provide an official platform for claimants
to articulate their needs and to negotiate the satisfaction thereof with the State,
or other powerful entities, on a relatively equal footing.46  Judges are well-
equipped to balance the competing interests arising from such negotiation and
to arrive at fair and well-reasoned solutions that give effect to this balance of
interests.  They are under a constitutional mandate to take rights seriously and
are experts at interpreting and enforcing rights.  Particularly, courts are able to
provide direct, timely and appropriate relief to claimants who can show that their
fundamental rights have been infringed or threatened.47  It would be most
unfortunate if courts were to preclude themselves from assisting in the socio-
48For similar arguments, see Liebenberg op cit note 4 at 188-189; Liebenberg op cit note
34 at 30.
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economic transformation of South African society by failing to display these
strengths in cases where they are called upon to vindicate socio-economic
rights.
It is hoped that courts will become more comfortable with enforcing socio-
economic rights as time progresses and will modify their current approach to
socio-economic rights adjudication in a manner that reduces the overly onerous
burden of proof on applicants and that more readily produces tangible benefits
where applicants are successful.  In particular, the Constitutional Court should
reconsider its stance against affirming the existence of enforceable individual
entitlements underlying socio-economic rights, should explicitly articulate the
basis of its findings in socio-economic rights cases in rights-terms and should
award individual relief for infringements of socio-economic rights in
circumstances where this would not be inappropriate or unjust.48
Whereas valuable steps have been taken towards building a health rights
jurisprudence that resonates with the spirit, purport and objects of the 1996
Constitution, these need to be supplemented by an explicit acknowledgment that
health rights generate legally enforceable entitlements and by interpretative,
evaluative and remedial judicial practices that enable the vindication of such
entitlements in appropriate circumstances.  Until this happens, the right to health
and the transformative aspirations of the 1996 Constitution will continue to have
a ‘hollow ring’ for those to whom it matters most.
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ANNEXURE A
TEXT OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
PROVISIONS SURVEYED IN CHAPTER 2
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights:
1.  The States Parties to the Present Covenant recognize the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.
2.  The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant
mortality and for the healthy development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial
hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic,
occupational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service
and medical attention in the event of sickness.
Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee
that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status....
Article 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights:
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The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right
of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights
set forth in the present Covenant.
Article 12 of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women:
1. States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure , on a basis of
equality between men and women, access to health care services, including
those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, States Parties
shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy,
confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary,
as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.
Article 5(e)(iv) of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination:
In accordance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this
Convention, States parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination in all of its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without
distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the
law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . 
e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular:... 
iv) The right to public health, medical care, social security and
social services;....
Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child:
1.  States Parties recognise the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health.  States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is
deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services.
2.  States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular,
shall take appropriate measures:
(a) to diminish infant and child mortality;
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(b) to ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health
care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health
care;
(c) to combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework
of primary health care, through inter alia, the application of readily
available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious
foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers
and risks of environmental pollution;
(d) to ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for
mothers; 
(e) to ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and
children, are informed, have access to education and are supported in
the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages
of breast-feeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the
prevention of accidents;
(f) to develop preventative health care, guidance for parents and family
planning education and services.
3.  States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view
to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.
4.  States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-
operation with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the right
recognised in the present Article.  In this regard, particular account shall be
taken of the needs of developing countries.
Article 11 of the European Social Charter:
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of
health, the Contracting Parties undertake, either directly or in co-operation with
public or private organisations, to take appropriate measures designed inter
alia:
1. To remove as far as possible the causes of ill health;
2. To provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of
health and the encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of
health;
3. To prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases.
Article 13(1) of the European Social Charter:
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social and medical
assistance, the Contracting Parties undertake:
(1) To ensure that any person who is without adequate resources and
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who is unable to secure such resources either by his own efforts or from
other sources, in particular by benefits under a social security scheme,
be granted adequate assistance, and, in the case of sickness, the care
necessitated by his condition.
Article 11 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man:
Every person has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary
and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the
extent permitted by public and community resources. 
Article 10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
1. Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment
of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being.
2. In order to ensure the exercise of the right to health, the States Parties agree
to recognize health as a public good and, particularly, to adopt the following
measures to ensure that right.
a. Primary health care, that is, essential health care made available to
all individuals and families in the community; 
b. Extension of the benefits of health services to all individuals subject
to the State’s jurisdiction;
c. Universal immunization against the principal infectious diseases;
d. Prevention and treatment of endemic, occupational and other
diseases;
e. Education of the population on the prevention and treatment of health
problems, and
f. Satisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups and of
those whose poverty makes them the most vulnerable.
Article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights:
(1) Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of
physical and mental health.
(2) States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to
protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical
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attention when they are sick.
Article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child:
1. Every child shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical,
mental and spiritual health.
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full
implementation of this right and in particular shall take measures:
(a) to reduce infant and child morality rate;
(b) to ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health
care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health
care;
(c) to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water;
(d) to combat disease and malnutrition within the framework of primary
health care through the application of appropriate technology;
(e) to ensure appropriate health care for expectant and nursing mothers;
(f) to develop preventive health care and family life education and
provision of service;
(g) to integrate basic health service programmes in national
development plans;
(h) to ensure that all sectors of the society, in particular, parents,
children, community leaders and community workers are informed and
supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition,
the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation
and the prevention of domestic and other accidents;
(i) to ensure the meaningful participation of non-governmental
organizations, local communities and the beneficiary population in the
planning and management of a basic service programme for children;
(j) to support through technical and financial means, the mobilization of
local community resources in the development of primary health care for
children.
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